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Abstract 
Choreography is commonly understood as a technical term that describes what the 
choreographer does in a literal sense: writing the dancing bodies according to a master’s 
set narrative. However, recent events in contemporary choreography suggest a different 
possibility of articulating choreography as a technique of offering rather than a technique 
of domination over other bodies. Through an analysis of some groundbreaking 
choreographic experiments by Xavier Le Roy, Jérôme Bel, Boris Charmatz, Eszter 
Salamon, Christine De Smedt, Jan Ritsema, and Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker, which have 
gained visibility since the late 1990s in the global art scene beyond the Western 
institution of dance, this thesis aims to theorise this shift in what choreography is and can 
be. 
  In an attempt to theorise choreography as a technique of offering, this thesis 
illuminates the relationship between some of the tactical operations in contemporary 
choreographic experiments and the post-structuralist rethinking of power, institution, 
the body, subjectivity and knowledge production. Turning to Michel Foucault’s rethinking 
of power and Jacques Rancière’s challenge of the position of mastery, it aims to articulate 
the tactical deconstructions of the choreographer-master in contemporary 
choreographic experiments. Borrowing Hannah Arendt’s notion of a ‘space of appearance’ 
and Jean-Luc Nancy’s rethinking of body, it attempts to articulate how choreography as a 
spatiotemporal technique offers spaces of appearances for other bodies.   
 This thesis also highlights a different possibility of articulating choreography by 
positioning it in the critical field called the ‘curatorial’. Reflecting the contemporary 
disciplinary crisis in art, where the given methodologies and tools no longer do the job 
that they used to do, there are increasing demands from cultural producers for different 
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modes of operations in order to open up new critical possibilities of interdisciplinary 
research. In thinking through Le Roy and De Keersmaeker’s ‘choreographed’ exhibitions, 
this thesis aims to rethink choreography in terms of the curatorial. This also means to 
rethink the curatorial in terms of choreography, where both theatre-making and 
exhibition-making can be rearticulated as a matter of body in relation to other bodies.  
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Introduction. 
Choreographed By, Not Curated By 
‘BZZZZZZZZZZ’ is the jolting sound I hear as I enter the empty gallery at the Fundació 
Antoni Tàpies in Barcelona. Inside the gallery, there is nothing but six performers who 
dramatically cease all activity on my entrance into the exhibition space. And the noise 
they make seems to function as a reset button that prompts three performers to exit the 
room swiftly, only to return moments later and encircle me. Dispersing and then 
organising themselves into a preconceived arrangement across the space, the performers 
return to what they were doing before they were interrupted by my appearance. This is 
what happens during the first few moments of my entrance into Retrospective (2012), a 
solo exhibition choreographed by the French choreographer Xavier Le Roy. 
I hear three performers saying out loud the production dates of Le Roy’s 
choreographic works. Then, these performers perform them in chronological order, to 
their own varied rhythms. But the ways in which they re-enact Le Roy’s works here are 
all different. One performer is stuck in an image extracted from one of Le Roy’s solo works, 
as if he is a human sculpture. Another performer, like a video, repeats a loop of 
choreography. While I try to make sense of what is happening, another male performer 
approaches me and begins to tell me an anecdotal history of his relationship to dance and 
the development of his artistic identity, using Le Roy’s works and biographical 
information as chronological anchors in his personal story. By presenting three different 
temporalities that can operate in the exhibition apparatus, Le Roy’s choreographic 
intervention in exhibition-making highlights the conditions that make exhibition 
exhibition.  
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As the title clearly points out, a retrospective is an operational mechanism of the 
exhibition-apparatus often called the white cube.1 It is where the absolutisation of time 
is devised, presupposed, and normalised. Thus it becomes a shrine where passing 
moments of the past can be recollected and represented. However, in Le Roy’s 
choreographic intervention, the mechanism of the ‘retrospective’ does not work towards 
the absolutisation of time. Instead, it operates as a trigger point that generates questions 
in his attempt to come to terms with the exhibition apparatus via a choreographic 
operation. And this inevitably highlights some of the disciplinary discordance between 
dance-making and exhibition-making. 
First of all, Le Roy is not a curator but a choreographer. Of course, this project was 
initiated by a curator, Laurence Rassel, who was the director at Fundació Antoni Tàpies 
and who invited Le Roy to exhibit in the first place. But it is still not ‘curated by’ Le Roy, 
but ‘choreographed by’ Le Roy. Why did Rassel want an exhibition ‘choreographed by’ Le 
Roy in the first place? The story of why Rassel invited Le Roy is worth a closer look. Le 
Roy confesses that he did not understand why he received an invitation from a museum 
curator to an exhibition project. Moreover, Rassel’s invitation was not about re-
presenting Le Roy’s existing choreographic piece in a museum context. As Le Roy points 
out, their collaboration began with Rassel sharing her problem of how to reinvent 
                                         
1 Directly referring to Brian O’Doherty’s Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space, I use the 
term ‘white cube’ as the theoretical framework of the white cube convention for gallery design, which is 
epitomised by Alfred H. Barr Jr’s MoMA construction. Originally published as a series of three articles in 
Artforum in 1976, O’Doherty’s discussion of the white cube space was later published as a book Inside the 
White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1999). As opposed to 
the term ‘white cube’, I will deploy the term ‘black box’ to describe the condition of performing arts, where 
there is a distinctive separation between the stage and the auditorium via the physical or conceptual fourth 
wall. However, as David Wiles discussed, there is an ideological resemblance between the white cube and 
the black box. As O’Doherty’s project was to overturn the claim of the white cube as a neutral space, Wiles 
argues that the concept of the black box was invented to meet aesthetic demands for ‘empty space’, that is 
a privileged space where society is kept at bay. See David Wiles, A Short History of Western Performance 
Space (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 256–257. 
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spectatorship. Le Roy explains that Rassel wanted to reinvent the ways in which visitors 
to the museum relate to works of art. Especially in a museum that is named after a 
historical heavyweight artist, she wanted to find an opening so that the relationship 
between works of art and visitors could be radically rethought. 
What is particular about the curator’s enquiry into how to create a different 
relationship between visitors and works of art lies in the fact that Rassel located her 
question in unfamiliar territory, where existing imperatives inherent to the white-cube 
space could be open to re-examination. In other words, instead of turning to artists whose 
parameters of practice were within museum contexts, Rassel went to Le Roy, who is a 
choreographer and works in a theatre context. This deliberate departure from one’s 
comfort zone was the very ground on which Le Roy’s exhibition project began. However, 
my interest lies in the fact that despite the obvious disciplinary discordance, there is also 
a common space between theatre-making and exhibition-making. They both need or 
work with the bodies of other people. Therefore, Rassel’s ambition to reinvent the ways 
in which visitors experience an exhibition becomes about re-examining the bodily 
aspects of exhibition-making via Le Roy’s choreographic intervention. 
This is not the first time that Le Roy has worked in an exhibition context. He has 
worked in a museum context before. For instance, in 2009 and 2011 at MoMA, Le Roy 
presented Self Unfinished (1998). But it was clear then that he was re-presenting his 
theatre piece in a museum. There was a specific indication of the beginning and the end, 
and there was a specific orientation of attention so that spectators watched performances 
from the front. However, as opposed to this way of reinstalling a black box in a white-
cube context, in Rassel’s deliberate departure from her own comfort zone she implicates 
Le Roy in her problem. In responding to Rassel’s problem, it became a choreographic 
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project through which the time and space of a theatre context was reorganised in an 
exhibition context. At the same time, Le Roy’s choreographic intervention highlights the 
specific spatialisation and temporalisation of the exhibition apparatus that was invented 
to resist the passage of time. In this light, I would like to argue that choreography is 
deployed as a critique of the specific spatialisation and temporalisation of both the white 
cube and the black box, one that predetermines how the body is perceived and can be 
materialised in a specific relationship between spectator-visitors and works of art. 
In recent years, dance-theatre has become a topical issue in exhibition-making. 
Since the early 2000s there have been increasing numbers of exhibitions devoted to the 
intrinsic link between the history of dance-theatre and the visual arts: Dancing Through 
Life at the Centre Pompidou (2012), Move: Choreographing You at the Hayward Gallery 
(2010–2011), and On Line: Drawing Through the Twentieth Century at MoMA (2010–
2011), to name but a few. And, in another strand, there have been many occasions when 
historical dance-theatre has been re-presented in a white-cube context as a performance 
or ‘live art’ programme: Yvonne Rainer’s Dance Works at Raven Row in 2014, Laurie 
Anderson, Trisha Brown, Gordon Matta-Clark: Pioneers of the Downtown Scene, New York 
1970s at the Barbican Art Gallery in 2011, and more. Against this backdrop, I would argue 
that the particularity of Le Roy’s Retrospective is highlighted even more; it is not just 
taking place in a white-cube space, but its taking place in a white cube becomes the very 
condition for its coming into being. 
In this light, Le Roy’s exhibition-making via a choreographic operation shows the 
possibility that choreography need not be subordinated to the institution of theatre and 
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the discipline of dance. 2  As Le Roy’s exhibition-making illustrates, one can deploy 
choreography to reinvent the exhibition apparatus. In doing so, choreography is deployed 
as a critique, which heightens the attention to the given conditions that have legitimised 
the exhibition apparatus as the white cube, which still dominate the condition of 
contemporary artistic production. In the particular regime of the modern institution of 
art, the apparatuses of theatre and exhibition are believed to have developed distinctively 
– from their respective spatiotemporal arrangements and institutional significations to 
the expectations and protocols attached. The theatre apparatus is developed for a fixed 
duration on a stage before a seated, front-facing audience; exhibition, on the other hand, 
has developed to accommodate artworks in a space available for viewing by the public 
during opening hours, over a duration of several weeks or months, whereby visitors enter 
and exit at will. Yet, Le Roy’s choreographic project of exhibition-making demonstrates a 
new possibility for thinking about choreography that goes beyond the given institutional 
and disciplinary boundaries. By being able to detach itself from the discipline of dance, 
choreography is no longer a pedagogical tool for devising the particular formulation of 
the body. Instead, choreography can be a powerful tool that offers a critique of how the 
body and its relation to other bodies has been perceived, materialised, and 
institutionalised within a specific spatiotemporal context. 
 
 
 
                                         
2 In Chapter 1, I will discuss how choreography was invented in the institutionalisation of dance in the West 
via Andre Lepecki’s Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement. By taking a detour via the 
publication Orchesography, where the term ‘choreography’ was first recorded in the West, I will argue how 
choreography was invented as a pedagogical tool that became the disciplinary logic of the institution of 
dance. 
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Losing One’s Way, Mapped: the Contemporary Disciplinary Crisis in Art 
As discussed, it is not difficult to come across claims from cultural producers who insist 
on going beyond the given disciplinary boundaries strictly canonised by the Western 
institution of art, whose rise and fall cannot be detached from the particular subjectivity 
project called Western modernity. Therefore, the problematisation of the given 
disciplinary boundaries can be understood as attempts to reinvent subjectivity. In this 
light, I aim to examine here the ways in which contemporary cultural producers articulate 
their mode of operation within and against the specific disciplinary boundary. For 
instance, within the epistemological norm of the Western institution of art, a painter 
makes a painting. A sculptor makes a sculpture. A choreographer makes dance. But what 
does it mean when a choreographer claims that what she or he makes is choreography 
rather than dance? By claiming choreography rather than dance, there is already the shift 
in emphasis from the outcome to the mode of operation. This may appear to be a simple 
play of words at first glance. Yet, as we examined in Le Roy’s case, this shift from dance 
to choreography is a definite claim against the given subjectivity within the specific 
disciplinary boundary.  
This shift in emphasis from the outcome to the mode of operation signifies the 
contemporary disciplinary crisis in art that we are witnessing today. When the given 
methodologies within a discipline no longer do the job that they used to do, we witness 
the rise of new tactics and a different mode of engaging with the problems we face. It is 
in this light that I was drawn to contemporary choreographic experiments by a new 
generation of choreographers who have been gaining in visibility in the European art 
scene since the late 1990s. Despite the fact that it is not possible to bracket the diverse 
artistic proposals evident in contemporary choreographic experiments under one 
15 
 
umbrella term, one of the common denominators is a claim often found in their own 
articulation, that what they produce is choreography rather than dance. 
Bojana Cvejić’s conversation with Xavier Le Roy in 2007 clearly explains what is 
at the heart of this subtle but significant move in contemporary choreographic 
experiments.3 Cvejić expresses her discontent with the particular label of ‘conceptual 
dance’ attached to this new generation of European choreographers by American dance 
critics. The framing of contemporary choreographic experiments as conceptual dance is 
obviously intended to refer to the movement called conceptual art in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In fact, the debate about whether a new set of choreographic experiments has to be 
framed by the term ‘conceptual dance’ has become a topic of many critical dance studies 
in recent years. But the term ‘conceptual dance’ was rejected by those who are framed as 
conceptual choreographers. Cvejić explains that the term encompasses the accusation 
that this group of choreographers betray the essence of dance, in line with American 
dance criticism influenced by Greenberg’s categorisation.4 In this light, the phenomenon 
of a new generation of choreographers claiming their work is choreography can be 
understood as a rupture that manifests the resistance against the Western art history 
machine which quickly captures any artistic experiments within a specific canon. And this 
resistance against the Western art history machine is an important symptom of the 
contemporary disciplinary crisis in art that we witness today. 
                                         
3 Xavier Le Roy, Bojana Cvejic , and Gerald Siegmund, “To end with judgment by way of clarification,” in It 
Takes Place When it Doesn’t: On Dance and Performance Since 1989, ed. Martina Hochmuth, Krassimira 
Kruschkova, and Georg Scho llhammer (Frankfurt: Revolver, 2008), 49–56. This discussion came out of a 
talk between Jonathan Burrows, Xavier Le Roy, and Bojana Cvejic entitled “Not Conceptual”, from a series of 
talks called Parallel Voices, which Burrows curated at Siobhan Davies Studios, London in 2007. 
4 Ibid. 
16 
 
The series of theoretical journeys that I have taken in the process of writing this 
thesis were led by this subtle yet definite move evident in contemporary choreographic 
experiments by a new generation of choreographers. Through reflecting on some of the 
tactics and methodologies deployed in contemporary choreographic experiments, I have 
realised that there is a parallel impulse between the move made by a new generation of 
choreographers and my own intellectual journey from the history of art to visual culture 
via curatorial studies.  
Since my first year at college as a student in the Department of Art History, this 
journey has taken me more than twenty years and across three different continents (BA 
in the States, MA in the UK, and fieldwork in Korea). Of course, in a bigger picture, it is all 
related to the discipline of art. However, from an economic point of view, this has been a 
dreadfully unproductive investment, as I have failed to acquire the status of an expert in 
any of the disciplines in which I have been trained. 
Therefore, asking why there have been claims of choreography rather than dance 
made by a new generation of choreographers in this thesis has also been an attempt to 
make sense of why and how I have been operating in a way that ends up dismantling the 
discipline that I began with. For instance, I could have moved on to a master’s programme 
in art history after my undergraduate study in art history, or to a doctoral programme in 
the Curating Department after my masters in curatorial studies, but I did not. As a 
consequence, I failed to acquire the status of ‘expert’ in any discipline that I have studied. 
Instead of attempting to accumulate particular sets of knowledge and skills within 
specific disciplinary parameters, I moved on to a new platform whenever I faced a set of 
questions that could not be asked in a previous discipline. For instance, while I studied 
art history, what could not be questioned was the presupposed notion of time in this 
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particular discipline. For instance, Western art history is based on a linear conception of 
time, whereby past, present, and future are understood in a chronological sense. What is 
problematic with this conception of time lies in the fact that this presupposes the entirety 
of history such that there is one vanishing point towards process and innovation. This is 
why I was drawn to some of the bold curatorial proposals that challenged the linearity of 
time by highlighting a multiple understanding of time that resonates with Foucauldian 
genealogical and archaeological research. 
In this way, I have been moving towards a discipline that was not even invented 
when my previous disciplines were founded. For instance, when the history of art was 
perceived as a legitimate discipline of the humanities in the late eighteenth century, there 
was no notion of curating or curators. In the UK, the Tate Gallery’s announcement in 1992 
of its ambitious plan to create a new exhibition space dedicated to contemporary and 
international arts signalled a radical shift in the institutional structure in the UK, and 
brought about increasing demands for a workforce that could deal with massive 
infrastructural change and its role in the institution of art, not to mention its newly 
redefined relationship with the public. 5  Therefore, the fact that the Curating 
Contemporary Art MA at the Royal College of Art in London was established in 1992 was 
not a mere coincidence.6 As the first masters programme in the world on the discipline 
called ‘curating’, it signalled an important directional change in art education in Western 
academies. 
                                         
5 Caroline Donnellan, “Establishing Tate Modern: Vision and Patronage” (PhD diss., London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2013). 
6 The Curating Contemporary Art programme was jointly initiated by the Royal College of Art and the Arts 
Council under the leadership of Teresa Gleadowe in 1992. 
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The reason why I think the emergence of curatorial studies within the Western 
academic structure is significant is because this is another important symptom of the 
contemporary disciplinary crisis within art in our time. Until the early 1990s, the direct 
relationship between the art academy and the jobs market was not an urgent subject for 
discussion. This does not mean that its relationship was absent or ignored. But the 
relationship between the jobs market and the academy was not perceived within a direct 
cause-and-effect formula. Yet, when the discrepancies between the needs of the job 
market and what was provided within the existing academic structure were highlighted, 
noting that the given academic structure was no longer capable of dealing with a set of 
urgent needs from the field, what inevitably emerged was either a new form of 
articulation of an existing discipline, or a reorganisation of the existing boundaries of that 
discipline. 
In recent decades, we have witnessed the unprecedented creation of new 
academic degrees and programmes in Western academies that opened their doors to 
many areas or sets of questions that were considered not serious enough to become 
academic disciplines in the past. This proves that there have been persistent critiques of 
any disciplinary attempts to reduce the boundaries of research and put a stop to such 
questions in order to maintain the given operational mechanisms of existing disciplines. 
However, I need to point out that this is not necessarily emancipatory. In a neo-liberal 
culture of fluidity and destabilisation of categories and disciplines, this process of 
reorganising the existing boundaries of disciplines has accelerated and reformulated the 
operational mechanism of the ‘knowledge economy’ in Western academies. Especially 
since the Bologna declaration, a so-called reform of European education privileging the 
modulation and schematisation of European education structures, the Western academy 
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has faced unprecedented pressure to create new business models, from both the market 
and a public sector that is suffering radical budget cuts. For instance, in contrast to the 
enormous resistance in the 1960s when the MFA was first introduced, the proliferation 
of studio-art PhD degrees for artists has rarely faced any opposition. In this sense, it 
would not be misguided to argue that the contemporary disciplinary crisis is welcomed 
by both the market and its consumers. Therefore, the contemporary disciplinary crisis in 
art has a double-faceted signification. It certainly means that financial logic becomes a 
primary mode of governance in the art education system but, on the other hand, this crisis 
also proves that there has been a form of resistance to the given presuppositions that 
sustain the existing disciplinary boundaries. 
One of the main reasons why I have been dissatisfied with the given disciplinary 
boundaries lies in the fact that the presupposed methodologies within single disciplines 
cannot support paradoxical desires to constantly disturb the originating ground on which 
sets of questions have been formulated. For instance, as a young art historian, it was 
important to learn the logic beyond the particular canonisation of artistic practices or 
works of art in the West. But, at the same time, I wanted to find a tool with which I could 
deconstruct the particular sets of underlying logics or presuppositions that have 
legitimised the specific canonisation process, which has actively collaborated with a 
particular subjectivity project called Western modernity. Or as a young curator interested 
in artistic practices and their potential to be an active social and political force, it was 
necessary for me to learn and experience the existing operational mechanisms of art 
institutions, but it was also important for me to be able to reflect critically upon 
operational mechanisms that normalise particular sets of curatorial practice. 
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In this context, I wanted to go beyond art history and curatorial studies in order 
to navigate different disciplines: film studies, cultural studies, and postcolonial theories, 
philosophy and aesthetics, feminist theories, social sciences, and more. This is why I 
moved to Curatorial/Knowledge, Department of Visual Culture at Goldsmiths College, 
London. However, on reflection, the biggest privilege that I had was not permission to 
jump from one discipline to another. Rather, it was the freedom to ‘start from the middle’, 
where the state of not-yet-knowing does not become an obstacle but a force to help 
formulate a question that could not be asked before within specific disciplinary 
boundaries.7 I would like to argue that this is a very different mode of operation from 
what is often called interdisciplinary research. As Michael Moran argues, ‘the very idea of 
interdisciplinarity is only possible in a disciplinary world’. I often find that the attempts 
to unify modes of knowledge in interdisciplinary circumstances in academic institutions 
or funding structures are often subordinated to the logic that everything goes on in the 
name of economic efficiency.8 
Irit Rogoff explains that starting in the middle is ‘starting from elsewhere and 
otherwise’. Thus, starting in the middle is not just protesting against an existing discipline, 
but is a profoundly critical operation that opens up other possibilities of engagement. By 
opening up such possibilities, it opens up a new platform that enables us to formulate the 
following question: ‘How do we know what we don’t know how to know?’9 This is not 
simply to raise alternative research methodologies in an area in which one does not have 
any previous training. Instead, it is the persistence to go beyond the conventional 
                                         
7 Irit Rogoff, “A Pantheon of Disenchantment” (unpublished manuscript, December 14–16, 2012), 1. From 
a lecture given at the Weaving Politics symposium, Stockholm, 2012. 
8 Michael Moran, “Interdisciplinarity and Political Science,” Politics 26 2 (2006): 74. 
9 Rogoff, “A Pantheon of Disenchantment,” 1–2. 
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dichotomy between actuality and potentiality that is demonstrated in Giorgio Agamben’s 
rereading of the term ‘potentiality’.10 
In ‘On Potentiality’, Agamben rethinks Aristotle’s dichotomy between actuality 
and potentiality. He argues that thinking about potentiality should concern a specific 
‘mode of existence’ that is not irreducible to actuality, one that maintains itself precisely 
as potentiality. What does it mean for a mode of existence to maintain itself as 
potentiality? In order to explain this point, Agamben returns to Aristotle’s discussion of 
sensation, and focuses on his treatment of sight and colour. He points out that, for 
Aristotle, where the ‘colour’ of actuality is light, darkness is the ‘colour’ of potentiality. 
Agamben pays attention to the fact that darkness is also a colour that one can see. By 
deconstructing Aristotle’s dichotomy between actuality and potentiality, Agamben 
articulates the mode of existence of potentiality as darkness. The crucial point Agamben 
wants to make here is that since we can experience darkness, we can also experience 
potentiality as it is. For instance, even when we deprive our senses of sight, as illustrated 
in the act of closing our eyes, we nonetheless are able to distinguish darkness from light, 
that is to say, we are able to see darkness. Rather than saying that we cannot see when 
we are in the dark, that we only have the potential to see, for Agamben we can see in the 
dark. In other words, darkness itself can become the object of our sight. This is how 
Agamben explains the mode of existence of potentiality. Potentiality exists as it is and it 
does not have to be reduced to actuality. But this does not mean that potentiality is a 
pregiven entity. Agamben argues that potentiality comes into being when one is 
                                         
10 Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 177–184. See also Irit Rogoff, “Turning,” e-flux 
0 (2008), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/turning/. Here, Irit Rogoff mentions Agamben’s notion of 
potentiality in relation to actualisation, arguing Agamben’s rearticulation of potentiality can offer a capacity 
to reorganise educational structural premises. 
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‘absolutely demanding’ without being grounded in any certainty or specific capacity to 
transform this demandingness into actuality.11 
In this light, I would like to go back to Rogoff’s question of how we know what we 
don’t know how to know. Thinking about this question in relation to Agamben’s notion 
of potentiality highlights the absolute demand through which other possibilities of 
engagement can be opened up. And it is on a platform called Curatorial/Knowledge in the 
Department of Visual Culture at Goldsmiths College that my absolute demand to 
understand the claim of choreography rather than dance has been accommodated. 
 
Choreography in the Curatorial 
Started by Irit Rogoff and Jean-Paul Martinon in 2008, Curatorial/Knowledge positions 
itself as a new critical platform that accommodates urgent demands from various cultural 
producers in different situations, whose practices concern the exhibition in one way or 
another. When this platform was founded, it was a time when the proliferation of 
international art biennales and fairs, as a new mode of artistic and curatorial production 
and distribution, had reached its peak. However, this also meant that it saw a downturn 
when various attempts to rethink curatorial activities critically began to occur. Departing 
from their passive role as the guardians of the museum, the increasing number of 
international biennales offered unprecedented opportunities for a new generation of 
curators claiming a new political and social role for curating. And we have witnessed the 
emergence of a new discourse on the ‘curator as’ that dominates the knowledge economy 
of the art market. In this light, keeping a critical distance from the hustle and bustle in the 
                                         
11 Agamben, “On Potentiality,” 178. 
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activities of curating, which is quickly being captured within the commodification process, 
there have been increasing demands for critical platforms that are not captured by the 
logic of representation. And one of the platforms that accommodate such demands for 
this space of reflection is the Curatorial/Knowledge programme. 
On this platform, where diverse proposals and demands cannot be pinned down 
as one type of subject matter, one of the common denominators that hold this platform 
together can be articulated as ‘the curatorial rather than curating’. If the curatorial 
privileges questions and processes, curating implies an activity directed towards a 
finished product. This is why I think that one of the jokes that we used to tell about this 
platform, that Curatorial/Knowledge is to prevent people from curating, does in fact 
explain well the prevailing demands from cultural producers to resist the logic of 
efficiency that quickly quash any space of reflection in the name of practicality. In other 
words, the demands for a new critical platform are not for curators to better their 
professional curatorial activities. Instead, departing from its own museological territory, 
to demand the curatorial is to resist a curator’s practice ending with the material 
production of exhibitions or events. The demands for the curatorial aim to unravel the 
very ground on which it stands, in order to navigate between different modes of 
knowledge production. Therefore, the demands for the curatorial are a definite symptom 
of the contemporary disciplinary crisis in art that is witnessed at every level. In this 
context, Curatorial/Knowledge can be understood as the manifestation of an absolute 
demand from cultural producers who insist that their practice is more than just the 
illustration or demonstration of what we already know or what we have already done 
within the conventional operation of institutions. As the solidus between curatorial and 
knowledge indicates, this absolute demand is not grounded in any certainty or specific 
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capacity to transform potentiality into actuality. Instead, it attempts to replace the 
actuality of a disciplinary system with potentiality, where the state of not-yet-knowing 
operates as a mode of knowledge production. It is on this privileged platform that I 
embarked on my research into choreography rather than dance, a notion that resists 
being pinned down by the logic of representation within a particular disciplinary 
boundary. 
Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to rethink the absolute demand evident in 
choreography rather than dance in terms of the curatorial. Rethinking choreography in 
terms of the curatorial means locating choreography in a new critical platform called the 
curatorial. In doing so, it allows me to start in the middle and elsewhere, where the lack 
of previous training in dance studies is not an obstacle to research on contemporary 
choreographic experiments. At the same time, rethinking choreography in terms of the 
curatorial also means rethinking curating in terms of the choreographic, where curatorial 
activities can be understood as a matter of the body. And in acknowledging curatorial 
activities as a matter of the body, choreography can also be deployed as a powerful 
critique against the particular operation of the body within the exhibition apparatus. 
Against this backdrop, I will briefly take a detour, tracing why and how I embarked on my 
research into choreography rather than dance in the curatorial. 
My interest in contemporary choreographic experiments initially began during 
my professional practice as a curator of a newly opened art institution in Seoul. As a 
curator working for a performance, or ‘live art’ programme, I witnessed a certain 
tendency in the so-called second wave of the ‘performance turn’ in the early 2000s that 
somehow embraced choreography as an emancipatory term against institutional 
hierarchies and logics that were already captured within the system of representation. 
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Moreover, choreography was understood as a magic word that somehow explained the 
artistic and curatorial impulse evident in a heightened attention to the body as an artistic 
medium that is somehow not contaminated by the exhibition apparatus. It seemed to me 
that the term ‘choreography’ was replacing what the term ‘performance’ did in the so-
called first wave of the performance turn in post-war art movements in Europe and 
America, when there was also a definite interdisciplinary impulse. In order to articulate 
further what I mean by this, I will make a quick detour and discuss some of the contexts 
that explain the emergence of the term ‘performance’ in the first wave of the performance 
turn in the 1960s and 1970s. 
What has to be discussed here is how the term ‘performance’ emerged as a magic 
word in the first wave of the performance turn in the 1960s and 1970s that promised 
everything that had failed in the Western institution of art. Especially, in this first wave 
of the performance turn, the term ‘performance’ was used as a healing term to counter 
the evil theatricality which was the name for everything that was already being captured 
within the system of representation. In this context, performance claimed to be innocent 
of the guilt of theatre. This type of theorisation of performance to oppose theatricality, 
which has been actively utilised in the English-speaking academic context, coincided with 
the so-called institutional critique of the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, there is nothing 
surprising in the rise of performance studies which insisted on being situated on different 
ground from theatre studies, where it could avoid being circumscribed within the endless 
cycle of sins and redemption. However, as Nicholas Ridout argues, what seems to be a 
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radical departure from existing theatre studies can in fact only be sustained as long as it 
remains in a ‘dialectical tension with theatre that it constantly seeks to transcend.’12 
In ‘The Undoing of Theatre’, Ridout explains further what he means by the 
‘dialectical tension’ between the discourse of performance and theatre. Performance 
condemns ‘theatre’s cultural insignificance in relation to an “expanded field”’.13 Ridout 
argues that the rise of a new discipline called performance studies was engineered 
precisely to be the counterpart to theatre’s limitations in the field of expanded artistic 
practice. Although departments of performance studies first appeared in the 1980s, 
mainly in American universities, the term ‘performance studies’ was first coined in 1965 
by Richard Schechner, who was the founder of the Performance Studies Department at 
New York University, the first programme in an American university solely devoted to 
performance.14 In his article ‘Approaches to Theory/Criticism’ in The Drama Review, 
Schechner argues that ‘any event, action, item, or behaviour may be examined “as” 
performance’.15 Therefore, he insists that the disciplinary boundaries of conventional 
theatre studies have to broaden their scope from theatre, music, and dance to include the 
anthropological study of ritual on the one hand, and sociological analyses of the 
performance of everyday life on the other. Moreover, the later addition of psychoanalysis 
in performance studies means that it aims to cover a huge range of social interaction, to 
the extent that it becomes difficult to maintain it as a useful and specific analytic category. 
                                         
12 Nicholas Ridout, “The Undoing of Theatre: The Politics of Effect on the Contemporary Stage” (PhD diss., 
Birkbeck, University of London, 2004), 12. 
13 Ibid., 5. The term ‘expanded field’ comes from Rosalind Krauss’s essay ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’. 
Rosalind Krauss, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field,” in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other 
Modernist Myths (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986). 
14  Shannon Jackson, Professing Performance: Theatre in the Academy from Philology to Performativity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8–10. 
15 Richard Schechner, “Approaches to Theory/Criticism,” TDR 10 4 (1996): 20–53. 
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Performance condemns ‘theatre’s inadequacy as a site for radical action.’ This is 
because, in contrast to the ‘real’ of performance, theatre is too artificial to accommodate 
any radicality.16 And the reason why performance can be real is because it only comes 
into being in the present. This is what Peggy Phelan argues: 
 
Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, 
documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of 
representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance.17 
 
Phelan, in her influential essay ‘The Ontology of Performance’, argues that performance 
only exists in the present. This radical proclamation positions performance as a critique 
of the system of representation from which theatre has not been able to escape. In 
contrast to performance’s radicality, theatre cannot escape from the representation 
machine, being incessantly circumscribed within the process of commodification in post-
industrial Western societies’ systems of reproduction.18 It is in this context that Phelan 
proudly announces that performance betrays the economy of reproduction.19 She argues 
that even though performance can be documented, the resulting photographs and video 
footage are not the same as those that only refer to the memory of what happened before. 
Phelan’s famous declaration about the ontology of performance explains well 
why ‘performance’ was perceived as an emancipatory term against the system of 
representation in the first wave of the performance turn in the 1960s and 1970s. 
                                         
16 Ridout, “The Undoing of Theatre,” 7–8. 
17 Peggy Phelan, “The Ontology of Performance: Representation Without Reproduction,” in Unmarked: The 
Politics of Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 146. 
18 Baz Kershaw, The Radical in Performance: Between Brecht and Baudrillard (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999). 
19 Phelan, “The Ontology of Performance,” 146. 
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However, despite its bold claim, we witnessed how performance was quickly perceived 
as a new artistic genre within the art history machine. For instance, from Allen Kaprow’s 
‘Happenings’ to Fluxus concerts, the term ‘performance art’ became a new currency that 
signified the fundamental objections that these artists made against the system of 
representation.20 And in the second wave of the performance turn in the 2000s, in the 
name of re-enactment, we witnessed how historical performances from the 1960s and 
1970s were repeated, documented, and even commodified within the art economy. 
Marina Abramović’s Seven Easy Pieces at the Guggenheim Museum in 2005 is a good 
example of how historical performances from the 1960s and 1970s were re-enacted, and 
became the object of re-presentation within the existing operational mechanism of the 
museum that serves a definite role in the society of spectacle. 
It is in this context that I want to go back to the rise in interest in the notion of 
choreography in the so-called second wave of the performance turn in the 2000s where 
the notion of choreography has suddenly become the very currency that everyone wants 
to possess in our contemporary art and knowledge economy. What is especially 
interesting to me is the fact that there is a parallel emphasis in the mode of operation 
between the term ‘performance’, which was the key term in the performance turn of the 
1960s and 1970s, and the term ‘choreography’, which is employed as a sort of conceptual 
term in contemporary artistic and curatorial practices. It is not hard to notice that the 
term ‘choreography’, which was conventionally understood as a technical term in the 
performing arts field, distinguished from performing arts practices such as theatre and 
dance in Greenbergian modernist discourse, is increasingly employed as a sort of 
                                         
20 American curator and critic RoseLee Goldberg’s Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present is a good 
example. 
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conceptual term to explain some of the most interesting artistic practices and curatorial 
proposals in the field of visual arts. In this light, it is no coincidence that there are 
increasing numbers of encounters and points of contact between visual artists and 
curators, and a new generation of European choreographers who gained visibility in the 
early 1990s. 
By a new generation of choreographers, I am thinking here of the practices of 
Xavier Le Roy, Boris Charmatz, Jonathan Burrows, Jan Ritsema, Jérôme Bel, Mårten 
Spångberg, La Ribot, and Eszter Salamon, to name but a few. Although they differ from 
each other in terms of their modes of operation, one of the significant common 
denominators that intersect these very different practices is the fact that each of their 
practices disturbs the conventional mode of production of dance-theatre. Opposing the 
pedagogical mode of production inherent in dance-theatre, they test new forms of 
community, collaboration, and mobilisation via the medium of human bodies in order to 
experiment with new forms of production. In other words, contemporary choreographic 
practices are another symptom of the disciplinary crisis in art, and this opens up an 
unprecedented space for critical reflection on the modern institution of dance. And one 
of the driving forces that enable this space of reflection is undeniably the attempt to 
rethink what choreography is and could be. 
In parallel with their attempts to rethink choreography, my investigation also 
begins by deconstructing the term ‘choreography’. Therefore, my thinking on 
choreography can be articulated in terms of choreo-graphy. In adding a hyphen between 
choreo and graphy, I attempt to highlight that the term ‘choreography’ is, in fact, a 
neologism that is made within a specific sociocultural and political context and ambition. 
Etymologically, choreography is a neologism that combines orcheso- ‘dance’ and -graphy 
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‘writing’, and first appeared in Thoinot Arbeau’s Orchesography in 1589. And here, the 
reason why this specific demand to write dance down emerged was hinted at in the 
conversation between the author of the book, Arbeau, and his fictional ex-student Capriol. 
I will discuss the story in the forthcoming chapters. However, I want to point out here the 
fact that this particular demand to write dance down stemmed from the realisation that 
dance as a particular discipline of art was vulnerable in the face of incessantly passing 
moments of now. For instance, on several occasions Capriol complains that nothing 
remained in the archive of dance. Therefore, in order to overcome its ontological 
weakness, a particular technique for writing dance was devised within the 
institutionalisation of dance in the West. What has to be paid attention to here is the fact 
that this technique of writing dance inevitably developed as a cohesive pedagogical 
practice, because writing dance means subordinating the bodies of others within the 
specific disciplinary canon. Therefore, rethinking choreography in terms of choreo-
graphy is to deconstruct the power structure inherent in the pedagogical practice within 
particular institutional logics and hierarchies that subordinate the bodies of others. In 
this light, the question posed is what can be achieved by deconstructing choreography as 
a pedagogical technique that subordinates others’ bodies? In the coming part, I will 
demonstrate how and why choreo-graphy can be a tactical articulation that highlights a 
different possibility for writing the bodies of others in artistic and curatorial practice in 
the contemporary disciplinary crisis. 
 
Choreo-graphy as the Event of Writing 
Whether it is theatre-making or exhibition-making, they both involve the bodies of others. 
This means that a certain technique for writing the bodies (of others) is voluntarily or 
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involuntarily deployed. This is the basic presupposition for the move from choreography 
to choreo-graphy that I attempt to make in this thesis. If the term ‘choreography’ implies 
particular disciplinary parameters within the modern institution of art in the West, 
choreo-graphy goes beyond the specific disciplinary boundaries of dance by opening up a 
possibility for thinking about what writing the bodies of others means and can be. Here, 
writing means more than a process of inscription on a computer or on paper in a literal 
sense. It is to put bodies in relation to other bodies, against or within the given structural 
conditions. Putting bodies in relation to other bodies means that bodies are signified in 
relation to these other bodies. However, what has to be highlighted here is the fact that 
this process of signification cannot be devised and planned in advance. Even though some 
encounters can be set up in a specific artistic or curatorial practice, encounters between 
bodies are inevitably open to contingencies, as a body always already manages to fail to 
sustain itself within a particular disciplinary canonisation. Therefore, rethinking 
choreography in terms of choreo-graphy highlights a new mode of engagement with the 
problematics of thinking ‘body’ that can always already happen in relation to other bodies. 
Hence, proposing choreo-graphy instead of choreography immediately disturbs and 
unsettles the particular modernist logic that perceives a body as an independent identity 
card for individuals. In doing so, choreo-graphy demands us to think ‘body’ in the event 
of writing where it is open to the contingent relation to other bodies. 
As the tactic of writing the movements of the choreographer-master within the 
institutionalisation of dance, choreography has evolved into a cohesive pedagogical 
practice in the institutionalisation of dance. Within the conception of choreography as a 
pedagogical practice, the act of writing the bodies of others was understood within a 
particular power operation based on a disciplinary logic and hierarchy via the mediums 
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of symbolic structure. But as demonstrated in Le Roy’s Retrospective, what contemporary 
choreographic experiments highlight is the possibility of rethinking choreography in 
terms of choreo-graphy, which takes place in the event of writing. Here, the term ‘event’ 
should be understood in a Derridean sense, where chronological linearity is ruptured and 
its arrival cannot be announced. Therefore, the event of writing is not something that can 
be pinned down in a particular power operation. Instead, it takes place when a body is 
put in relation to other bodies through which the process of signification of being a body 
occurs contingently. 
I will articulate this process of signification via the notion of the ‘space of 
appearance’, which I borrow from Hannah Arendt.21 In the following chapters, I will 
discuss in detail why I decide to deploy this term. But if I briefly outline the context, it is 
important to highlight that Arendt’s concept of a space of appearance is not something 
that has a physical boundary that can be examined in an empirical sense. In order words, 
it is not something to be given but something to be created as an event. For instance, Le 
Roy’s choreographic production of an exhibition in Retrospective effectuates a situation 
where the spectator-visitor confronts living bodies, so that an unprecedented space of 
appearance in an exhibition context is produced. Therefore, in Le Roy’s Retrospective, a 
space of appearance is opened up when a visitor-spectator is allowed to be more than a 
‘disembodied eye’ and a performer is allowed to be more than a performer, thus going 
beyond the accepted canonisation in the institution of theatre.22 Moreover, once a space 
of appearance opens up, what is challenged is the dichotomy of the prescribed roles 
within the theatre/exhibition apparatus. This is how choreo-graphy emerges as a 
                                         
21 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 198. 
22 Brian O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space (Berkeley: University of 
Berkeley Press, 1999), 10. 
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spatiotemporal tactic that disturbs the smooth operation of the particular subjectivity 
project on which spectatorship is devised, legitimised, and sustained within the modern 
institution of art. In this light, one of the main strands of investigation in this thesis is 
examining how the tactical operation found in contemporary choreographic experiments 
can be articulated as a critique against the subjectivity project on spectatorship within 
the modern institution of art. 
The ways in which a new generation of choreographers engage with the 
particular subjectivity of the spectator, devised in the modern institution of art, is to 
rethink the particular disciplinary hierarchies that presuppose the specific relation of a 
body to other bodies. This is why, in many contemporary choreographic experiments, we 
witness experimentation with the positionality of the spectator and its relation to the 
positionality of the choreographer-master. Turning upside down the sets of conditions 
that sustain the position of the choreographer-master, a new generation of 
choreographers turn the existing limits of conventional choreographic practices into 
material for setting up epistemological games. And it is in these epistemological games 
that new possibilities for the positionality of the spectator and its relation to the 
positionality of the choreographer-master are tested. 
In this light, one of the common strategies found in contemporary choreographic 
experiments is to highlight the failure of the speech-act of the choreographer-master. For 
instance, in Le Roy’s choreographic experiment with exhibition-making, Le Roy’s speech-
act, involving the deliberate naming of his exhibition as a retrospective, is meant to fail. 
As discussed in an earlier part of the chapter, a retrospective is one of the crucial 
operational mechanisms of the exhibition apparatus that aims to resist the passage of 
time. Yet, Le Roy’s Retrospective has travelled to New York, Rio de Janeiro, Hamburg, 
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Singapore, and Paris since its premiere at Fundació Antoni Tàpies. Therefore, in the end, 
the project will be an accumulation of retrospectives that happened in various cities and 
institutions. This structural condition of Le Roy’s Retrospective will create a constellation 
of associations and experiences around his work that no one can predict. Therefore, Le 
Roy’s series of retrospectives can never be captured by the particular exhibition 
mechanism called a retrospective, as it comes to have an open-ended structure. In this 
open-ended structure, the absolutisation of time devised by the exhibition apparatus no 
longer works. Instead, in Le Roy’s attempt to relocate his solo works over two decades in 
an exhibition context, what is highlighted is a constant process of transitions and crashes 
between different temporalities, triggered by unexpected encounters and exchanges. In 
other words, Le Roy deploys the retrospective as a point of departure or a basic material 
for an epistemological game instead of as a point of arrival, by which the speech act of 
calling it a retrospective is meant to fail. 
The failing speech acts of Le Roy, the choreographer-master, show us his 
meticulous resistance towards the position of mastery. In order for Le Roy’s speech act 
of calling his choreographic experiment a ‘retrospective’ to work as it promises, the 
totality of his perspective has to be presupposed. And this only comes into being via the 
absolutisation of time through which a particular position of mastery is presupposed. 
However, in Le Roy’s choreographic production of an exhibition, he constantly resists the 
instalment of a bird’s-eye perspective, so that spaces of appearance for other bodies, via 
contingent encounters between participants, can be opened up. This strategy of opening 
up spaces of appearance in order to resist the conventional positionality of the 
choreographer-master is only one of the examples that I find among contemporary 
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choreographic experiments, and I will examine different strategies throughout the 
forthcoming chapters in this thesis. 
In doing so, I will attempt to theorise different strategies deployed by a new 
generation of European choreographers via which I aim to articulate a move from 
choreography to choreo-graphy. Going beyond the disciplinary limits of dance, my 
attempt to articulate choreo-graphy will be achieved by asking different questions that 
will reveal the ways in which I engage with some of the contemporary choreographic 
experiments since the late 1990s. In Chapter 1, departing from examining the scandals 
brought by Jérôme Bel, I will begin by asking how the particular conception of 
choreography was first proposed within the discipline of dance that has been devised and 
developed in its particular institutionalisation. In doing so, I will conduct genealogical 
research on how a particular conception of the body has been devised and reformulated 
within the institutionalisation of dance in the West. It is this specific reformulation of the 
body that will highlight how the institution of dance collaborates with a particular 
subjectivity project called Western modernity. 
In Chapter 2, I will discuss Dance for Nothing (2011) by Eszter Salamon, paying 
attention to how she highlights the function of writing, in the most expanded sense of the 
term, in choreographic practice. Via Derrida’s deconstructive project on writing, I will 
highlight how a deconstructive understanding of writing offers a new generation of 
choreographers a different possibility for thinking about choreography in terms of 
choreo-graphy, as a spatiotemporal technique for offering a space of appearance for other 
bodies. Instead of operating as a representational tool, writing in Derrida’s project 
becomes a deconstructive force where the position of the logocentric author is disturbed 
and reconstructed. In this light, a different possibility for understanding writing will 
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allow us to rethink the conventional positionality of the choreographer-master as the 
ultimate author in relation to other bodies. In Chapter 3, via the Belgian choreographer 
Christine De Smedt’s recent choreographic experiment Untitled 4 – 4 Choreographic 
Portraits of Jonathan Burrows, Alain Platel, Xavier Le Roy & Eszter Salamon (2012), I will 
examine how the subjectivity of the choreographer-master is deconstructed by being 
reframed as a truth game where the production of subjectivity is understood as 
something to be created, not something to be given or revealed. 
When the conventional positionality of the choreographer-master as author is no 
longer sustained, what becomes possible is a new way of thinking about the positionality 
of the spectator. In rethinking the positionality of the spectator, I will articulate the notion 
of spectatorship in terms of the spectator-body, so that the fact that the subjectivity of the 
spectator always comes into being in relation to other bodies can be highlighted. In 
rethinking the subjectivity of the spectator in terms of the spectator-body, which is often 
neglected in both the conventional exhibition-making and theatre-making processes, 
what is highlighted in contemporary choreographic experiments is a different 
understanding of a power operation whereby spectatorship is no longer captured within 
victimisation. In this light, the spectator-body is a force from which new knowledge about 
the potentiality of thinking about the body can be opened up. In disturbing and 
reconfiguring the relationship between the spectator-body and the choreographer-
master, Xavier Le Roy, in various contemporary choreographic experiments, 
demonstrates how the rearticulation of the spectator-body produces new knowledge on 
a power operation, and I will discuss some of his projects in detail in Chapter 4. 
When the spectator-body can be perceived as something that emerges, not 
something pregiven, its process of signification can be understood in terms of the event 
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of writing. In Chapter 5, I will discuss this event of writing through examining The Agora 
Project (2009–2011). In articulating how the event of writing in The Agora Project brings 
about spaces of appearance for other bodies, where there is no hierarchical division 
between the spectator-body and the dancer-body, I will highlight the choreographic 
bodies that emerge in this space of appearance that only come into being in relation to 
other bodies. 
In Chapter 6, through examining Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker’s recent exhibition 
Work/Travail/Arbeid (2015), I will highlight how contemporary choreographic 
experiments become an important platform where radical thinking about the body can 
be put forward. In highlighting a move from choreography to choreo-graphy, De 
Keersmaeker’s choreographic production of the exhibition Work/Travail/Arbeid 
demonstrates how choreo-graphy as a spatiotemporal technique can reconfigure the 
spectator-body that is constantly disturbed by unexpected situations and contingent 
encounters. Through contingent encounters caused by De Keersmaeker’s displacement 
of the spectator-body from the theatre apparatus to an exhibition context, what emerges 
is the choreographic body. It is via the choreographic body that we come to be aware of 
the fact that my coming into being a body depends on other bodies’ coming into being, 
and vice versa. Therefore, being a body is being with other bodies in open-ended 
possibilities. This is the absolute demand of being a body that exists as potentiality. 
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Chapter 1. What Makes Dance Dance? 
– A Reformulation of the Body and Its Institutionalisation 
 
Two Points of Departure 
There are two initial threads which I shall attempt to interweave into the question posed 
in this chapter: what makes dance dance? The first thread comes from my encounter with 
Jérôme Bel’s dance-theatre in the early 2000s in Seoul. It was the time when 
interdisciplinary practices were at the centre of attention at national and international 
levels. What has to be noted here is the fact that Jérôme Bel is enthusiastically accepted 
in the visual art field rather than by the conventional performing arts audiences. There 
can be many explanations of this but one of the possible answers would be that the 
institutional critique performed by this new generation of choreographers opens up a 
new space of collaborations between different disciplines. When Bel’s dancers dance to 
pop songs that anyone can join in with in The Show Must Go On (2001), or when he talks 
on stage without any dancing in Pichet Klunchun and Myself (2005), it was clear that his 
proposal is more than a matter of dance.  
What I mean by a new generation of European choreographers is a group of 
European choreographers whose practice has often been referred to as ‘non-dance’ or 
‘conceptual dance’.23 The fact that this new generation of European choreographers’ 
practices are referred to as non-dance paradoxically tells us that there is a certain logic 
that has made dance dance within a particular institutional framework. Moreover, the 
accusations that these choreographers do not perform dance tell us that there has been 
                                         
23 Le Roy, Cvejic , and Siegmund, “To end with judgment by way of clarification,” 49–56. 
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an agreed understanding about the essence of dance. Therefore, by labelling the dance-
theatre produced by this new generation of choreographers as non-dance, what is 
highlighted is an accusation that this new generation of European choreographers betray 
the essence of dance. In this context, examining contemporary choreographic 
experiments is to ask what makes dance dance within a particular institutional 
framework and how this new generation of choreographers attempt to redefine this 
definition in order to highlight the conditions of the institution that they inhabit. 
The choreographers whom I shall focus on, in my attempt to answer the question 
of what makes dance dance, include Jérôme Bel, Boris Charmatz, Eszter Salamon, 
Christine De Smedt, Xavier Le Roy, Jan Ritsema and Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker. 24 
Despite the fact that it is not possible to understand their diverse projects as a unified 
movement or artistic group, there are several areas in which their practices come 
together. Among them, I shall explore the way in which this new generation of 
choreographers have complicated what used to be the simple and definite statement of 
what makes dance dance. By turning upside down the sets of conditions that sustain the 
Western institution of dance, these choreographers have become estranged from what 
has become normalised within the Western model of the modern institution of dance.25 
                                         
24 I will discuss Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker’s Work/Travail/Arbeid (2015) in Chapter 6. Despite the fact 
that she is older than most of the choreographers that I discuss in this thesis, I do not use the term ‘new 
generation of choreographers’ in a chronological sense. De Keersmaeker has constantly collaborated with 
this generation of choreographers, for instance with Jérôme Bel in 3Abschied (2010) and with Boris 
Charmatz in Partita 2 (2013). 
25 By the Western model of the modern institution of dance I am not exclusively referring to the school of 
modern dance (the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century) within a genre-based 
categorization. Distancing itself from a rigid periodic distinction, the term ‘Western model of the modern 
institution of dance’ is used to describe the ruling episteme still dominating the institution of dance-theatre 
worldwide that presets the ontology of its subject as ‘being-toward-movement’. In fact, defining the Western 
institutionalisation of dance as producing a subject that is being-toward-movement is the main thesis of 
Andre Lepecki’s Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006). Throughout the book, he argues that the ideal of motility that is privileged in the 
institutionalisation of dance in the West began in the Renaissance and moved on to what he calls Western 
modernity. Again, the term ‘Western modernity’ deployed by Lepecki also refuses to be framed within a 
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Within the specific institutional framework of the Western model of the modern 
institution of dance, what makes dance dance has been the disciplining of oneself 
according to a strict canon demonstrated by the teacher’s body. Disciplining oneself in a 
dance studio is about the painful reformulation of the body in order to achieve the ideals 
expected of a dancer. It is a long and painful process of modelling one’s body via endless 
repetitions of exercises and dieting. Then, the question to be asked is the following: what 
is the ultimate goal of reformulating the body in the modern institution of dance? 
The popular image we have of dance as a capital ‘A’ art form is not far removed 
from images of classical ballet dancers endlessly jumping up and down as the reification 
of a continuum of movement. This is obviously the product of a specific idealisation of the 
human body. In other words, there is nothing natural about how the human body is 
portrayed in the modern institution of dance. The notion of people jumping up and down 
as if they are not bound by the law of gravity is the product of a specific disciplinary 
demand that has ‘shaped styles, prescribed techniques and configured bodies’.26 
The question that I ask in this chapter, what makes dance dance, seems to align 
with the questions asked through contemporary choreographic experiments, which 
question why the body has been captured within this particular disciplinary logic that 
demands the particular reformulation of the body as part of the institutionalisation of 
dance. It is to ask what has conditioned the smooth operation of this particular 
disciplinary logic in the Western model of the modern institution of dance. In doing so, 
André Lepecki’s Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement (2006) is 
                                         
periodic categorization. For Lepecki, Western modernity is the name for a particular political project that 
aims to produce a kinetic subjectivity. 
26 Andre Lepecki, Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 3. 
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another crucial point of departure. Here, Lepecki attempts to create a new critical 
language to theorise the conditions that formulate a particular disciplinary logic of 
reformulating the body within the modern institution of dance. In doing so, Lepecki 
privileges post-structuralists’ thinking whose political aim is to estrange what has been 
normalised within Western modernity. Lepecki argues that there is an intrinsic link 
between the institutionalisation of dance in the West and the emergence of Western 
modernity as a particular political project. In other words, Lepecki contends that dance’s 
collaboration with Western modernity has resulted in a particular disciplinary logic of 
reformulating the body. Why then has dance collaborated with Western modernity in its 
institutionalising process? 
Lepecki argues that dance’s collaboration with Western modernity begins from 
dance’s desire to secure an autonomous place in the modern classification of art, and this 
desire brings about dance’s active collaboration with modernity’s production of 
hyperkinetic subjectivity. In other words, the discipline of dance comes into being by 
submitting itself to modernity’s obsession with hyperkinetic subjectivity. In becoming a 
machine that constantly produces this form of subjectivity, the ultimate goal of the 
discipline of dance must be to reformulate the body so that it can actualise this production. 
In the forthcoming part of this chapter, I will further investigate Lepecki’s discussion on 
Western modernity as a particular project that aims to produce hyperkinetic subjectivity 
and the emergence of the modern institution of dance in the West. In doing so, I aim to 
ask why the modern institution of dance has collaborated with, and in turn been 
conditioned by, the hegemonic ideology called Western modernity. 
For Lepecki, Western modernity is not the name for a specific chronological period, 
nor a specific historic event. Rather, Western modernity is a particular political project 
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that aims to produce a specific form of subjectivity. Lepecki finds ground for his argument 
in Harvie Ferguson’s Modernity and Subjectivity: Body, Soul, Spirit (2000), in which 
Ferguson articulates Western modernity as a specific form of subjectivity that constitutes 
its subject as a constant display of motion.27 Moreover, in turning to German philosopher 
Peter Sloterdijk’s critique of ‘kinaesthetic politics’ in Eurotaoismus (1989), Lepecki 
argues that Western modernity as kinaesthetic politics produces a permanent ontological 
agitation of the modern subject.  
In this context, Lepecki attempts to make sense of why ‘hyperkinetic subjectivity’ 
has been normalised within the Western institution of dance. In highlighting the link 
between the advent and legitimisation of dance as a discipline and the modernist 
obsession with the production of ‘hyperkinetic subjectivity’ in the specific political 
project called Western modernity, Lepecki positions himself differently from the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari where the concept of movement is conceived as a 
form of positive political progress.28  
In order to stress the fact that there is nothing natural about this alignment 
between dance and movement, Lepecki highlights the historical understanding of dance 
before dance’s collaboration with Western modernity. Via the dance historian Mark 
Franko’s research on the perception of dance in the Renaissance, Lepecki highlights that 
dance’s relationship with movement was not as normal as we perceive it today:29 
                                         
27 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 9. Harvie Ferguson, Modernity and Subjectivity: Body, Soul, 
Spirit (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 5. 
28 Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 12. Lepecki quotes Deleuze’s argument that there are only two political 
positions: ‘embracing movement or blocking it’. Lepecki argues that Deleuze associated the latter with a 
reactionary force. Moreover, by raising Randy Martin’s argument in Critical Moves (1998), Lepecki 
highlights the fact that in Deleuze and Guattari, movement is perceived as a positive force towards a politics 
of progress. See Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972–1990 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 127. 
29  Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 7, 13, 3, 2. See also Mark Franko, The Dancing Body in 
Renaissance Choreography (Birmingham, Alabama: Summa Publications, 1986), 9. 
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As the dance scholar Rodocanachi put it … as for the movements, it is the dance 
itself that seems to have been the least of the dancer’s concern.30 
 
In highlighting the fact that movement has not been considered to be a principal 
ingredient of what makes dance dance, Lepecki aims to estrange this relationship 
between dance and motility that is normalised within the Western model of the modern 
institution of dance. Then, the question to be asked is the following: If movement was the 
least of the dancer’s concerns, what was their principle concern? Despite the fact that 
these questions require an in-depth historical investigation which is beyond the scope 
and purpose of the research conducted for this thesis, in the coming part I will briefly 
discuss the institutionalisation of dance in the West by examining Lepecki’s articulation 
in Exhausting Dance. 
 
Institutionalisation of Dance in the West 
If I could argue that institutionalisation is about transforming oneself into a memory 
machine where a certain logic of representation can be repeatable, it would not be wrong 
to argue that the institutionalisation of dance begins when the movements of the dance 
master can be recorded and passed on to his pupils. In this context, it is significant that 
Lepecki tells the story of a Jesuit priest, mathematician and dance master, Thoinot Arbeau 
and his pupil, Capriol, as recorded in a book called Orchesography, first published in 1589. 
This dialogue between the dance master and the pupil reveals Capriol’s desire to write 
                                         
30  Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 2–3. See also Franko, The Dancing Body in Renaissance 
Choreography, 9. 
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down the master’s dance so that he can learn it despite Arbeau’s absence. In other words, 
Capriol’s desire to write down his master’s dance was nothing to do with the ideal of 
motility. Rather, it was to avoid ‘being reproached for having the heart of a pig and the 
head of an ass’. 31  Capriol’s desire to write down his master’s dance concerns the 
reformulation of the body in producing a particular subjectivity, but this was not 
necessarily about transforming the body so that it could be the actualisation of the ideal 
of motility. 
In this context, Lepecki points out that the early period of dance’s 
institutionalisation concerned what Erving Goffman called ‘performance of the self’, 
through which one gains admission to the social theatrics of heterosexual dancing and 
mating.32 And even in the later time of Louis XIV, the Sun King who presented himself as 
Apollo in Ballet de la Nuit in 1653, the principal concern was not about reformulating the 
body so that it could express kinetic subjectivity.33 It was certainly concerned with a 
display of power and a particular reformulation of the body as the reification of this 
absolute power, but being-toward-movement was not the principal concern, even in early 
French court dance.34 When or how then did this ideal of motility begin to be embedded 
in Western dance? 
                                         
31 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 26. See also Thoinot Arbeau, Orchesography: A Treatise in the 
Form of a Dialogue Whereby All Manner of Persons May Easily Acquire and Practise the Honourable Exercise 
of Dancing (New York: Dance Horizons, 1996), 11. 
32  Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 26. See also Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), 17–79. 
33 Ballet de la Nuit is a ballet by Jean-Baptiste Boe sset, Jean de Cambefort, Michel Lambert and probably 
Jean-Baptiste Lully. It premiered on 23 February 1653, and featured Louis XIV. It was the fourteen-year-
old’s debut at court. This court ballet lasted 12 hours, beginning at sundown and continuing until morning, 
and consisted of 45 dances. Louis XIV appeared in five of them. The most famous dance in Ballet de la Nuit 
portrays Louis XIV as Apollo the Sun King. 
34 The Acade mie Royale de Danse was founded in 1662. 
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In this context, Lepecki mentions the German dramatist and poet Heinrich von 
Kleist’s 1810 essay ‘On the Marionette Theatre’. Here, we can find one of the earliest and 
certainly most densely articulated theories of dance (specifically Romantic ballet) being 
clearly linked to a performance with an uninterrupted flow of movement.35 This is how 
the ideal of the uninterrupted flow of movement via the figure of a puppet is articulated: 
 
Puppets, like elves, need the ground only so that they can touch it lightly and 
renew the momentum of their limbs through this momentary delay. We [humans] 
need it to rest on, to recover from the exertions of dance, a moment which is 
clearly not part of the dance.36 
 
As Heinrich von Kleist’s text demonstrates, human bodies are portrayed as puppets that 
maintain uninterrupted flows of movement.37 For Kleist, the ideal of the human body is 
close to a puppet that can move lightly in the air. For Lepecki, positing a puppet as an 
ideal for the human body is a symptom that reveals what the kinetic project of modernity 
attempts to disguise. We all know that a puppet cannot be a self-propelled entity: the 
energy source is hidden behind a black curtain on stage. Lepecki argues that this positing 
of the ideal of the human body as a puppet reveals the ‘colonial gesture’ inherent in 
Western modernity, whereby ‘the actual source of energy is disguised and buried 
                                         
35 Filippo Taglioni’s 1832 production of La Sylphide is considered to be the first Romantic ballet, which 
premiered at the Paris Opera. Susan Foster argues that it was with the emergence of Romantic ballet that 
dance’s alignment with movement became apparent. The premise of Romantic ballet is to present dance as 
a ‘continuous motion, a motion preferably aiming upwards, [an] animating body thriving lightly in the air’. 
Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 3. See also Susan Foster, Choreography and Narrative: Ballet’s 
Staging of Story and Desire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 197–250. 
36 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 3. See also Roger Copeland and Marshall Cohen, eds., What Is 
Dance?: Reading In Theory and Criticism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 179–184. 
37 Copeland and Cohen, What Is Dance?, 179. 
46 
 
underneath the smooth surface of the colonialist’s desire’. 38  The discipline of dance 
participates in this colonial desire that attempts to transform the human body into a 
‘machine for free movement’.39 It is this colonial desire that is responsible for the advent 
of the ‘techno-body’ that has been normalised by the institutionalisation of dance.40 The 
techno-body is a specific reformulation of the body free from the demands of gravity and 
the need for energy. And it is this machine for free movement that serves to produce 
hyperkinetic subjectivity as a modern mode of existence. 
However, Lepecki argues that it was only by the 1930s that a definite theorisation 
of the ideal of motility as the essence of dance emerged in the modern institution of dance. 
For instance, Lepecki discusses John Martin’s famous lecture at the New School in 1933. 
John Martin, the first New York Times dance critic, was an ardent advocate of modern 
dance and a fierce critic of the classical school of ballet. In this lecture, he argued that both 
Romantic ballet and Classical ballet were ‘dramaturgically too tied up with narrative and 
choreographically too invested in the striking pose’.41 For John Martin, these historical 
predecessors of modern dance failed to discover movement as the essence. And for 
Martin, the essence of dance was movement. In his view, even the anti-balletic gestures 
of Isadora Duncan did not articulate that dance was to be founded on movement alone.42 
Dance had to invest more in its essence in order to become an independent form of art. 
                                         
38 Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 100. 
39 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 100. See also Carter, The Lie of the Land, 364. 
40 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 7. See also Mark Franko, “Figural Inversions of Louis XIV’s 
Dancing Body,” in Acting on the Past: Historical Performance Across the Disciplines, eds. Mark Franko and 
Annette Richards (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2000), 36. 
41 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 4. See also John Martin, The Modern Dance (New York: Dance 
Horizons, 1972), 6. 
42 For John Martin, choreographers such as Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey, Mary Wigman and Rudolf 
von Laban were the ones who actualised the essence of dance. See Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 4. 
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In this context, Lepecki argues that the institutionalisation of dance has been moving 
toward the ideological programme for defining dance as a continuum of movement. 
By deconstructing this specific historical trajectory, Lepecki prepares the ground 
on which he can formulate a logic to rearticulate many contemporary choreographic 
experiments that have been accused of being non-dance. As the title Exhausting Dance 
already suggests, Lepecki argues that contemporary choreographic experiments are 
about exhausting the modern disciplinary logic of dance. In exhausting this logic, what 
contemporary choreographic experiments achieve is the ‘deflation of movement’ that is 
evident in many contemporary choreographic experiments. 43  And because the 
conventional ontology of dance as a continuum of movement no longer works in 
contemporary choreographic experiments, this new generation of European 
choreographers has been understood as betraying the very ontology of dance: there are 
no longer people jumping up and down; no longer are there displays of spectacular 
movement according to specific choreographic manuals. Instead, turning the sets of 
conditions that sustain the Western institution of dance upside down, these 
choreographers have successfully estranged the ideal of motility that has become 
normalised within Western dance. In this light, Lepecki attempts to see whether there 
might be any emancipatory potential in the deflation of the movement of the new 
generation of choreographers. 
In this process of attempting to create a critical language for this new generation 
of choreographers, one of the most obvious tactics deployed by Lepecki is to privilege 
                                         
43 The list of choreographers in Lepecki’s discussion in Exhausting Dance does not exactly match the list of 
the choreographers I examine in this thesis. For instance, Lepecki includes Trisha Brown who is often 
associated with the avant-garde Judson Dance Theatre, and Bruce Nauman who does not identify himself 
as a choreographer. 
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philosophy. More specifically, he attempts to rethink the body and subjectivity through 
post-structuralist projects by creating a new frame of reference for this new generation 
of choreographers. In doing so, he echoes post-structuralism’s political aim of divorcing 
itself from the modernist project that produces a particular subjectivity, and giving rise 
to a new generation of choreographers who problematise the existing ontology of dance 
as a continuum of movement. Within this framework, the practice of these new 
choreographers becomes the symptom that exemplifies the exhaustion of the modernist 
project and its aim to produce a kinetic subjectivity. 44  In other words, Lepecki’s 
privileging of the discipline of philosophy, especially post-structuralism’s aims to review 
Western modernity, provides important references points for articulating the 
operational tactics deployed by this new generation of choreographers. In doing so, 
Lepecki aims to trigger a discussion of this group of choreographers that goes beyond the 
self-contained disciplinary boundaries of dance studies in order to push dance studies 
forward into other critical study areas. 
Against this backdrop, I will take a close look at two choreographic experiments 
by Jérôme Bel and Boris Charmatz. Despite the fact that it is not possible to categorise 
them within an artistic movement or group, Bel and Charmatz both trained as traditional 
ballet dancers at conventional French dance institutions in the 1980s (Bel at the Centre 
national de danse contemporaine in Angers and Charmatz at the École de Danse at the 
Opéra national de Paris). Their problematisation of the very institution that they inhabit, 
especially its disciplinary desire to reformulate the body within a specific logic of 
representation, allows me to juxtapose Bel and Charmatz in this chapter. 
                                         
44 Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 7. 
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In the coming part, I will first examine Bel’s Pichet Klunchun and Myself (2005), 
which is one of his dance-theatres that I saw in Seoul. Then, I will examine Charmatz’s 
Enfant (2011), a recent production that I came across several times at various European 
festivals. Following Lepecki’s reading of contemporary choreographic experiments as a 
key symptom of the exhaustion of modernism’s aim to produce a kinetic subjectivity, I 
will examine how conventional configuration of the body has been challenged both in Bel 
and Charmatz’ dance-theatres. 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself is a good example that demonstrates Bel’s mode of 
critical engagement with the disciplinary logic which aims to reformulate the body. In the 
modern institutionalisation of dance in the West, this disciplinary logic was manifested 
in the dancing-subject who is in a constant agitation or ‘flow or continuum of movement’. 
In presenting a clear counter-logic to the disciplinary logic of the institution of dance via 
juxtaposing himself with a traditional Thai Khon dancer Pichet Klunchun, Bel clearly 
reveals his understanding of what makes dance dance, that does not necessarily involve 
jumping up and down and creating striking poses.  
However, what has to be considered here is the fact that Bel does not juxtapose 
himself with a ballet dancer but a Thia Khon dancer Pichet Klunchun. Thus, what is 
emerged is a complex relationship not only between contemporary choreographic 
experiments and the modern institution of dance, but also between the modern 
institution of dance and the other. In these multiple layers of meanings, I first pay 
attention to how Bel demonstrates a counter-logic to the kinetic subjectivity demanded 
by the modern institution of dance in the West. In other words, why has the body within 
the specific institution of dance been conceived as something controllable under the 
pedagogical logic of representation? 
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Bel problematises what I would like to call as the modern subject machine that 
understands the body as a self-enclosed boundary and a self-sufficient entity. Under the 
operation of the modern subject machine, the body is conceived as something already 
there, as a blank canvas whose boundaries and limits are predictable and visibly 
determined.45 However, the body as a blank canvas does not mean that it is neutral. The 
body is always already captured within the particular modalities of sociopolitical 
discourses that are impregnated with institutional power and hierarchies. This will be 
discussed further in the coming part via examining the dialectical position of Bel and 
Klunchun.   
In parallel with the institutionalised body in Pichet Klunchun and Myself, I will also 
discuss Charmatz’s inert bodies of children in Enfant. This dance-theatre was first 
presented at the Avignon Festival when he was invited to be the associate artist. 
Charmatz’s inert bodies of children show a dramatic contrast from the conventional 
disciplinary logic that reformulates the body as always being-toward-movement. But his 
inert bodies of children, who are not professional dancers, do not represent the 
emancipated body. It is true that Enfant disturbs what has been normalised within the 
institution of dance. Yet, Charmatz’s performance also highlights complex sociopolitical 
institutions whose area of control (and moral codes of conduct) begins by reformulating 
the body within a specific disciplinary logic. 
 
 
 
                                         
45 By the modern subject machine I mean the systematic production of the self-sufficient, independent 
individual as a basic unit for a holistic picture of the world. 
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Jérôme Bel’s Pichet Klunchun and Myself 
Jérôme Bel’s Pichet Klunchun and Myself (2005), which is one of the first of Bel’s dance-
theatres that I came across in Seoul. This dance-theatre has also remained one of the most 
problematic dance-theatres for me, and has lingered in my psyche for a long time. It has 
intrigued me to embark on further theoretical investigations into the critical potential of 
contemporary choreographic experiments, but at the same time it has evoked mixed 
emotions over time that has often resulted in thwarting my attempts to articulate further 
my positionality in relation to contemporary choreographic experiments. And one of the 
main issues for me begins with the fact that, in this dance-theatre, I identify with the 
positionality of Klunchun as a Thai Khon dancer, instead of with Jérôme Bel. And what is 
problematic for me is not so much what Bel or Klunchun says on stage, but what remains 
unsaid from the position of Klunchun in this seemingly egalitarian conversation between 
the two. In order for me to explain why I find what is unsaid problematic, I need to make 
a brief detour via this dance-theatre. 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself is an important work for Bel, because this particular 
work represents a breakthrough in his career. Since he premiered nom donné par l’auteur 
in 1994, Bel has been an important reference point for a new generation of 
choreographers who have attempted to create a different relationship with the 
institution of dance in the West. But it is not wrong to say that with Pichet Klunchun and 
Myself Bel gained the widest public acknowledgement, as well as unprecedented 
attention from other fields of contemporary art. One of the reasons for the popular 
success is the element of humour that is evident throughout the performance. This 
element of humour stems from the clear counter-logic presented by Bel, not only against 
the Western model of the institution of dance but also in the way he positions himself 
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against the traditional Thai dancer, Klunchun. For some, this element of humour becomes 
problematic, as laughter from audience members materialises what is unsaid about the 
positionality of Klunchun, which is installed and devised by Bel. 
For instance, when Pichet Klunchun and Myself was presented at the Spring Wave 
Festival in Seoul in 2007, a local art critic became so furious that he yelled at Bel, who was 
on stage. The performance had to be terminated and was only able to resume a few 
minutes later after that critic had left the theatre after being booed by other audience 
members. What prompted such a violent reaction from that person? This question has 
stayed with me for a long time. Despite the fact that I disagree with the way in which this 
critic expressed his view, his violent reaction allows me to pay attention to the fact that 
Bel’s position, opposing the Western model of the modern institution of dance, is 
highlighted by the juxtaposed positionality of himself against Klunchun, which inevitably 
installs a ‘versus’ structure through which modernist logic can be uncritically imposed. 
And the problem for me lies in the fact that, contrary to Bel, Klunchun’s position and his 
relationship with the Western modern institution of dance can never be as clear as they 
first seem to be. 
As a legitimate heir of the modern institution of dance in the West (trained as a 
ballet dancer at the Centre national de danse contemporaine in Angers), Bel’s position 
opposing the very institution that he inhabits cannot be clearer when he presents his 
favourite movement to Klunchun: Bel does not dance at all but looks at the audience. In 
other words, Bel refuses to perform what could be a representation of the very institution 
in which he trained as a dancer. But what becomes problematic lies in the fact that 
Klunchun’s position and relationship with the Western model of the modern institution 
of dance cannot be as simple as Bel’s. As Klunchun explains on stage, traditional Thai 
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Khon dance has become a lost art. Since King Rama VII of Thailand banned Khon dance 
from the public realm in the name of modernisation (which is another name for 
Westernisation in many non-Western contexts), Khon dance does not even belong to its 
own people. As Klunchun admits, it now belongs to Western tourists. Klunchun talks 
about his recent attempts to re-enact Khon dance in his own theatre in Bangkok. Of course, 
these attempts are not intended to resurrect the dead masters from the last two hundred 
years; instead, Klunchun wants to translate Khon dance into his own language and in 
relation to his own contemporary situation. Nevertheless, as Klunchun admits, in so doing, 
he ends up failing both the audience that expects to see ‘virtuosic’ Khon dance, as well as 
the audience that expects to see Westernised contemporary dance. Klunchun’s struggle 
to open up the possibility of thinking about and practising other forms of dance does not 
seem to work, as he cannot clearly identify the enemy that he is rebelling against. Is it a 
local authority that has banned public performances of Khon dance? Is it Western tourists 
who limit Khon dance to being an exotic commodity? Or is it homogenisation brought 
about by a global capitalist movement in the name of progress? Instead of choosing 
between becoming a subcategory of the Western model of the modern institution of 
dance in the name of traditional dance (thanks to its diversity policy), or diminished by 
obeying the dominating imperative of modernisation, in order for indigenous knowledge 
to be translated or repositioned as intellectual property, there should be complex layers 
of resistance and operation. 
Therefore, Klunchun paradoxically highlights the fact that the ‘operation within’ 
is not as simple as one might imagine. In other words, Bel’s clear counter-logic opposing 
the very institution that he inhabits is not the end of the story. In this light, I would like to 
examine further what is unsaid in Bel’s conversation with Klunchun in Pichet Klunchun 
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and Myself. From the position of Bel, what is unsaid is the fact that the formation of the 
subjectivity of Klunchun in this dance-theatre highlights the position of Bel himself, not 
the other way round. I would argue that this formation of the other (who does not 
understand Bel’s radical gestures) resonates with the very mechanism that produces the 
colonial subjectivity that necessitates the derogation of the other. In this context, I would 
like to argue that Bel’s positioning of himself against Klunchun results in a simplification 
of the complex power structures, struggles, and different forms of resistance inherent in 
non-Western contexts and their relationship with the Western model of the modern 
institution of dance. In other words, not doing any dance on stage may not be the best 
solution in some non-Western contexts, whose archives have been violently dismantled 
and whose visibility is not even secured in the name of modernisation. 
Thus, I need to ask whether this strategy, which I have been referring to as the 
‘operation within’ that is often found in post-structuralist thinking, can still be an effective 
mode of resistance for those who cannot be comfortably positioned ‘within’. Klunchun 
trained as a traditional Thai Khon dancer, but he also trained in the USA and at other 
Western institutions. This does not, however, automatically position him within the 
institution that Bel inhabits. Although the ‘operation within’ allows us to escape from the 
dichotomy inherent in the conventional mode of institutional critique, I came to wonder 
whether this strategy could be a pertinent tactic for those who are not given any access 
to, or whose ontological or epistemological condition of being visible depends on the 
generous invitation of the West which always maintains its position as the subject 
through which silenced others are presupposed. 
The complexity of Western modernity as the ontological and epistemological 
condition that we inhabit requires us to acknowledge the fact that Western modernity is 
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the name for various temporal and spatial conditions through which different power 
structures have been installed and operated, and this requires different forms of 
resistance and criticality. In this light, I would like to emphasise that my investigation of 
contemporary choreographic experiments delivers one version of the critiques of the 
very institution that a new generation of European choreographers inhabit. And what 
interests me lies in the fact that this type of institutional critique does not seek to destroy 
the given institution, but to reformulate or enrich it. 
For instance, the story of how Pichet Klunchun and Myself came to be staged and 
legitimised as an artistic production clearly demonstrates how critical engagement with 
a particular institution is also part of the institutional operation. In his interview with Jan 
Ritsema at Les Laboratoires d’Aubervilliers, Bel reveals the back story to how he devised 
this simple and seemingly transparent structure for the performance, where one asks a 
question while the other answers, which later turned out to be so effective for him.  
When Bel was invited by a Singaporean curator, Tang Fu Kuen, to the Bangkok Fringe 
Festival in 2004, he said that he did not have any intention of giving a performance of the 
dialogue that he had with Klunchun, who had been introduced to him by the curator. Bel 
initially planned to repeat the format of his previous work, Véronique Doisneau (2004), a 
monologue in which a dancer talks about her life. When he arrived in Bangkok, however, 
he did not have enough time to actualise his initial plan. Before the scheduled premiere, 
all he had was the four days of conversation between himself and Klunchun, with whom 
Bel did not have anything in common, apart from the fact that they were both invited by 
the same curator and both were involved in the field of dance in an expanded sense of the 
term. 
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In this situation, Bel decided to restage his conversations with Klunchun. To 
respond to a situation in which they had to produce something for the festival, Bel 
developed keywords that came up during the conversations that he had with Klunchun. 
In so doing, this process slowly developed into a structure in which one asks the other 
questions. Within this mirror-like structure, one interrogates the other. Also, when one 
of them demonstrates some movements, the other plays the role of the audience. During 
their conversation, they began with what they had in common, their identities as dancers, 
and then progressed to a realisation that there were certain differences between them 
within this constructed space of what is common. 
This tactic of departing from a common space was inevitable because, without 
this space of the common, they could not even initiate a conversation. What is, however, 
problematic with this process of enacting a conversation lies in the fact that in order to 
operate in this common space, there is no other way to proceed but to reproduce the 
hegemonic logic that is presupposed in what is considered to be in common. I would 
argue that this is what Spivak meant by saying that the subalterns cannot speak for 
themselves.  In other words, when Spivak argues that the subalterns cannot speak for 
themselves, it does not mean that they are not allowed to speak but that they lack the 
ground on which this presupposed, unspoken, but evidently present hegemonic logic can 
be rearticulated. Therefore, in the case of Pichet Klunchun and Myself, the attempt to 
identify difference, departing from this constructed space of what is common, inevitably 
leads to reproducing the hegemonic logic that dominates this common space between 
them. This is the Western institution of dance, that has been safeguarded by the 
modernist logic of categorisation that aims to justify the autonomous status of dance as 
art. 
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On stage, Bel begins to ask Klunchun questions. ‘What is your name?’ Klunchun 
replies, ‘My name is Pichet Klunchun’. Then further questions: ‘How old are you?’, ‘Where 
do you live?’, ‘Are you married?’, and ‘What is your profession?’ From their conversation, 
the audience gets to know that Klunchun is 35 years old and a traditional Thai Khon 
dancer from Bangkok. As Bel himself admits, at first, the mode of questioning Klunchun 
resembles that of a police interrogation. Soon, however, Bel attempts to open up the 
common space, asking why he decided to become a dancer. But unlike Bel’s original 
intention, his question highlights somewhat the differences between them, as Klunchun 
replies to Bel’s question with a long story about how his mother had longed for a son and 
had prayed in a Buddhist temple. 
At first, Bel cannot understand why Klunchun has to answer the question about 
why he decided to become a dancer with a long story about his birth. Klunchun tells Bel 
that this particular temple god appreciates dance more than anything, and so, after his 
birth, his mother commissioned a performance before the temple statue. In other words, 
for Klunchun, becoming a dancer was not a matter of preference or choice. For Klunchun, 
it was his destiny. Bel, in further professing his ignorance of Klunchun’s relation to dance, 
continues to ask more questions about Khon dance. Klunchun explains that the Ramayana 
legend, which came from India two hundred years ago, provides the basic plot for Khon 
dance-theatre. It was King Rama II, an excellent dancer himself, who translated the legend 
and choreographed the movements as a legitimate artistic repertoire for the glorification 
of his royal court. At this moment, Bel intervenes in Klunchun’s explanation. Bel argues 
that it was also politics that gave birth to ballet. In attempting to find common ground 
between himself and Klunchun, Bel talks about how Louis XIV advocated the 
establishment of a school of ballet in order to propagate his political message. 
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Bel then asks Klunchun whether he can demonstrate some of the movements 
from Khon dance for him. What follows is a lucid demonstration of the physical language 
of Khon. Klunchun also explains how the language of Khon works within the formal 
conventions of Thai theatre. Klunchun demonstrates a few techniques of Khon dance, 
such as turned-back movements of the fingers with turned-out legs and aggressive 
stomps. At last, Bel attempts to learn Klunchun’s movements himself. But these 
movements are not something that one can learn in such a short time. They require years 
of practice and painful training. Instead of narrowing the gap between Bel and Klunchun, 
Bel’s attempt to learn Klunchun’s movements ends up by reinforcing the differences 
between them. 
And it is at this moment that the audience begins to giggle or laugh at Bel’s 
voluntary positioning of himself as an ignorant dancer. What is ironic is the fact that their 
laughter is not really directed at Bel’s inability to perform what Klunchun performs. 
Rather, it highlights Klunchun’s ignorance of the new critical language of contemporary 
dance that refuses to accept the old imperatives of the institution of dance based on hard 
training and painful practice in the studio in front of the gaze of a master. For instance, 
when Klunchun asks Bel a question about the kind of dance he practises, Bel replies to 
Klunchun that he is identified as a choreographer, but he does not really do the job. And 
when Bel is asked to demonstrate his favourite movement, all Bel does is stand still on 
stage, doing nothing. Klunchun is baffled. Then, there is further laughter from the 
audience. It is this stark contrast between the two positions in relation to the Western 
institution of dance that elicits laughter from the audience, and I would argue that this is 
what is unsaid, and the laughter from the audience is how what is unsaid is materialised. 
When Bel demonstrates his favourite movement, which is doing nothing and staring at 
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the audience, Klunchun seems to be shocked by this bold gesture from Bel. But the 
audience seems to enjoy this clear contrast between their positions. And it is through this 
element of humour that Bel’s radical denial of the given imperatives of the conventional 
institution of Western dance seems to gain more sympathy from audience members. 
Although the different positions of the ignorant one and the knowledgeable one 
are not made clear in this performance, what drew my attention was the fact that the 
ignorant position of Bel vis-à-vis Klunchun’s dance does not really put him in the position 
of one who is ignorant. Instead, it was the knowledgeable Klunchun, who practises 
traditional Khon dance, who was perceived as ignorant as he did not understand Bel’s 
counter-logic opposing the Western institution of dance. Therefore, despite the fact that 
Bel did not install a simple colonialist and colonised model in his performance, it was 
clear that the different positions of the two highlighted somewhat their unequal 
relationships with the Western institution of dance. 
The reason why Bel’s counter-logic to the dominating Western institution of 
dance is because he belongs to the Western institution of dance.  In fact, it is the Western 
institution of dance that legitimises Pichet Klunchen and Myself as a valid critique of this 
institution. As Bel confesses in the aforementioned interview with Ritsema, at first he was 
not even sure this could be called a performance. Even after its premiere in Bangkok, Bel 
did not have any desire to include this performance in his repertoire. It was Frie Leysen, 
artistic director of the Kunsten Festival des Arts at that time, who asked Bel to recreate 
the piece at the Kaaitheater in Brussels.  Bel said that it was in the studio of the 
Kaaitheater, where many of his friends and colleagues were present supporting this 
performance, that he realised that what he had done could work as a performance. In 
other words, without Leysen’s invitation, this piece might not have come into being at all.  
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Moreover, if his colleagues and friends had not supported this production, this 
performance would not have gone on to tour the globe. In other words, it is the existing 
institution of dance that embraces Bel’s counter-logic opposing his own institution. It is 
the existing Western institution of dance that continuously redefines what makes dance 
dance and gives new life to what might otherwise be conceived as a mere representation 
of a conversation between two strangers. In this context, Pichet Klunchun and Myself is 
not just a dance performance given by two performers in conversation, but a 
performance that is produced, consumed, and distributed by the specific economy of the 
Western institution of art. In other words, the institution of dance is not just a house that 
displays practices, but one with active producers, consumers, and distributors of what is 
to come. 
In contrast to Bel’s situation, Klunchun’s struggle against the Western institution 
of dance is more complicated. During his conversation with Bel, Klunchun attempted to 
convey his knowledge of Khon dance to the audience. He explained the subtle gestures of 
characterisation that distinguish four characters, the female, the male, the demon, and 
the monkey in Khon dance. He also explained how the general shape of the body in Khon 
is meant to imitate the architecture of Thai temples. But this knowledge of Khon turned 
out to be incapable of creating a logic to counter the Western institution of dance. On 
stage, Klunchun explained that since King Rama VII of Thailand banned Khon dance from 
the public realm in the name of modernisation in the 1960s, the fight for Khon dance 
became, paradoxically, one about making sure that Khon dance was safely located within 
the Western model of the modern institution of dance, through which theatre stages are 
secured and the movements of masters are preserved. In other words, in the process of 
modernisation and so-called ‘developing’ nations’ attempts to catch up and overcome 
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their ‘belatedness’ in order to transform themselves into modern states, the Western 
model of the institution becomes the norm and the condition for sustainability within or 
against the upside-down sociopolitical structures of post-colonial states. But these 
attempts to be at the centre of things, or to catch up from their belatedness, were never 
meant to be successful as they only confirm that the alleged inferiority of the non-West 
in relation to the West is legitimate. As Klunchun admits, in its fight for survival, Khon no 
longer belongs to its own people. In an attempt to preserve what is on the brink of 
disappearing in the name of modernisation, it ends up belonging to Western tourists. This 
paradoxical demand is inherent in any contemporary artistic production in the non-West, 
on the one hand the Western model of the modern institution of art is something to catch 
up with, but on the other hand, it is something to resist.  
 
The Body Under the ‘Garment of Grace’ 
If the centre of my analysis in Pichet Klunchun and Myself is the complex layers of the 
institutionalised body of the other, in this part, I would like to discuss othering process of 
the body of children via disciplinary control over the body that Charmatz highlights in his 
dance-theatre Enfant. If a puppet, which symbolises the ontology of hyperkinetic 
subjectivity in the Western model of the modern institution of dance, disguises the actual 
source of movement, disguises actual source of movement, Charmatz’s Enfant is not 
afraid of revealing the real source of movement 
When the second notice bell rings, the stage goes completely dark. Through the 
gloom of the darkened stage, I can only see the outlines of two huge machines standing 
on it. They look like cranes with long wires reaching out all over the stage. A few minutes 
later, two dancers are hooked up to the machines. The first dancer is dragged across the 
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floor and then hoisted dangerously in the air. Then the second dancer is hoisted even 
higher. The horrible creaking and groaning noises produced by the machines intensify 
what is already a charged atmosphere in the theatre. Finally, when they are brought down, 
they are placed next to another dancer who is already on what looks like a huge, rolling-
carpet machine placed in the centre of the stage. They are then savagely shaken and 
thumped up and down to the point where it becomes uncomfortable to watch. This is the 
very beginning of Enfant. 
Despite this sounds too obvious, the crane-like machines themselves, which is the 
source of movement, do not have any intent. Once they are engineered to move the 
dancers up and down, they are apparently indifferent to what they bring about. It is at 
this very moment when the human bodies seem to be completely defeated by the cold 
machinery that I think about the image of a man erased by the waves of the sea, as 
portrayed by Michel Foucault. In The Order of Things, while finishing his research on 
human sciences in the age of reason, Foucault writes the following as the last sentence of 
the book: ‘The man will be erased like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.’46 
Through this image of a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea, vulnerable to being 
erased by the waves at any moment, what does Foucault imply? The basic condition for 
the birth of human science in the age of reason was to construe humans as the stable 
subject and object of knowledge, positioning Man as the source of all representation and 
knowledge. However, this is exactly what Foucault refuses to accept. 
What must be highlighted is the fact that Foucault’s declaration that ‘the man will 
be erased’ has nothing to do with the Apocalypse or a pessimistic prophecy. Instead, it is 
                                         
46 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994), 387. 
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an affirmation that the humans whom we know today are not the ultimate destination of 
history. Throughout the vast array of his research, Foucault challenges the progressive 
view of human science that claims to have concrete knowledge and an answer to the 
question of what human nature is. By challenging Western modernity’s political 
investment in the construction of a predetermined notion of Man, Foucault continually 
seeks ‘the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of 
transforming ourselves’.47 In this context, Foucault’s image of a human face drawn in the 
sand at the edge of the sea should be understood as an affirmation that the notion of Man 
can always be rewritten, as it is just a matter of constitution at a specific time for specific 
strategic functions. For Foucault, rewriting has to begin by questioning the privileged 
position of humans as the subject via which the foundation for all types of signification is 
guaranteed. 
On the stage of Enfant, the well-trained bodies of dancers do not have any will to 
resist the operation of the machinery. They seem already to have given up the privileged 
position of the human as subject. Here, the human body is completely subjected to the 
power of the machinery, so that the impotence of the human body exposes its materiality 
as flesh. With the bodies so vulnerable, with no will to resist, what is Charmatz trying to 
say? Does he want to highlight the victory of the machine over humanity in the age of 
technology? Is this his critique on our technological society? 
It is true that we have become more immune to images of the human body as mere 
flesh in the midst of our contemporary media storm. We can no longer feel anything about 
images of female nudes in bling commercial advertisements or violent images of dead 
                                         
47 Foucault, The Order of Things, 153. 
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bodies on battlefields in remote corners of the world. However, what is troubling here, 
and at the same time what bestows a critical possibility on Charmatz’s presentation of 
the impotence of human bodies, comes, ironically, from the fact that this presentation 
takes place in a theatre. 
I am fully aware of the fact that I am not here to watch Swan Lake, which means I 
do not expect to see dancers thriving lightly in the air as a symbol of overcoming gravity. 
Yet, because it takes place in a theatre, the fact that Charmatz does not yield to the 
conventional disciplinary logic of dance highlights what is ruptured by the 
choreographer’s wilful renunciation of disciplinary control over the body. By presenting 
impotent bodies that do not have any muscular energy to resist the operation of the 
machinery, what is highlighted is Charmatz’s refusal of the hyperkinetic subjectivity that 
is demanded, normalised, and institutionalised in the modern institution of dance. This 
creates friction with the conventional understanding of what the discipline of dance is 
supposed to be. Throughout modernity, dance has been supposed to seek to maximise 
the potential of the human body in order for it to be presented as being-toward-
movement. And in return, this clear identity has guaranteed for dance an autonomous 
status in modern art. 48  However, Charmatz’s refusal to accept this disciplinary logic 
clearly problematises this given condition within the Western model of the institution of 
dance. In the coming part, I will develop the discussion of how Charmatz’s refusal of the 
disciplinary logic in Enfant not only disturbs the smooth operation of the modern 
                                         
48 The history of dance being recognised as art, and hence granted aesthetic autonomy, is a complex one. 
Among other things, dance being recognised as art can be examined by looking at the historical alliance 
between dance and theatre, and to an even greater extent between dance and literature.  
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institution of dance, but also the complex sociopolitical discourses that constitute a 
specific ethical imperative in our contemporary society. 
 
Not Everyone Charmed by Charmatz’s Enfant 
‘Not everyone charmed by Charmatz’s Enfant’.49 This is the headline of a review of Enfant 
after it premiered at Festival Avignon. This is the reason that this reporter provides: 
 
Nine other dancers appear on stage holding children who are seemingly asleep. 
Some of the dancers hold the children tenderly but others manipulate their limbs 
as if they were objects.50 
 
After the scene where three adult dancers are shaken on top of what looks like a rolling-
carpet machine, the problem that is exposed on Charmatz’s stage becomes even more 
complicated. Some of the survivors of the rolling-carpet machine begin to appear on stage 
again while pushing the bodies of children along. So the bodies of children slither across 
the floor. Some being pulled by their feet, more than a dozen children are dragged on 
stage by adult dancers, exposing their inertia as they do so. The vulnerability of human 
bodies is intensified by the bodies being those of children, so small and inert that they 
look like they have no energy whatsoever. After being bumped along upside down, these 
helpless, unresisting little figures are piled up into heaps before being swung around in 
                                         
49 Brent Gregston, “Not everyone charmed by Charmatz’s ‘Enfant’”, review of Enfant, by Boris Charmatz, 
RFI, July 12, 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/visiting-france/20110712-turning-adult-world-its-head. 
50 Ibid. 
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the air in all directions by the adult dancers. Therefore, it is not surprising that ever since 
Enfant premiered in 2011, it has aroused controversy. 
 
It was sinister and distasteful to see these small children being tossed around like 
so many limp dolls.51 
 
As this review clearly reveals, as soon as the bodies of children appear, normative moral 
codes begin to function that go beyond the discipline of dance. Now this is not just a 
matter of dance. It is as if someone sets off the emergency alarm by accident so that the 
ear-bashing sound of a siren automatically rings. In a civilised Western society, the bodies 
of children should remain out of reach. As soon as one touches the body of child that is 
not one’s own, one has to be prepared for the noise of a siren tearing at one’s ears. The 
hasty reaction from the press – a headline such as ‘Not everyone charmed by Charmatz’s 
Enfant’, or a convinced review that the message of this performance is the 
choreographer’s denunciation of paedophilia – reveals how the signifier enfant is no 
longer safe and immune from the world we live in, but comes to be located in a perplexing 
position. Enfant, especially the body of an enfant, no longer signifies a world that is safe 
and innocent, like in the images portrayed in The Sound of Music. Instead, it becomes one 
of the most agitating words in our media-driven society, signifying a battlefield where 
complex issues of our society are fought. In an interview with Ruhrtriennale, Charmatz 
acknowledges the fact that the word enfant does not signify what it used to thirty years 
                                         
51 Patricia Boccadoro, “Review: Enfant (‘Child’),” review of Enfant by Boris Charmatz, Culture Kiosque, 
December 9, 2011, http://www.culturekiosque.com/dance/reviews/bcharmatz_enfant_pbocca681.html. 
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ago.52 He says that the word enfant is already caught up within complex and countless 
social issues, such as school violence, paedophilia, social insecurity, poverty, and racism. 
In this context, it is quite significant that Charmatz uses the word enfant in its singular 
form as the title of his work, despite there being dozens of children in the performance. 
As Charmatz himself explains, it is because the performance is not about presenting cute 
and young children singing and dancing for the amazement of adults, but about posing 
questions that are formulated by the signifier enfant. 
 
The children are not bringing, let’s say, the life, usually … they sing and dance but 
what they bring first is being asleep, not moving, being inert, so they bring more 
troubles, problems, questions than the security of life.53 
 
It was when I saw Heiner Goebbels’ When the Mountain Changed its Clothing (2013) that 
I was able to comprehend what Charmatz was trying to do. After a year or so, by chance 
at the same festival at which I saw Charmatz’s Enfant, I saw Goebbels’ When the Mountain 
Changed its Clothing (2013). This is a musical theatre piece that Goebbels produces with 
forty young girls, aged between ten and twenty, from the Vocal Theatre Carmina 
Slovenica. These young girls are also amateur performers like the children in Charmatz’s 
Enfant.54 In this performance, Goebbels attempts to answer his initial question, ‘what do 
young girls dream of?’, through various constructed theatrical scenes of these girls 
singing and dancing. Unlike the inert bodies of children in Charmatz’s Enfant, the bodies 
                                         
52 “Boris Charmatz u ber enfant und links,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhM0ejAb350. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The girls in Goebbels’ When the Mountain Changed its Clothing are generally older than the children in 
Charmatz’s Enfant. 
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of these young girls are not at all exposed to what could be considered a hostile situation. 
It becomes clear to me that these girls are represented within what Giorgio Agamben calls 
the ‘garment of grace’.55 
The ‘garment of grace’ is a term that Agamben uses in his essay ‘Nudity’ to explain 
the complex sociopolitical desire to capture the body within a specific disciplinary logic. 
And the reason why I feel that Goebbels’ representation of the girls in When the Mountain 
Changed its Clothing is within the garment of grace is because his articulation of the girls 
is never located outside the comfort zone of permissibly represented children (not the 
bodies of children). In other words, the girls are safely located within the normative idea 
of how children ought to be represented. 
Ever since Adam and Eve were expelled from Paradise, we have been trained not 
to see the human body as it is. Even pornography is not about seeing the body as it is. A 
specific discursive operation involving nude human bodies in pornography is not about 
exposing the human body as it is. Rather, it is very much about obeying discursive 
imperatives projected onto human bodies, for instance, the objectification of female 
bodies for the pleasure of the male gaze. In other words, the human body has never been 
allowed to be presented as it is. It is in this context, in his essay ‘Nudity’, that Agamben 
conducts an interesting analysis of how the theology of clothing has been developed as a 
subjectivity project so that what makes humans human lies in the fact that we all have a 
body. He argues that the story in Genesis about the fall of Adam and Eve is not about a 
mere moral failure, but instead reveals to us the imperatives imposed on the human body. 
Agamben argues that the human body has never been naked, even before the Fall, as it 
                                         
55 Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Redwood City: Stanford University 
Press), 60. 
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has always been enveloped by ‘the cloth of grace of God’. This is why the Fall is about the 
discovery of the human body, ‘which [has] become visible for the eyes that have now been 
“opened” and … what was before veiled and dressed is now unveiled and undressed’.56 
Watching dozens of girls singing and dancing according to the direction given by 
a hetero-white-male gaze, I realise that the very notion of a child as an innocent being we 
have in our mind is only sustained by the ‘garment of grace’ that has been culturally, 
religiously, or institutionally demanded and protected. In fact, it is not difficult to find 
traces of how the notion of the child was invented in the first place in Western modernity 
as part of a legal, political, and social process of constituting the notion of the individual. 
What used to be perceived as a ‘little adult’ suddenly becomes an unknown species that 
has to be reinvented under the newly organised notion of modern man. For me, this is 
what Charmatz’s choreography of inert bodies of children is highlighting. And his 
decision to remove the ‘cloth of grace’ that has been wrapped around the body of what 
was once only a little adult is what makes people upset. 
In attracting attention to some of the controversies caused by Boris Charmatz’s 
inert bodies of children in Enfant, I have attempted to highlight how the body has always 
already been captured within a specific disciplinary logic that is devised to meet 
particular sociopolitical hegemonic demands. In briefly introducing Agamben’s critique 
on the notion of the ‘cloth of grace’, that has formulated specific knowledge of the body 
within Christian hermeneutics, I have attempted to highlight the fact that the body can 
never be presented as it is. In other words, it is a disciplinary logic that conditions the 
                                         
56 Ibid., 59. 
70 
 
understanding and conception of the body. And the emergence of the techno-body in the 
modern institution of dance is no exception. 
Briefly detouring via Lepecki’s line of thinking that aims to suggest the deflation 
of movement as a signifier of contemporary choreographic experiments, I examined the 
techno-body (the body as being-toward-movement) that is devised, legitimised, and 
sustained within the Western institution of dance. However, even though there are no 
longer bodies obsessed with a continuum of movement, what is highlighted is not the 
possibility of the body being a pure material entity. Both the institutionalized body in 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself and the discursive body in Enfant highlight the fact that the 
body has always already been captured within a logic of representation. The body can 
never be naked or be without its socially, politically, and culturally constructed ‘garment 
of grace’.  
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the particular strategy developed in the 
institutionalisation of dance in the West that reconfigure the body within a specific 
disciplinary logic. In doing so, I will pay attention to the term choreography, which is a 
neologisim that combines choreo- and -graphy. With the emergence of the particular 
tactical operation that writes dancing bodies, the modern institution of dance produced 
the particular understanding of the dancing-subject. What has to be highlighted here is 
the fact that the term writing is more than a literal process of inscribing something on 
paper or on a computer. In the coming part, via French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s 
theory of writing, I will highlight complex layers of the term writing. I will demonstrate 
how pushing the parameters of thinking writing can be deployed as an active force that 
disturb the smooth operation of the modern subject machine. Hence, the technology of 
writing as emerged in the institutionalisation of dance should not be perceived as an 
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auxiliary technology. Instead, it is emerged as a deconstructive force through which the 
choreographer-subject can be reconstituted. 
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Chapter 2. What Makes Dance Choreography?  
– Binding the Body with the Technology of Writing 
 
Tactics in the Institutionalisation of Dance 
The question that I want to consider in this chapter is how the particular disciplinary logic 
of dance that I discussed in the previous chapter has come to be institutionalised so that 
it can be repeated and operate as an institutional principle. In other words, I am asking 
how the ‘structural necessity’ of any institutionalisation process has been met and dealt 
with at a particular moment in history by a specific group of people or individuals. The 
term ‘structural necessity’ comes from Christopher Johnson’s System and Writing in the 
Philosophy of Jacques Derrida.57 In revisiting Jacques Derrida’s discussion, in Writing and 
Difference, of Foucault’s project on madness, Johnson explains that Derrida disagrees with 
the way in which Foucault localises the division between reason and madness within a 
specific historical context. Nevertheless, Johnson points out that Derrida agrees with the 
‘structural necessity’ of such a division, that Foucault refers to as a ‘decision’. Johnson 
explains that, at first glance, Derrida’s italicised use of the term ‘decision’ seems to be 
somewhat abstract when compared with Foucault’s original notion of the term. It is 
because Foucault’s notion of the decision implies ‘inherent violence’, as it is already 
historically determined. Johnson, however, argues that for Derrida, the decision is a 
fundamental structure of logos. And it is the violence that is inevitable in the irruption of 
logos that makes Derrida’s decision fundamentally violent too. What is significant in 
Derrida’s idiosyncratic deployment of Foucault’s notion of the decision is the fact that, for 
                                         
57 Christopher Johnson, System and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 53. 
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Derrida, the term, as a fundamental structural necessity, is equivalent to a passion for 
inscription. As Johnson contends, for Derrida, decision is analogous to the principle of 
inscription. And as Derrida says, ‘it is the moment at which we must decide whether we 
will engrave what we hear’.58 
In this context, the way I deploy the term ‘structural necessity’ refers to Derrida's 
decision as being equivalent to a passion for inscription. In other words, when I ask what 
is ‘the structural necessity’ in the institutionalisation of dance, I ask how it is captured 
within a ‘passion for inscription’. In pursuing the question of how the disciplinary logic of 
dance is captured within a ‘passion for inscription’, I shall pay attention to the dialogue 
between the Jesuit priest and dance master, Thoinot Arbeau, and the lawyer and past 
pupil Capriol that Lepecki mentions in Exhausting Dance.59  
This dialogue, which can be found in Orchesography, a book first published in 1589, 
gives us a clue to understand the kind of tactics deployed in order to transform the 
specific disciplinary logic of dance into something inscribable and repeatable. Before I go 
into the details of the dialogue, I would like to explain how I use the term ‘tactics’. Here, I 
employ the term based on Kevin Jon Heller’s discussion in ‘Power, Subjectification and 
Resistance in Foucault’.60 In attempting to rethink Michel Foucault’s notion of power, 
especially his notion of ‘non-subjective power’, Heller contends that Foucault 
distinctively separates the term ‘strategy’ from ‘tactics’. For instance, tactics are 
something that can be planned by individuals or a group; but strategy cannot be planned, 
as it is the effects of the operation of specific tactics. This is what Heller argues: 
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59 Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 26.  
60 Kevin Jon Heller, “Power, Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault,” Substance 25 (1996): 78–110. 
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‘Tactics’ are the intentional actions carried out in determinate political contexts 
by individual and groups; ‘strategies’ are the unintentional but institutionally and 
socially regularised effects produced by the non-subjective articulation of 
different individual and group tactics. Both tactics and strategies involve power, 
because both create social change; only strategies, however, involve non-
subjective power.61 
 
Therefore, my aim in tracing the tactics utilised by specific groups or individuals, as 
illustrated in the dialogue between Arbeau and Capriol in Orchesography, is to examine 
the strategies that emerged to inscribe a disciplinary logic for the institutionalisation of 
dance.62 In other words, it is through identifying the tactics deployed that I can examine 
the effects that are produced by their specific deployment. 
The dialogue begins when Capriol, a young lawyer from Paris, goes to Langres to 
visit his old master, Arbeau, who is not only a maths master but also a dance master as 
well as a Jesuit priest. At first glance, this particular dialogue may look like a general 
greeting between master and ex-pupil. This is how Capriol presents himself to his master: 
 
Capriol: I come to pay you my respects, Monsieur Arbeau. You do not remember 
me, for it is six or seven years since I left this town of Langres to go to Paris and 
thence to Orleans. I am an old pupil of yours, to whom you taught computation.  
Arbeau: Indeed at first glance I failed to recognize you because you have grown 
up since then, and I feel sure that you have also broadened your mind by 
                                         
61 Ibid., 87. 
62 Orchesography is the most detailed and authentic record of fifteenth and sixteenth century dances in the 
West. It deals with what we would today call the ballroom dances of the period. The figure of Capriol is 
believed to be fictional, while Thoinot Arbeau is the author of the book and a historical figure.  
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manliness and learning. What do you think of the study of law? I pursued it in 
bygone days myself.63 
 
In this dialogue, Capriol reveals his identity as a past student of computation, and Arbeau 
asks Capriol about his study of law, which Arbeau himself pursued a long time before. Yet, 
what is happening here is not a simple identification of each other’s occupations. As 
Lepecki points out, the encounter between the priest, mathematician, and dance master, 
Arbeau, and the lawyer, Capriol, illuminates the special relationship that appeared 
between mathematics, law, and theology in the advent of the disciplinary tactic that 
bound the dancing body to writing.64 After revealing his identity to Arbeau, Capriol tells 
his master the purpose of his visit, which gives us a clue as to why and how this binding 
of the body to writing began. He tells Arbeau of his desire to learn a proper dance as a 
mode of socialisation: 
 
Capriol: I find [dancing] a noble art and necessary in the conduct of affairs, but I 
regret that while in Orleans I neglected to learn fine manners, an art with which 
many scholars enriched themselves as an adjunct to their studies. For, on my 
return, I have found myself in society where, to put it briefly, I was tongue-tied 
and awkward, and regarded as little more than a block of wood … I should like to 
have acquired skill in dancing during the hours between my serious studies, an 
accomplishment which would have rendered my company welcome to all.65 
 
                                         
63 Arbeau, Orchesography, 11. 
64 Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 25. 
65 Arbeau, Orchesography, 11. 
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Capriol says that he has to learn how to dance so that he may ‘not be reproached for 
having the heart of a pig and the head of an ass’.66 This young lawyer’s desire to dance, 
as a mode of socialisation in the hetero-mating theatrics of society, initiates a specific 
project that necessitates a complex mode of entanglement between what Foucault calls 
the technologies of the self and those of domination. I will return to this point in the next 
chapter, but first I will briefly explain what I mean by this. Capriol’s desire to learn his 
master’s dance, as if these movements belonged to him from the beginning, is about 
internalising the great movements of the master. And it is this process of internalisation, 
and Capriol’s deliberate intention to place himself under the imperatives of the hetero-
mating theatrics of society, that complicates the notion of domination, which always 
already accompanies what Foucault calls the ‘technologies of the self’, based on one’s 
deliberate participation.67 
Capriol and Arbeau do, however, face a problem. In their attempt to restage not 
only Arbeau’s dance but also the great dances of the past, they realise that these great 
dances of the old masters are no longer available to them. Arbeau points out that 
knowledge of dance is not something that can be recovered once its master is gone.  
 
Arbeau: As regards ancient dances all I can tell you is that the passage of time, the 
indolence of man or the difficulty of describing them has robbed us of any 
knowledge… 
                                         
66 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 26–27. See also Arbeau, Orchesography, 11.  
67 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954–1984), ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 222. 
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Capriol: I foresee then that posterity will remain ignorant of all these new dances 
you have named for the same reason that we have been deprived of the 
knowledge of those of our ancestors.  
Arbeau: One must assume so. 
Capriol: Do not allow this to happen, Monsieur Arbeau, as it is within your power 
to prevent it. Set these things down in writing to enable me to learn this art, and 
in so doing you will seem reunited with the companions of your youth and take 
both mental and bodily exercise, for it will be difficult for you to refrain from 
using your limbs in order to demonstrate the correct movements. In truth, your 
method of writing is such that a pupil, by following your theory and precepts, 
even in your absence, could teach himself in the seclusion of his own chamber.68 
 
When Arbeau regrets that all the greatness of ancient dance has been erased by the 
passage of time and nothing remains in the archive of dance, Capriol worries that 
Arbeau’s own art of dance may face a similar fate. Thus, Capriol suggests that his master 
write down his movements so that, even in his absence, his dance can be passed on to 
future generations. This is the very moment when dance became a writing project, 
through which the body submits itself to the force of writing. At the intersection where 
the ‘techniques of domination’ and the ‘techniques of the self’ demand to meet, we see the 
rise of a tactic of submitting the body to the force of writing, which is later developed into 
a coherent technology called choreography. As Lepecki explains: 
 
                                         
68 Requoted from Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 27. See also Arbeau, Orchesography, 15.  
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At the critical point where dance finds its new destiny as choreography, we find 
the joint labors of a lawyer and a priest. Here is a powerful foundational duo to 
consider choreography’s ontohistorical relationship to the force of law. A male 
couple, dancing within a psycho-philosophical, theological, and gendered space 
triangulated by hard discourses and disciplines: mathematics, religion, law.69 
 
With the emergence of this new technology, thanks to ‘the joint labours of a lawyer and a 
priest’, dance now finds its new destiny as choreography. What is most important in this 
technology of choreography is the fact that it locates the body under the force of writing. 
In so doing, this joint tactic of a lawyer and a priest enables the institutionalisation of a 
particular disciplinary logic. 
As its name clearly indicates, Arbeau’s Orchesography reveals what might be the 
first moment when the tactic of binding two seemingly unrelated words, orcheso- (dance) 
and -graphy (writing), was plotted and engineered.70 As this neologism literally reveals, 
dance-writing means to write one’s movements onto the body of another. What has to be 
emphasised here is the fact that there is no natural transference between writing and the 
body of another. The very tactic of putting them together brings about the advent of the 
technique that disciplines the body of the other (based on a particular conception of the 
linguistic body within the logic of representation) under the force of writing. And the 
deployment of this tactic seems to capture the dancing body successfully, within the 
disciplinary logic of dance, allowing for the emergence of a technology later called 
choreography in the institutionalisation of dance in Western modernity. 
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What must be highlighted, however, is the double-sided effect of the tactical 
operation of binding the body with writing. The tactic of binding the body with writing is 
what allows the master’s dance to be recorded in the archive of dance. Yet, what must 
also be highlighted is the unstable ground on which the subjectivity of the master 
emerges in this tactical operation. In the coming part, I will attempt to articulate further 
why the tactical operation of binding the body results in bringing about the unstable 
ground for the subjectivity of the master. 
 
Writing Emerging as a Deconstructive Strategy 
In Exhausting Dance, Lepecki discusses this unstable ground on which the master’s 
subjectivity is articulated with the term ‘the spectral’. Thanks to the power of 
telecommunication inherent in the technology of writing, by submitting the body to the 
force of writing, the movements of the dead master are able to find a way of always being 
present. Therefore, the institution of dance is ready to transform itself and become a 
memory machine from which the dead master’s movements never fade. 
My particular focus here is the Derridean term ‘spectral’ that is used by Lepecki 
when articulating the subjectivity of the master that emerges in the institution of dance. 
Because of its spectral presence, the emergence of the master-subjectivity brings about a 
‘haunting temporality’ where time is caught up in the haunted chamber of the dead 
choreographer.71 It is true that it is this haunting temporality that enables the dead 
master to be ‘reunited’ with his living pupils. But the position of mastery here is unstable. 
Because of its spectral subjectivity, the spectral master only comes into being by 
                                         
71  Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 26–28. See also Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on 
Subjection (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 2. 
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disturbing any stabilisation of the ground on which its master-subjectivity emerges. In 
other words, it is the technology of writing that enables the emergence of the spectre-
master in the institution of dance. Yet, it is the same technology that prevents the 
instalment of the position of mastery, as its ‘haunted temporality’ confuses time by 
disturbing the solid ground on which is installed the position of mastery. 
It is in this light that I would like to examine Jacques Derrida’s tactical investment 
in writing. This investment begins by highlighting a self-deconstructing logic inherent in 
writing. For Derrida, the self-deconstructing logic of writing becomes evident when we 
think about the power of telecommunication inherent in the technology of writing. It is 
this power that makes writing writing, but at the same time it is what pushes the 
structural possibility of writing to the point where writing no longer functions as writing 
in a conventional sense. Derrida’s notion of the power of telecommunication inherent in 
writing does not simply mean that communication can occur beyond the physical 
presence of the sender of the message. He pushes the structural possibilities inherent in 
writing itself in order to allow the radical or absolute absence of the addressee. 
For example, let us say that A is writing a letter to B. From the perspective of A, 
who is sending of the letter, B is a distant presence. In other words, the notion of absence 
at play here is merely a modified form of presence. But Derrida pushes this further, to the 
point where the notion of absence ‘must be capable of being carried to a certain 
absoluteness’. Derrida insists that writing ‘must remain readable despite the absolute 
disappearance of any receiver, determined in general’. Likewise, Derrida pushes this 
notion of absence, not only in relation to the perspective of the receiver, but also that of 
the sender: 
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To write is to produce a mark … which my future disappearance will not, in 
principle, hinder in its functioning … For a writing to be a writing it must continue 
to ‘act’ and to be readable even when what is called the author of the writing no 
longer answers for what he has written … The situation of the writer is, 
concerning the written text, basically the same as that of the reader.72 
 
Here Derrida is arguing that in order for a written text to function as writing, it has to 
work even in the absolute absence of the context of its production. This does not change, 
even in a situation where writing cannot be interpreted in a linguistic system as it is 
established as a secret cipher only known by the producer and the receiver. In other 
words, even if producer and receiver were the only ones who know how to decipher the 
code and they were to die, it could still be identified as writing due to what Derrida calls 
‘iterability’. The word iterability literally means repetition. But the prefix of the word, iter 
(probably from itara ‘other’ in Sanskrit), makes it somewhat distinct from its literal 
meaning, as it allows the meaning of repetition to be tied to the notion of alterity, or 
otherness.73 In other words, what allows writing to remain writing is not just its simple 
ability to be repeated. Instead, by making an etymological connection to concepts of 
otherness to explain the notion of iterability, Derrida highlights the fact that the 
repetition that is presupposed here as the function of writing is not simply a repetition of 
the same.74 In doing so, Derrida opens up the structural possibility of a written mark that 
is freed from the ‘logocentric’ idea of an indefinitely repeatable meaning that 
presupposes a solid, sovereign subject. This is one of the reasons that explains why 
                                         
72 Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Limited Inc, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. 
Gerald Graff (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 7–8. 
73 Johnson, System and Writing, 118. 
74 Ibid., 184. See also Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” 40. 
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Derrida invests in the technology of writing and why writing emerges as a deconstructive 
strategy in Derrida’s operation opposing the institution that he inhabits. In the coming 
part, I will take a brief detour to examine Derrida’s problematisation of the logocentrism 
inherent in the Western school of philosophy. In doing so, I will take a closer look at how 
Derrida deconstructs logocentrism, which he defines as the foundation of the Western 
school of philosophy. 
 
Foundational Instability of Logocentrism 
Before focusing on Derrida’s problematisation of logocentrism, I would like to briefly 
discuss Christopher Johnson’s examination of the move made by Derrida from language 
to writing, and how this corresponds to the transformation, contemporaneous with 
Derrida, of the episteme evident across disciplines. Christopher Johnson, in System and 
Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, argues that during the 1960s, there was an 
epistemic shift from language to a more specific notion of writing within structuralism, 
or between structuralism and post-structuralism. 75  He argues that this move from 
language to writing was necessary and inevitable, saying ‘it is not the initiative or 
inspiration of one individual thinker (Derrida) but the effect of a more general 
transformation of the modern episteme’.76  
                                         
75 In System and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Johnson argues that Derrida’s own work was 
itself a major influence on the dissemination of the idea of écriture, which is discussed in Of Grammatology 
and Writing and Difference. The influence of Derrida’s reference to écriture should, however, not be 
overstated. As he himself recognises, ‘it is as much a symptom as it is a cause’. For instance, Derrida writes, 
‘the contemporary biologist speaks of writing and programme in relation to the most elementary processes 
of information within the living cell. And finally, whether it has essential limits or not, the entire field 
covered by the cybernetic programme would be the field of writing’. Requoted from Johnson, System and 
Writing, 4. See also Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 9. 
76 Johnson, System and Writing, 5.  
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Johnson talks about how information science and the general technological 
evolution of communication technology contribute to the epistemic shift from language 
to the technology of writing. Johnson clearly states, however, that Derrida does not 
display this complex conceptual and methodological matrix of the aforementioned 
disciplines in his Of Grammatology, as the orientation of Derrida’s writing is to create a 
critique opposing the discipline of Western philosophy.77 
One of the tactical reasons for Derrida’s investment in writing is to disturb the 
logocentrism via which the Western institution of philosophy has been sustained. 
According to the etymology of the term, the Greek word logos translates literally as ‘word’, 
but it also carries within it a larger sense of ‘logic’, ‘reason’, or ‘meaning’.78  Hence, 
semantically, logocentrism implies not only a tendency to privilege ‘word’, but also 
expresses a desire that is deeply embedded in the Western metaphysical tradition; the 
desire for an ultimate origin, telos, a centre or principle of truth which grounds meaning.79 
Therefore, Derrida ultimately attempts to disturb a logocentric desire that is deeply 
embedded in the Western metaphysical tradition, one ‘consistently and dogmatically 
positing a moment of pure and unmediated “presence”’.80 In other words, logocentrism 
is the defining mode of Western metaphysics that seeks to establish an essential 
foundation of reality in presence. 
                                         
77 In System and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Johnson argues ‘This is not to say that one 
should attempt to discount or minimize the importance of Derrida’s references to the “extra-philosophical” 
sphere of modern science. His citation of two sciences in particular, biology and cybernetics, is symptomatic 
and not simply a passing gesture to the intellectual fashion of the moment, for what these two disciplines 
offer to philosophical reflection is obviously of considerable relevance to Derrida’s theory of writing.’ 
Johnson, System and Writing, 7.   
78 Simon Morgan Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary (London: Continuum, 2010), 89. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 41. 
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In this context, the question to be asked is the following: What is this ‘presence’, 
and how does it come into being? From the spatial presence of something we can see, 
hear, or touch through to the temporal presence of the here and now in which we live, 
and even the absence of some presence that has been lost but might be achieved in the 
future (the return of the Messiah, for example), the Western tradition of metaphysics is 
obsessed with the notion of presence. But for Derrida, this metaphysical concept is not as 
simple as it appears at first glance. Instead, the metaphysics of presence is based on the 
foundational instability inherent in the notion of presence itself. This is because every 
seemingly pure, stable, or self-identical presence is nothing more than an effect generated 
by a prior series of differences. Nothing is ever purely and simply there. 
In this context, it is important to pay attention to Arthur Bradley’s argument in 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology. He argues that in order to dogmatically sustain the notion of 
pure and unmediated presence as an ultimate ground for truth, the metaphysical 
tradition of the West developed a tactic of establishing a series of binary opposites. For 
instance, in the Western metaphysics of presence, there is always a series of binary 
oppositions between concepts, values, or terms where, in each case, one concept is 
identified as the bearer of presence itself while the other is identified with the falling 
away, or loss of that presence. Against this backdrop, the transcendental is privileged as 
being more present than the empirical, the ideal is championed over the material, the soul 
over the body, the masculine over the feminine, and speech is perceived as the bearer of 
presence, not writing.81 
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Yet Derrida argues that the privileged position given to speech (phone) over 
writing (gramme), as the means by which the presence of logos is expressed, is not as 
sustainable as it seems at first glance. This is because all language, both speech and 
writing, is essentially mediation. If speech is also the product of mediation, the ground 
which sustains the privileged position of speech over writing loses its legitimacy. Such a 
rereading of logocentrism can be a good example of a particular operation that has 
become central to Derridean thinking: deconstruction.  
What needs to be emphasised here is the fact that deconstruction should not be 
understood as a philosophical process of destruction or demolition.82 As Bradley points 
out, ‘with those two apparently contradictory prefixes “de-” and “con-”’, what Derrida is 
actually describing is a ‘double process’ that is both ‘destructive and constructive’.83 In 
other words, on the one hand, it undoubtedly performs a negative or critical role in 
undoing, dismantling, or questioning the way in which any given system is put together. 
On the other, however, it has a very positive dimension, because its purpose is not to 
destroy but to reconstruct a given structure. What Derrida attempts to do is to articulate 
the often hidden or repressed conditions according to which it is possible for any 
structure to be constituted in the first place. This is why Derrida argues that 
deconstruction signifies the ‘undoing, decomposing and de-sedimenting of structure’ in 
order to ‘understand how an “ensemble” was constituted and to reconstruct it to this 
end’.84 This is why deconstruction is not something we do from the outside. If Derrida’s 
reading of the privileged positionality of logocentrism has a purpose, it is not to denounce 
                                         
82 Ibid., 42. See also Derrida, Of Grammatology, 10, 21. 
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what is already there but to highlight the contradictions within logocentrism itself. For 
Derrida, the process of his deconstructive reading is to show what is already in self-
deconstruction. This is why deconstruction is the ‘name for a structural or foundational 
instability on which, despite appearances to the contrary, every metaphysical system is 
erected’.85 
In highlighting the foundational instability inherent in logocentrism, Derrida 
pushes the self-deconstructing logic in logocentrism even further, to the point where he 
makes the radical claim that ‘writing precedes speech’. For Derrida, writing is primary, 
and speaking is also a form of writing. The reason is simple. Whether it is speaking or 
writing, they are both a form of inscription. In this context, the term ‘writing’ is not limited 
to the sense in which one inscribes something on paper or a computer. Rather, it should 
be understood in terms of Derrida’s notion of ‘archi-writing’. Derrida’s notion of archi-
writing challenges our epistemological understanding of writing as being merely the 
technical process of inscription on paper or a computer. This does not, however, mean 
that Derrida’s archi-writing dismisses the empirical understanding of writing. In this 
neologism, ‘archi’ means origin, principle, or telos. In other words, archi-writing is what 
is already there before we use it. This is why Derrida argues that archi-writing can even 
be seen in cultures that do not have any technical system of writing. 
In creating the particular neologism of archi-writing in his critique opposing the 
logocentrism of the Western school of philosophy, Derrida highlights the unstable ground 
on which stands the privileged position of speech over writing. Moreover, by 
deconstructing the very ground on which logocentrism is sustained, Derrida aims to 
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stress the fact that signification, broadly perceived, always refers to other signs. 
Therefore, one can never reach a sign that refers only to itself. And this process of infinite 
referral, of never arriving at meaning itself, what makes writing writing, is the breach that 
is inevitably brought about between what is intended to be conveyed and what is actually 
conveyed. In other words, for Derrida, writing is an active force that generates a spatial 
differentiating and a temporal deferring, as opposed to a mere representational medium 
of the logocentric subject. 
In taking a detour via Derrida’s deconstructive operation against logocentrism, I 
have attempted to highlight the instability of the ground on which the privileged position 
of speech over writing has been sustained. When the privileged position of speech is no 
longer secure, the ground on which the subject is perceived as the source and the origin 
of speech is also challenged. This detour highlights how Derrida’s critique of logocentrism 
ultimately disturbs the specific conception of the subject. Therefore, rethinking the 
relationship between speech and writing is also to rethink the modern conception of the 
subject as a concrete and stable ground for generating a meaning. 
Against this backdrop, I will go back to contemporary choreographic experiments 
that highlight ‘choreography rather than dance’. 86  Through understanding Derrida’s 
investment in the technology of writing, I will be able to lay the theoretical ground on 
which the heightened attention to choreography in contemporary dance can be 
articulated as a tactic of dismantling the conception of the master-subject as the origin of 
dance within the modern institution of dance. In juxtaposing Derrida’s investment in the 
technology of writing with the shifted emphasis from dance to choreography that is 
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evident in contemporary choreographic experiments, I aim to demonstrate how 
choreography emerges as a deconstructive strategy opposing the positionality of mastery 
that has sustained the modern institution of dance. 
 
Choreography Precedes Dance 
In Cvejić’s conversation with Xavier Le Roy, she contends that one of the most evident 
shifts in contemporary dance since the early 1990s is its claim to be ‘choreography rather 
than dance’.87 As Derrida deconstructs the privileged positionality of speech over writing, 
the shifted emphasis of ‘choreography rather than dance’ highlights how contemporary 
choreographic experiments challenge the privileged notion of dance in relation to 
choreography. In the institutionalisation of dance in the West, dance has been associated 
with the logocentric idea of authentic moments, whereas choreography has been 
perceived as a mere representational medium. Moreover, what this presupposed 
hierarchical relationship between dance and choreography implies is a position of 
mastery where a process of subjection is necessary. 
The claim for ‘choreography rather than dance’, a defining tactic deployed by the 
new generation of choreographers, highlights how contemporary choreographic 
experiments destabilise the solid ground on which the logocentric idea of the subject as 
the ultimate source of origin of dance stands. This in turn disturbs the particular 
subjectivity of the master as devised, sustained, and legitimised in the modern 
institutionalisation of dance. As Derrida’s radical argument that ‘writing precedes speech’ 
disturbs the very ground on which the conventional notion of communication, as the 
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transmission of meaning between self-completed subjects, has been sustained, the claim 
for ‘choreography rather than dance’ highlights the fact that the conventional 
positionality of the master-subject in the modern institution of dance can no longer be 
sustained in contemporary choreographic experiments. 
In this context, it is interesting to go back to the earlier discussion on the spectral 
subjectivity of the master from which emerges the tactical operation of binding the body 
with the technology of writing. What must be emphasised here is the fact that the spectral 
subjectivity of the master in the institution of dance always writes one’s movements for 
the body of another, from the moment of its inception. This is why the choreographic ‘I’ 
is perceived only as providing a ‘space of appearance’ for other bodies, to borrow Hannah 
Arendt’s words.88 This does not change in a situation where one is choreographing for 
oneself. This particular understanding of the paradox inherent in the tactic of binding the 
technology of writing and the body is important to explain why contemporary 
choreographers define their practice as choreography rather than dance.  
It is in this light that I would like to discuss Dance for Nothing (2011) by Eszter 
Salamon. Here, Salamon presents a speaking body on stage that iterates John Cage’s 
famous speech, Lecture on Nothing, originally delivered at the Artists’ Club in New York 
in 1949. In the interview that I conducted with Salamon, she claims that the days of the 
muted dancing bodies demanded by the modern institution of dance are over. 89 
Nowadays, she claims, one of the distinguishable features of choreographic experiments 
since the 1990s is the advent of the speaking body on stage. Awakening from muteness, 
contemporary choreographic stages have witnessed the proliferation of the speaking 
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body. However, Salamon’s speaking body is not deployed for better communication with 
an audience who often feel excluded from the specific institutional language of modern 
dance. Instead, Salamon’s speaking body should be understood as a writing body in a 
Derridean sense, where there can be no hierarchical division between speaking and 
writing. In this sense, Salamon’s argument that the days of muted bodies are over refers 
to the shift in emphasis from dance to choreography. In this light, I will attempt to 
articulate how Salamon’s tactical deployment of choreography enables her 
speaking/writing body to be in a constant process of being spatially differentiated and 
temporally deferred from any type of concrete ground on which the logocentric idea of 
the choreographer-subject emerges. 
 
The Choreographer’s Body Never Refers to Itself 
When Salamon comes onto the square-shaped stage, with spectators placed along its four 
sides at the start of Dance for Nothing, what immediately captures my attention is the fact 
that there is no music. Instead, what we, the spectators, hear for the duration of the 
performance is Salamon’s voice iterating John Cage’s Lecture on Nothing. This lecture was 
first delivered in 1949, and later published in his collected writings Silence: Lectures and 
Writings in 1961. What is interesting about this published version is the fact that Cage 
stresses rhythmic structures in the lecture. Printed in four columns, the published 
version facilitates a rhythmic reading and Cage explains the forty-eight units that 
constitute the whole structure. This musical quality inherent in the text would have 
provided the perfect condition for Salamon to respond to by generating movements. 
Salamon’s iteration of Cage’s lecture becomes the source of the music for her own body, 
producing movements based on the rhythms created by her mouth. 
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Instead of playing back a recording of the lecture, or having somebody else read 
the text while she danced, Salamon moves according to the rhythms of her speaking body. 
The conventional understanding of a dance-theatre presupposes a hierarchical 
relationship where the body becomes the subject that submits to the music. The dancing 
body is devised according to the rhythm of the music, as if the music commands the 
movements of the dancer.90 Yet, in Salamon’s dance-theatre, we see a more complicated 
structure, as the source of the music is that which is supposed to be subject to the music. 
Therefore, the conventional hierarchical relationship between music and the body never 
becomes clear. 
Salamon reiterates Cage’s lecture, which begins ‘I am here, and there is nothing to 
say. If among you are those who wish to get somewhere, let them leave at any moment.’91 
This evident resistance to arriving at any definite point of meaning, where a logocentric 
conception of the subject is presupposed, is highlighted even more by Salamon’s attempt 
to generate movements simultaneously to her reiteration of Cage’s speech. She falls down. 
She crawls. She stretches and flexes her body. She makes turns. She flaps her hands. She 
swivels on one knee. She walks. She scrawls in the air with gangly and interlocked arms. 
She does all this while reiterating Cage’s lecture at her own pace and rhythm for the 
duration of an hour. 
Therefore, as time goes by, we, the spectators, cannot pay full attention to Cage’s 
lecture as Salamon’s dancing body is simultaneously producing a language of the body. In 
                                         
90 I am referring to Romantic ballet as the matrix of dance, whereas in most folk dances, for example, the 
musicians observe the dancers and adjust their playing to the movements as much as the dancers dance to 
the music. This is (at least partly) impeded in ballet as the dance takes place in a theatre with an orchestra 
where there is no direct visual or other communication possible between dancers and musicians. 
91 John Cage, “Lecture on Nothing” in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1961), https://seansturm.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/john-cage-lecture-on-nothing.pdf. 
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other words, Salamon’s dancing/writing body constantly takes our attention away from 
Salamon’s speaking/writing body, and vice versa. In the interview that I conducted with 
Salamon, she describes this state of body-writing on multiple levels as achieving a ‘trance 
of multitasking’.92 The human brain is not engineered for multitasking. The fact that the 
term ‘multitasking’ derives from computer technology tells us that this is not how we are 
made. Recent scientific studies seem to support this argument by showing that 
multitasking increases levels of poor performance and errors. This is why the Fordist 
assembly lines became the symbolic structure of organised productivity in human beings. 
But, in insisting on being in a state of trance while multitasking, Salamon appears 
disinterested in the efficacy and productivity of her speaking/dancing/writing body. And 
what is paradoxical is the fact that this is how Salamon actualises Cage’s desire to 
actualise nothingness, which does not mean the negation of a thing but the negation of 
any arrival point. Any words or movements emerging from Salamon’s multitasking are 
soon fragmented, fractured, and reconfigured into nothingness. Therefore, what the 
spectator encounters for the duration of Salamon’s performance is a constant state of 
spatial differentiating and temporal deferring from arriving at any point of signification. 
In this context, I would like to develop the discussion on spatial differentiating and 
temporal deferring generated by Salamon’s speaking/writing body. First, there is a 
spatial differentiating and temporal deferring between the text pre-written onto 
Salamon’s body during preparation time, and what is actually inscribed during the time 
of the performance. In the interview that I conducted with her, she told me that she 
                                         
92 From the interview that I conducted with Eszter Salamon in Manchester on 18 July 2013 during 
Salamon’s performance of Dance for Nothing at the Manchester International Festival. See also Jeroen 
Peeters, “Entranced in Multitasking,” review of Dance for Nothing, by Eszter Salamon, Corpus, September 
12, 2009, http://www.eszter-salamon.com/WWW/dancefornothing.htm. 
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memorised John Cage’s text to the point where she does not have to think about what to 
do next. On stage, what she writes is what is already inscribed to become part of her body. 
And then, there is another layer of writing from the spectators. While Salamon writes on 
stage, I am, as a spectator, at first determined not to miss anything. I pay full attention. I 
try to read everything that is produced by her writing, attempting to grasp every point 
she makes. In this attempt to grasp everything, a specific type of writing/inscription is 
deployed due to my inability to remember everything. And, of course, there is another 
layer of writing taking place after the performance. I am now searching my memory to 
literally write Salamon’s body-writing in parallel with Derrida’s writing.  
Therefore, my writing in front of my computer can never be the ultimate account 
of what happened in Salamon’s choreography. It is just one of the processes that highlight 
the constant spatial differentiating and temporal deferring in any attempt to deploy the 
technology of writing. As I cannot predict where my writing will arrive (although I have 
a plan for what to write), Salamon’s durational acts may not proceed as she planned. Of 
course, I have some initial ideas, feelings, and most importantly, memory which I want to 
incorporate into the text. But I can only discover where it is going to lead me via the 
process of the actual movement of writing and rewriting, as both an empirical and a 
physical act. It is because, in the process of writing, there are always unexpected 
questions that are raised which lead to different routes from those initially planned. In 
this light, what becomes clear is the fact that my writing only comes into being by being 
in a constant state of doing. And what this doing does is to take my writing somewhere 
that I initially had not thought of. 
In the coming part, I would like to discuss further this doing of writing, through 
which writing emerges as a deconstructive strategy opposing the very institution that it 
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inhabits. In doing so, I will go back to Derrida’s essay ‘Signature Event Context’, where he 
engages with the philosopher of language J. L. Austin’s speech act theory. In opposition to 
some orthodox readings of Austin’s speech act theory within English linguistic 
philosophy, Derrida’s deconstructive reading in ‘Signature Event Context’ not only 
contributes to his own project of deconstructing the technology of writing, but also 
resurrects once again Austin’s theory in reference to the critical discussion of the 1970s.93 
 
Signature Event as a Breaking Force  
‘Signature Event Context’ begins with Derrida’s question of how and why Austin 
emphasises the ‘act’ in speech. What must be pointed out here is the fact that Derrida 
deliberately attempts to expand Austin’s notion of speech, going beyond the logocentric 
limits imposed by Anglo academic linguists. Derrida expands the parameters of the 
discussion on Austin’s speech act theory and locates it within the larger notion of 
communication. In doing so, Derrida questions our common conception of 
communication as a vehicle for meaning within a linguistic exchange. 
Derrida first rethinks the eighteenth century French philosopher and 
epistemologist Étienne Bonnot de Condillac’s theory of communication found in the 1746 
publication Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge. Here, Condillac argues that because 
humans have to communicate their thoughts or their ideas, which are the signified 
content, they have to invent a particular means of communication, i.e. writing.94 This 
                                         
93 Jacques Derrida’s essay ‘Signature Event Context’ in Limited Inc has a complicated publishing history. It 
was first written for an international conference held by International l’Association des Socie te s de 
Philosophie de Langue Française (Montreal, August 1971) and was included in Derrida’s Marges de la 
philosophie in 1972. See “Editor’s Foreword” in Limited Inc, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. 
Gerald Graff (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
94 Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” 4. 
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representational character of written communication can be more complicated, as is seen 
in various systems of writing such as hieroglyphics, ideographs, and phonetic alphabets 
where the specific system functions as the representation of representation. But as 
Derrida points out, even in explaining the complicated system of writing, Condillac never 
gives up the relationality between ideas and signs in his formulation. Derrida 
deconstructs Condillac’s notion of writing as a means of communication by highlighting 
the fact that the notion of absence is already implied within Condillac’s formulation of the 
technology of writing. This is because, according to Condillac’s formulation, writing is 
invented and deployed in order to communicate something to those who are absent. Of 
course, Condillac’s notion of absence is a modification of the notion of presence, as this 
absence implies the physical absence of a speaker is just a temporal phenomenon. But as 
we have already discussed in the previous part, Derrida pushes this notion of absence 
inherent in Condillac’s exploration of writing to the point that it arrives at an absolute. 
As opposed to Condillac’s presupposition, Derrida further argues that we do not 
have any ground to limit communication to words. 
 
Indeed, [communication] opens up a semantic domain that precisely does not limit 
itself to semantics, semiotics and even less to linguistics. For one characteristic of 
the semantic field of the word communication is that it designates non-semantic 
movements as well.95 
 
Because one can communicate movements such as shock or fear, that cannot be captured 
within a semantic or semiotic domain, Derrida argues that communication does not have 
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to refer to the conveyance of words, and so be limited to linguistic exchange. Derrida 
points out one of the apparatuses that limits communication to linguistic exchange is 
context. He argues that context is produced as a kind of consensus that prescribes 
communication. He points out that, within the notion of context, communication is 
supposed to be listened to, and one engages with or pursues dialogues across a horizon 
of intelligibility.96 Therefore, in problematising the notion of context, Derrida questions 
the structure that sustains this operation of communication. For instance, if the 
conditions of a context cannot be absolutely determined, the ground on which the notion 
of communication has been sustained can no longer be insisted upon. 
In addition, Derrida argues that what sustained the notion of communication was 
an empirically determined subject secured by a context. But as we have discussed in the 
previous part of this chapter, when the technology of writing is deployed, the ground, on 
which the notion of the determined subject has been sustained, is challenged. This is 
because the notion of absence is inherent in the technology of writing, and this disturbs 
the very notion of the subject inherent in the conventional notion of communication. As 
Derrida explains: 
 
To be what it is, all writing must, therefore, be capable of functioning in the 
radical absence of every empirically determined receiver in general. And this 
absence is not a continuous modification of presence, it is a rupture in presence, 
the ‘death’ or the possibility of the ‘death’ of the receiver inscribed in the 
structure of the mark…97 
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What Derrida emphasises here, in deploying the technology of writing, is a rupture in 
presence that can be brought about by the radical absence of a determined receiver. In 
this light, writing ‘must continue to “act” and to be readable even when what is called the 
author of writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have 
signed’. 98  My focus here is how Derrida deploys the word ‘act’ in explaining the 
operational mechanism of the technology of writing. In other words, according to Derrida, 
writing is not something to be read or interpreted but something that has to continue to 
act. And this conception of writing as an act is what allows Derrida to be connected to J. 
L. Austin’s speech act theory. 
In How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin makes a groundbreaking argument 
that changes the entire discourse of analytic linguistics. This is concerned with what he 
calls the ‘performativity’ of language. As opposed to the conventional understanding of 
language as a medium to describe or report reality, Austin argues that speaking can also 
bring about doing. For instance, when one says ‘I do’ at the church altar, this is not just 
describing or reporting reality. Moreover, this is not just to verify whether this statement 
is true or false. Instead, it brings about the act of marriage through which the utterance 
is actualised. In repositioning the role of language, that had been limited within 
conventional analytic linguistics, Austin further categorises the performative into three 
sub-categories: the locutionary, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary. 
For instance, when A asks B the question ‘Is there any salt?’, the locutionary act of 
uttering delivers the meaning of the sentence to B. This allows the further illocutionary 
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act of uttering to be performed so that B can understand the desire of A to have some salt. 
Austin distinguishes the meaning delivered by a locutionary utterance from the force 
brought out by an illocutionary utterance. In other words, what A is really asking is not 
about the presence of the salt in the dining room; rather, he expresses his desire to have 
some salt. When B finally understands what A really means, then the further 
perlocutionary act of causing B to hand over the salt to A produces the effect of A’s speech. 
But what is interesting about Austin’s theory is the fact that he also discusses the situation 
where A’s speech does not produce what A intended in the first place. Austin calls this 
type of instruction ‘infelicitous’, as opposed to felicitous instructions. 
Despite the radicality inherent in Austin’s theory of speech acts, his premature 
death in 1960 became an obstacle to his groundbreaking thinking being acknowledged. 
It is hard to deny that Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Austin’s speech act theory in 
‘Signature Event Context’ contributed to Austin’s articulation of what language could do 
becoming located in the centre of theoretical discussions in the 1970s. Likewise, it was 
Austin’s revolutionary theory that enabled Derrida to rearticulate the possibility of 
written marks going beyond the binary opposites between speech and writing. Opposing 
John Searle’s orthodox reading of Austin’s speech act theory, Derrida pays attention to an 
act of writing that does not know the dichotomy between speech and writing. 
In light of this, it is Derrida who actively responds to Austin’s consideration of how 
to do things with words. For Derrida, what writing does can be explained by his notion of 
‘rupture’, traversing all types of written communication. The term ‘rupture’ is a breaking 
force that is inherent in the structure of any written marks. This is a revolutionary 
understanding of what writing does. Instead of our common understanding that writing 
adds something or inscribes something for better communication, Derrida argues that 
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writing is a breaking force. And it is this rupture that brings about the spacing 
(espacement) that separates the written sign from other elements of the internal 
contextual chain, which is always open to the possibility of disengagement and grafting.99 
And it is this spacing in speech acts that brings about a disruption of presence. Unlike 
Austin, who maintains presence by making reference to the source (origin) of the 
utterance, Derrida pushes it further by replacing it with what he calls signature. 
Within the structural possibilities of writing, a signature can easily lose its ties to 
the signer. But a signature is still a trace of the source. Derrida calls this a signature event. 
In other words, a signature event is a rupture created between the signer and the source 
of an utterance. Moreover, we cannot control a signature event or how it is deployed, but 
we know that absence will always be a part of it. Even if an object is present when the 
word that refers to it is uttered, there is still a gap between the word and the object. 
In his deconstructive reading of Austin’s speech act theory, Derrida shows the 
possibility of writing being sustained without the subject as the author, whose position 
of mastery comes from the conception of the subject as the ultimate source of utterance. 
In parallel with Derrida’s operation against the Western school of philosophy, Salamon’s 
speaking/writing body highlights the possibility of body-writing being radically detached 
from the disciplinary logic of dance that necessitates a master-subjectivity as the ultimate 
source of utterance. In Salamon’s patient and consistent body-writing in the ‘trance of 
multitasking’, where meanings attached to words, and the hierarchical orders attached 
to sequences of movements begin to be pushed away, what emerges is a signature event. 
The body does not inscribe on top of existing writing within a conventional notion of 
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communication, but deconstructs what is already inscribed so that the impossibility of 
communication can be recognised. 
In the coming part of this chapter, I shall examine another signature event that 
emerged in one of the contemporary choreographic experiments by Jérôme Bel. By 
straightforwardly juxtaposing what is said and what is conveyed (that does not satisfy 
institutional expectations), Bel highlights the infelicitous speech act inherent in writing. 
This infelicitous speech act exposes what Derrida would call the ‘dissension’ between 
what is conveyed and what is expected. And by highlighting dissension within the modern 
institution of dance, what emerges is a signature-event such that the positionality of the 
choreographer-master as the source of the utterance is no longer secure. Moreover, here 
I highlight the fact that the signature-event provoked by Bel’s choreographic experiment 
pushes Derrida’s notion of the signature-event even further, by revealing not only the 
dissension between the signer and the source of the utterance, but also the dissension 
between the signer and the institution in which the signer is legitimised as the source of 
the utterance.  
 
Signature Event in Bel’s (In)felicitous Instructions 
Jérôme Bel’s The Show Must Go On (2001) is entirely constituted of linguistic instructions, 
formed by the lyrics of pop songs that direct the movements of the dancers on stage. In 
other words, it is the lyrics of pop songs that direct the specific writing of the bodies on 
stage. It begins on an empty stage. For about ten minutes, the spectators are left in 
darkness, listening to the song ‘Tonight’ from West Side Story. The lyrics of the song, 
‘Tonight, Tonight, It all began tonight, I saw you and the world went away’, seem to 
describe our expectation as spectators, ready to be diverted by the performance on stage. 
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When the next song, ‘Let the Sunshine In’, is played, the stage lighting begins to intensify 
as if it is the song that dictates the stage direction. Then we come to notice that at the 
front of the stage, a DJ is positioned with his back to the spectators as if he were a 
conductor with an orchestra or the director of the stage. His prominence makes it clear 
who is controlling the movement of the dancers and why they move in a particular way. 
The gap of silence created between the songs is the length of time it takes for the DJ to 
change a stack of CDs and hit the play button. Finally, when another song, ‘Come Together’, 
is played, nine men and nine women come onstage, dressed in casual street clothes, and 
stand silently. For a while, they just stand still and do nothing, apart from staring at the 
spectators. But when the song ‘I Like to Move It’ begins, the performers onstage suddenly 
go crazy. One of the women keeps jerking the backdrop, while one of the men takes off 
his T-shirt and swings it around above his head. At the same time, an overweight man 
plays with his belly, and a woman furiously strips to her bra and panties and then dresses 
again. 
Then, the tune ‘Ballerina Girl’ begins and all the men leave the stage, triggering a 
laugh from the spectators. The women onstage perform some signature ballet 
movements in humorously clumsy fashion, evoking more laughter. When the song 
‘Private Dancer’ begins, a DJ from the auditorium suddenly walks on stage and begins to  
dance alone there. He even goes back to the DJ station in order to shine a spotlight on 
himself. Then, when another song, ‘Every Breath you Take’, is played, all the performers 
return to the stage. However, all they do is stand still and watch the spectators again, as 
if to remind the spectators that it is not only they who are watching during this 
performance. The spectators begin talking to each other, trying to figure out what is going 
on, as they realise that they are an essential part in making this experiment meaningful. 
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As time goes by, the response of the spectators grows, as some of them sing along to the 
songs being played.100 
However, this cheerful reaction was not the case when it premiered at the Théâtre 
de la Ville in Paris in 2001. Angry spectators stormed the stage and asked for a refund. 
Despite the hostile reception at its premiere, the popularity of The Show Must Go On grew 
rapidly over time. It seems its initial failure fuelled a growing interest in the piece, and 
the more the piece became controversial, the more the spectators seemed to enjoy its 
controversy. 
But if one thinks about it carefully, there are not really any controversial aspects 
in this piece. Paradoxically enough, this piece did not rebel against the operational 
mechanism of the modern institution of dance. For instance, the conventional hierarchy 
is sustained between the master (a linguistic imperative) who writes the movements and 
the dancers who execute these movements as they are told. Through its continuous 
obedience to the voice of the master, substituted into the lyrics of the songs, the 
operational principle of a conventional dance-theatre is faithfully delivered in this piece. 
The song says ‘come together’, and the dancers on stage come together. The song 
says ‘I like to move it’, and the dancers move it, whether it is a tongue, a knapsack or a 
zipper. In other words, the problem caused by Bel’s performers is not the fact that they 
do not obey the rules, but that this obedience does not reproduce what is expected of it.  
It is a failed utterance, thus the instructions become ‘infelicitous’, to borrow J. L. Austin’s 
term. And here, let us consider the political potential of the act of writing. 
                                         
100 The response to Bel’s work has changed dramatically over time. For instance, when I saw The Show 
Must Go On in 2015 at Sadler’s Wells in London, the spectators really enjoyed the performance, as if they 
were at a pop concert. They seemed to understand Bel’s intention and language.  
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When one obeys the rules but does not produce the effect that has, in the past, 
been engineered, what opens up is a space that reveals its internal dissension through 
which its conventional hierarchical order is exhausted. And this internal dissension is not 
simply about the conflict due to the signer’s failure to be the source of utterance. It reveals 
that, in order for the signer to be legitimised as the source of the utterance, the signer has 
first to be legitimised within specific institutional imperatives. For instance, in Bel’s 
performance, the dancers faithfully obey the linguistic imperatives on their bodies. 
However, this does not produce ‘proper’ movements that can be hierarchically organised, 
from the most complex to the most simple, within the existing system of dance-theatre. 
In other words, the signer (the DJ or the lyrics of the pop songs) conflicts with the 
conventional signer (the dance master) that has been legitimised within the modern 
institution of dance. 
Moreover, in this performance, there were some professional and some amateur 
dancers. Nevertheless, the spectators could not distinguish between them because their 
movements never became more than those that anyone could do. The movements being 
those that anyone could do disturbs the presuppositions on which the notion of 
‘properness’ has operated in the modern institution of dance. Who is it that tells a dancer 
which movements are proper and which are not? 
Properness is another word for the imperatives given from a position of mastery. 
Throughout the development of Western dance, the notion of properness has been 
manufactured through a strict process of authorisation based on choreographic manuals 
that write the movements of dead masters. Therefore, if one wants to become a 
professional dancer, one must go through a predetermined process: first to master the 
movements in these manuals. But Bel’s dancers, who produce movements that anyone 
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could do, obviously diverge from the strict process of legitimisation within the modern 
institution of dance. They obey what the lyrics of the songs dictate, as professional 
dancers obey choreographic manuals. Yet, Bel’s dancers fail to produce what is 
considered as proper in the modern institution of dance, thus they exhaust the 
conventional operation of institutional imperatives. When the existing institutional 
imperatives are exhausted, what we are able to see is the emergence of a signature event 
where particular pedagogical presuppositions are suspended. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
Chapter 3. What Makes Choreography a Truth Game? 
– Disturbing the Modern Subject Machine 
 
Choreographic Production of Subjectivity 
In the previous chapters, I have examined how rethinking the relationality between the 
subject-making and the body-making via choreography (writing the bodies of others), in 
contemporary choreographic experiments disturbs what I would like to call the modern 
subject machine. In Chapter 1, I examined how the conception of the body is 
problematised by Bel’s and Charmatz’s presentation of the institutionalised body. Within 
the modern subject machine, the conception of the body is based on a unitary, self-
enclosed entity whose boundary is predetermined, in order for the body to be utilised as 
a legal identity card.101 This is because, in order for the body to continue to function as a 
valid identity card for a subject, it has to remain absolutely individual and verifiable. In 
this light, by challenging the particular conception of the body, Bel’s and Charmatz’s 
choreography disturbs the smooth operation of the modern subject machine and its 
subjectivity production process. In Chapter 2, via Derrida’s philosophical investment in 
writing, I discussed how the technology of writing emerges as a deconstructive force 
against the modern conception of the subject as the ultimate source of the meaning.102 In 
pushing the structural possibilities inherent in writing, Derrida ultimately disturbs the 
logocentric conception of the subject whose coming into being also presupposes a 
particular understanding of the body.  
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102 Eszter Salamon’s Dancing for Nothing and Je ro me Bel’s The Show Must Go On are examined in Chapter 
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In briefly summarising the previous chapters, I attempt to highlight the fact that 
choreography is what allows us both to rethink the body via the subject, and rethink the 
subject via the body. This is why the technology of writing the body (of others) in 
contemporary choreographic experiments is always emerged in the never-ending 
dynamics between the subject-making and the body-making. And this is why 
choreography can be deployed as a critical force in reviewing the given relationality 
between the body and the subject within the modern subject machine. In this context, I 
will discuss the choreographic production of subjectivity that disturbs the very ground 
on which the operational mechanism of the modern subject machine has been secured. 
In challenging the operational mechanism of the modern subject machine that requires a 
predetermined conception of the body, the choreographic production of subjectivity in 
contemporary choreographic experiments brings about a different knowledge of the 
conditions that produce us as subjects.  
In the modern institution of dance, the production of the choreographer-subject 
was formulated in a power relationship between the one who writes other bodies and 
other bodies that are written by the choreographer-master. But this power relationship 
is much more complex than a unilateral process of subjection. In Chapter 2, it is via 
Derrida’s notion of the spectral inherent in the technology of writing that I attempt to 
highlight the foundational instability inherent in the choreographer-master. It is true that 
the spectral subjectivity of the choreographer transforms the institution of dance into a 
memory machine whereby the dead master’s movements never disappear, but it is also 
true that this spectral subjectivity of the choreographer emerges in a ground that 
destabilises the positionality of the choreographer-master.  
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Against this backdrop, in this chapter I aim to examine a different intellectual 
itinerary from that of Derrida by thinking about the foundational instability inherent in 
the positionality of the choreographer-master, highlighted in contemporary 
choreographic experiments. In doing so, I would like to go back to Capriol’s plea in 
Orchesography that I have discussed in the previous chapter once again: 
 
Capriol: Do not allow this to happen, Monsieur Arbeau, as it is within your power to 
prevent it. Set these things down in writing to enable me to learn this art, and in so 
doing you will seem reunited with the companions of your youth and take both 
mental and bodily exercise, for it will be difficult for you to refrain from using your 
limbs in order to demonstrate the correct movements. In truth, your method of 
writing is such that a pupil, by following your theory and precepts, even in your 
absence, could teach himself in the seclusion of his own chamber.103 
 
As I have already mentioned, for Lepecki, it is the pupil Capriol’s plea that enables the 
emergence of the choreographer-master in the modern institution of dance. In Capriol’s 
plea, however, the subjectivity of the choreographer-master is not a unilateral force of 
oppression. In other words, the constitution of the subjectivity as the choreographer-
master in the modern institution of dance is, in fact, envisaged by the pupil who is afraid 
of losing his master’s dance after the master passes away. Capriol made his plea to his 
                                         
103 Thoinot Arbeau, Orchesography: A Treatise in the Form of a Dialogue Whereby All Manner of Persons May 
Easily Acquire and Practise the Honourable Exercise of Dancing (New York: Dance Horizons, 1996), 15. 
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period, considered by both Arbeau and his pupil, Capriol, to be an essential part of the education of every 
well-bred young man. 
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master, Arbeau, to write down his movements so that future generations could learn his 
dance. And since that moment, dance has submitted itself to the citational force of writing. 
This constitutes a condition for the emergence of the spectral subjectivity of the 
choreographer-master.  
As Capriol’s plea clearly reveals, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the 
subjectivity of the choreographer-master only comes into being via the pupil voluntarily 
submitting him or herself to the disciplinary logic of dance. In other words, the 
subjectivity of the choreographer in the modern institution of dance only comes into 
being when there is a subject who voluntarily places himself under the pedagogical 
authority of the choreographer-master. Therefore, the choreographer-master cannot be 
understood as an autonomous power as he always requires the pupil’s voluntary 
submission to his commands. In highlighting the fact that it is the pupil’s voluntary 
submission that brings about the subjectivity of the choreographer-master, I will examine 
Michel Foucault’s critical shift from power to relations of power.104  
 
Rethinking the Choreographer-Master via Foucault’s Rethinking of Power  
Foucault pays attention to the fact that any operation of power is far from a unilateral 
operation of the powerful subject. In reviewing his own early work on asylums and 
prisons, Foucault admits that he might have placed too much emphasis on technologies 
of domination.105 In this context, he stresses the fact that technologies of domination are 
by no means only pure violence and coercion. Instead, they always overlap with the 
                                         
104 ‘…power has to be analysed in terms of relations of power’, Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (Brighton: The Harvester Press Limited, 1980), 208. 
105 Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in The Politics of Truth (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 154. 
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process of the individual acting upon himself. 106  Foucault calls this volunteer 
participation ‘technologies of the self’. And it is at this intersection, where the 
technologies of domination and the technologies of the self intersect with one another, 
that a specific disciplinary logic of ‘knowing yourself’ becomes actively internalised in the 
production of subjectivity in the Western institution of philosophy. 
In the two lectures that Foucault gave in 1980 at Dartmouth College, later 
published under the titles ‘Subjectivity and Truth’ and ‘Christianity and Confession’ in The 
Politics of Truth, Foucault explains why this particular disciplinary logic of ‘knowing 
yourself’ has been developed into the practice of self-examination. In doing so, Foucault 
asks how this practice has been developed into a coherent technique that produces a 
basic condition for the production of subjectivity in the Western institution of philosophy. 
In the coming part, via the aforementioned two lectures, I will follow Foucault’s 
genealogical investigation into the practice of self-examination in the Western institution 
of philosophy, and explore how this practice develops into a coherent technique for the 
production of the particular subjectivity that takes place at the intersection between 
technologies of domination and technologies of the self. In other words, I will attempt to 
reveal how this practice of self-examination (later developed into a confessionary 
practice found in various Christian institutions) exemplifies the Foucauldian 
understanding of the operation of power that occurs at the interaction between 
technologies of domination and technologies of the self. This Foucauldian understanding 
necessarily requires us to review the conventional strategy of resistance often found in 
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historical avant-gardism, where power is presupposed as the unilateral source of 
external oppression.   
Against this backdrop, I would like to bring up the Belgian choreographer 
Christine De Smedt’s recent choreographic experiment Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic 
Portraits (2012). I will juxtapose De Smedt’s investigation of choreographic portraits in 
Untitled 4 with Foucault’s genealogical investigation of the practice of self-examination 
that takes place at the intersection of technologies of domination and technologies of the 
self.107 The reason I decided to juxtapose two different projects with different aims is to 
highlight a different possibility of the practice of self-examination that is demonstrated 
in De Smedt’s choreographic portraits and a truth game that Foucault articulates in his 
idiosyncratic investigation on the historical models of the practice of self-examination.  
In De Smedt’s Untitled 4, this different possibility of the practice of self-
examination is manifested as a truth game, through which the conditions that produce us 
as subjects can be rearranged and reconfigured. Her Untitled 4 begins by problematising 
her own mode of practice as a choreographer. But instead of producing her own portrait 
via the practice of self-examination, De Smedt decides to create choreographic portraits 
of fellow choreographers Jonathan Burrows, Alain Platel, Xavier Le Roy, and Eszter 
Salamon. In creating choreographic portraits of four choreographers with whom she has 
worked or who have been long-time colleagues and friends, De Smedt presents on stage 
the complex subjectivity of the choreographer that cannot be captured within the modern 
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subject machine.108 Instead of being captured within the modern subject machine that 
normalises the dialectical circuit of self-examination, De Smedt’s choreographic 
production of subjectivity highlights a different understanding of the choreographer-
subject. The subjectivity that emerges on the stage is De 
Smedt/Platel/Burrows/Salamon/Le Roy and is suggested in terms of a truth game that 
is open to constant rearrangement and reconfiguration against the operation of the 
modern subject machine.  
The term ‘truth game’ comes from Foucault’s genealogical investigation into the 
practice of self-examination in the Western institution of philosophy.109 As opposed to 
the predetermined operation of the modern subject machine, Foucault’s term highlights 
the possibility of rethinking the conditions that produce us as subjects. And it is via the 
notion of a truth game that I attempt to articulate the tactical operation of resistance 
deployed in contemporary choreographic experiments that oppose the given subjectivity 
of the choreographer-master within the modern institution of dance. But before 
discussing De Smedt’s choreographic production of subjectivity as a truth game, I would 
first like to examine Foucault’s genealogical investigation through which this particular 
notion of a truth game emerges.  
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Foucault’s Genealogical Investigation into the Practice of Self-Examination 
The term ‘truth game’ comes from two lectures later published under the titles 
‘Subjectivity and Truth’ and ‘Christianity and Confession’ in The Politics of Truth. 110 
Before articulating how I deploy this particular term, it is first necessary to explain the 
background to these lectures. Given in English, these lectures were Foucault’s 
intervention into the philosophy of the subject that dominated in the post-war era in 
France. Foucault attempted to highlight the paradox inherent in the conventional mode 
of understanding the subject that necessitates a process of subjection, as opposed to the 
claim for the subject being an ultimate source of original thought. In other words, 
Foucault contends that the subject-making in the Western school of philosophy 
presupposes a position of mastery that controls and predefines the mode of production 
of the subject.  
In ‘Subjectivity and Truth’, Foucault begins by questioning the Cartesian 
conception of the subject as foundation. This means that the subject is, a priori, a pre-
existing platform from which thought and action can emerge. This platform, that is 
responsible for the subject’s actions and experiences, is often referred to as the self. And 
it is this self that unifies the acts of conscious awareness. But Foucault finds that this 
Cartesian claim is not what is actually taking place in the constitution of the subject. In 
Foucault, Subjectivity and Identity: Historical Constructions of Subject and Self, Robert M. 
Strozier explains why Foucault finds the Cartesian conception of the subject 
paradoxical.111 
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Imagine Descartes in a dark room, alone. Only a glimpse of him is visible as he 
speculates about himself, by himself. What is happening here is the theatre of the mind, 
with a capital-S Subject who watches over him and a subject who thinks. Therefore, as 
opposed to the presupposed notion of a subject as the foundation or origin, the Cartesian 
constitution of the subject relies upon a dialectical formulation: if the subject only comes 
into being via self-reflexive examination by the capital-S Subject, the subject cannot act 
as the foundation or origin. In other words, when one is subjected to one’s own gaze, what 
this brings about is a split subjectivity. And it is this split subjectivity that allows the 
emergence of the notion of the capital-S Subject, whereby all subjects have to go through 
a process of subjection, as opposed to the notion of the subject as a priori and self-
founded.112 
In order to avoid this fundamental paradox in the Cartesian constitution of the 
subject, Foucault contends that the post-war structuralist constitution of the subject 
replaces the notion of the subject as self-founded with that of the discursive subject. 
According to their argument, there is no a priori subject, only a socially constructed one. 
They attempt to deconstruct the notion of the individual subject as a closed entity, a self-
representational entity, limited by its localisable and visible corporeal boundaries, 
revealing it to be the product of modern legal, moral, social, and political discourses 
seeking specific pedagogical domination. But these structuralist projects, that attempt to 
replace the individual subject with a discursive subject, also have to face the logical 
paradox inherent within them. As demonstrated in early feminist thinking, if any 
individual subject has the capacity to stand outside itself and examine the cultural forces 
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acting upon it, this means that one can find one’s true self, in contrast to the constructed 
one, which contradicts the notion of a discursive subject.  
It is in this context that Strozier highlights Foucault’s genealogical research, 
which recounts the process of constituting the subject throughout Western history. 
Strozier argues that Foucault attempts to resolve the paradox inherent in the structuralist 
constitution of the discursive subject by pursuing the constitution of a genealogy of 
‘subjectless subjectivity’ in his later writings. The notion of subjectless subjectivity does 
not mean negation of the notion of the subject. Instead, as Strozier points out, by 
highlighting the techniques for making the subject penetrate the institutional history of 
Western philosophy, Foucault attempts to construct a ‘genealogy of the historical 
ontology of self-constitution’, via which he attempts to envisage a different mode of 
constituting the subject.113 In this context, for Foucault, his genealogical research is a 
particular tactic via which the technique of forming the subject in the history of the West 
can be revealed and reorganised.114 
In performing genealogical research on the constitution of the subject, Foucault 
first pays attention to the practice of self-examination, as the Cartesian constitution of the 
subject illustrates. For Foucault, this practice of self-examination has later developed into 
a coherent technique for forming the subject under the modern subject machine. In this 
light, Foucault pays attention to the disciplinary logic of ‘knowing oneself’, as this has 
been internalised in the practice of self-examination since antiquity. What is problematic 
for Foucault about this particular disciplinary logic lies in the fact that this subjectivity 
automatically involves a process of subjection.  
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In his genealogical tracing of how knowing yourself has been internalised in this 
practice of self-examination, the relation between the genealogy of the modern subject 
and the history of knowledge is highlighted.115 In the practice of self-examination, the 
subject is required to constitute itself both as a subject and an object of knowledge, for 
both itself and others. This does not mean, however, that Foucault locates his genealogical 
research in the history of science in general. In other words, he is not interested in 
creating objective value which is created by the demand to know oneself. Instead, he 
seeks to discover ‘the discursive, the institutional and the social practices from which 
these sciences arose’. And in these archaeological spaces where the practice of self-
examination surfaces, Foucault’s project seeks to determine how the practice of self-
examination became ‘coherent reflective techniques with definite goals’.116  
For Foucault, the institutionalisation of the practice of self-examination is 
manifested as a confessionary practice in a particular time of Western history.117 In The 
Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault: A Genealogy of the ‘Confessing Animal’, 
Chloë Taylor emphasises the fact that, for Foucault, confessionary practices occur at the 
intersection of ‘techniques of domination’ and ‘techniques of the self’. It is at this 
intersection, where the technologies of domination and the self mingle, that Foucault 
attempts to answer why and how this specific obligation for confessionary practice 
emerged in the West in relation to the production of subjectivity.  
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Foucault first examines how confessionary practice was exercised in Greek and 
Hellenistic society. Foucault admits that, at first glance, the obligation to tell the truth 
about oneself did not seem to concern pagan philosophers in the classical period. This is 
because the objective of philosophical training was ‘to equip the individual with the 
master’s discourse’. 118  Therefore, the burden of verbalisation fell on the side of the 
master, not on his pupils’ shoulders. Foucault points out that there was another reason 
why the obligation to confess did not have much importance in antiquity. It was because 
the pupils’ ties to the master were circumstantial or provisional. In other words, in 
antiquity, the relation between pupil and master did not require unilateral obedience. 
Moreover, this relationship was a temporary one, for a certain period of one’s life. Under 
these conditions, the exhaustive and continual presentation of oneself to the supervision 
of the capital-S Subject was not necessary. 
Foucault argues, however, that this does not mean that the demand to develop 
techniques for discovering the truth about oneself were absent in classical times. A most 
dramatic contrast to Christian confessionary practice lies in the fact that confessionary 
practice in classical times was not at all to do with ‘discovering the truth hidden in a 
subject’. 119  Instead, it was to account again for truths forgotten about the subject. 
Foucault explains that to account again for truth is to memorise the oral precepts of 
conduct, as memory is conceived as ‘a force for truth’ when it is permanently present and 
active in the soul. In other words, the subject is perceived as the point where rules of 
conduct come together and register themselves in the form of memories. Based on this 
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understanding of the subject, the obligation to tell the truth is not to discover a still 
unknown truth deep inside one’s soul. As Foucault explains: 
 
Truth is conceived as a force that is not defined by a correspondence to reality but 
as a force inherent to principles and which has to be developed in a discourse. It is 
something which is in front of the individual as a point of attraction, a kind of 
magnetic force which attracts him towards a goal.120 
 
This means that confession is understood as ‘a force capable of transforming pure 
knowledge and simple consciousness into a real way of living’. This is why confession is 
not directed towards examination of oneself as the object of knowledge, but towards ‘the 
constitution of a self, which could be at the same time and without any discontinuity in 
the subject of knowledge and subject of will’. Therefore, the role of confession and 
consultation is to ‘give to truth as a force’. In this context, Foucault argues that, in ancient 
philosophy, the practice of confession might be considered a truth game.121 Again, the 
objective of this truth game was not to discover a hidden truth about oneself. Rather, the 
objective was to turn the individual into a place where truth could appear and act as a 
real force. In other words, the self does not have to be discovered but constituted, through 
the force of truth. This force lies in ‘the rhetorical quality of the master’s discourse’, and 
this rhetorical quality depends on how distant the pupil is, in his way of living, from the 
true principles that he knows. In contrast to this understanding of confessionary practice 
in the ancient world, Foucault argues that, in Christianity, confessionary practice is linked 
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to ‘the art of interpretation’.122  This is why, in Christianity, the pagan philosophers’ 
conception of truth had to be radically revised. In examining the second part of Foucault’s 
lecture, later transcribed as ‘Christianity and Confession’, I will attempt to articulate 
further how the truth game is transformed into the ‘art of interpretation’ in Christian 
institutions in the West. 
 
The Body to be Interpreted 
For the early Christian fathers, truth was something to be discovered, not constituted. In 
other words, truth is something hidden in or behind the deepest and most secretive part 
of the soul. Therefore, it can only be reached via an analytical examination. In this context, 
one’s task is to bring to light what is normally the most obscure part of oneself. This is 
why Christianity is the very manifestation of confessionary practice. Foucault points out 
that, among the many Christian institutions, the monastery has many similarities to the 
pagan schools of philosophy in classical times. There is nothing surprising in this, since a 
monastic life was considered to be a true form of philosophical life. Therefore, in Christian 
monasteries, there is an obvious transfer of several techniques of the self, from the 
practices of pagan philosophy that put emphasis on sustaining conformity with acts and 
rules. Therefore, some of these constitutive elements inherent in the constitution of the 
subject in classical times are repeated in the Christian constitution of the subject. But, in 
the end, Foucault argues that Christianity reveals itself as having a very different form of 
constitution from that of the ancient world.123 
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Foucault contends that what concerned early Christian monks was not the 
knowledge of whether there was conformity between an idea and the order of external 
things, but rather a ‘question of scrutinizing the thought in itself’. This is why Foucault 
argues that it was for the ‘first time in history that thoughts are considered as possible 
objects for an analysis’. Moreover, these thoughts have to be suspected, since they can be 
secretly altered, disguised in their own substance. Therefore, hermeneutics in 
Christianity becomes about ‘discovering the reality hidden inside the thought’. 
Then, the question is how do you analyse your own thoughts? The early Christian 
fathers concluded that one interpreted one’s thoughts by telling them to others. This act 
of verbalisation has ‘the specific virtue of verification of the truth’.124 It is because what 
marks the difference between good and evil thoughts is that evil ones cannot be referred 
to without difficulty. If one blushes when recounting them, that is proof that those 
thoughts are not as good as they may appear. 
This is why Foucault argues that verbalising the truth about oneself cannot be 
disconnected from the obligation to renounce oneself. Under Christian hermeneutics, one 
is able to acquire knowledge about oneself from the departure point of renouncing 
oneself and the hidden part of the soul. In this light, it is not surprising that the body was 
demonised under Christian hermeneutics. The reason is quite simple. One’s body is more 
difficult to decipher than one’s thoughts. The process that takes place to decipher one’s 
thoughts necessitates translating or transposing thoughts into the linguistic realm, where 
they can be communicated to others. As Elaine Scarry points out, however, in The Body in 
Pain, the body does not have its own language with which to articulate itself to others.125 
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The body does not know how to submit itself to linguistic force. For instance, when one 
has a headache, one may not find the exact words that are already taken for granted to 
convey one’s state of pain. A sentence such as ‘I feel like I’m being hammered’ reveals that 
there is no direct link between the body and language. In other words, the body lacks its 
own words that can be acknowledged and allowed in a linguistic utterance. Because of 
this difficulty in locating the body within the realm of the linguistic, the body remains as 
somebody else, within oneself. The body cannot be easily verbalised and transformed 
into subjective data for interpretative analysis, and so remains forever foreign to oneself. 
Therefore, within the Christian confessionary formula, one can either demonise 
this other to its very limit, or attempt to transfer its indecipherability into something to 
be deciphered.126 For instance, the obsession with the task of analysing one’s sexual 
desire in Christian confessionary practice, to which Foucault pays attention in his project 
on the history of sexuality, can be understood as an attempt to decipher the body so that 
it can be transferred as interpretive material for analysis.127 In this attempt to deal with 
the indecipherability of the body in the linguistic realm, a specific technique has to be 
invented so that the body can be perceived as an object of knowledge that can be 
deciphered and communicated. For the Christian Church, thanks to this technique of self-
examination, the body now becomes an important object of knowledge, which is later 
captured within confessionary practice. 
By taking a detour through Foucault’s genealogical research on the practice of self-
examination, which has been institutionalised as confessionary practice in the West, I 
have attempted to articulate the thread that interweaves the complex avenues of 
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Foucault’s investigation of the constitution of the modern subjectivity. For Foucault, one 
of the important techniques for making modern subjectivity is confession, which 
transforms the subject into the object of knowledge. Once the subject becomes the object 
of knowledge, the process of subjection cannot be avoided and the position of mastery is 
internalised. However, this process of subjection in the practice of self-examination is 
always installed by the voluntary submission of those who obey the demand to practise 
self-examination.  
In this context, I would like to go back to De Smedt’s choreographic portraits in 
Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic Portraits. As discussed before, this dance-theatre begins with 
De Smedt’s problematisation of her own mode of practice as a choreographer. The reason 
why I pay attention to this problematisation is because, by posing a question about her 
own mode of operation, De Smedt inevitably positions herself as the object of 
examination so that a process of subjection is necessitated. Yet, the ways in which she 
deals with the question of the mode of her own practice allow her to escape from being 
caught within the split subjectivity that necessitates this process of subjection. In other 
words, De Smedt refuses to position herself as an object of knowledge to be interpreted. 
Instead, she creates a truth game, through which she attempts to reconstitute her 
subjectivity as a choreographer who is open to constant rearrangement and 
rearticulation. In the coming part, I will take a closer look at some of De Smedt’s tactics.  
 
Problematising the Mode of Operation as a Choreographer 
In a booklet published on the occasion of Untitled 4, De Smedt confesses that it was a 
question about her own mode of operation as a choreographer that became the driving 
force behind this particular dance-theatre: 
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What is it that I always do? Or rather that I don’t want to do? I realized that in my 
work there was a hidden premise not to involve biographic and personal elements. 
But what do I mean by personal? What is the relationship between how I think the 
personal and the work that I make?128 
 
In other words, for De Smedt, this hidden presupposition not to involve personal and 
biographical elements when giving a performance has influenced her basic mode of 
operation as a choreographer. However, does that mean that her work can be completely 
distinguished from her way of life, the decisions she makes every day, and the people she 
has relationships with? In an attempt to push this question further, as the title of the 
dance-theatre suggests, De Smedt turns to four choreographers with whom she has 
collaborated, and had professional or personal relationships for a long time: Alain Platel, 
Jonathan Burrows, Eszter Salamon and Xavier Le Roy.129 In doing so, De Smedt is able to 
avoid being caught up in a mirroring structure whereby she examines herself. 
De Smedt conducted a series of interviews with these four fellow choreographers, 
and the interviews became the basic skeleton through which the structure of the 
performance emerged. Therefore, four different structures that together constitute the 
dance-theatre reveal the particularities of the interviews that she had with these four 
choreographers. The particularities of the interviews can of course come from her 
particular relationships with each of those choreographers. But I want to emphasise the 
                                         
128 Christine De Smedt, “4 Choreographic Portraits,” in 4 Choreographic Portraits (Ghent: les ballets C de 
la B, 2012), 3. Published on the occasion of the premiere at Kaaitheater in Brussels, 2012. 
129 Christine De Smedt has been with les ballets C de la B (founded by Alain Platel in 1984) for more than 
20 years. She was a colleague of Jonathan Burrows at P.A.R.T.S. in Brussels, founded by Anne Teresa De 
Keersmaeker. She co-produced Dance#1/Driftworks (2008) with Eszter Salamon. She participated Xavier 
Le Roy’s Low Pieces (2009–2011) and Temporary Title (2015).  
123 
 
fact that the structure also reveals the particular mode of operation of each of these 
choreographers. Therefore, what is presented on stage is not just a representation of the 
interviews that De Smedt conducted. Instead, De Smedt attempts to reveal the mode of 
operation of each choreographer that I already reflected in the structures of the dance-
theatre presented on stage.  
When De Smedt examines her own question about the mode of her practice as a 
choreographer, this initial question positions her as an object of examination. Soon 
however, by including other choreographers, De Smedt successfully escapes from a 
mirroring structure that would sustain the split subjectivity. Then, a problem arises with 
the positionality of De Smedt herself as she examines other choreographers within a 
confessionary situation where the invited choreographers talk to her about their mode of 
practice. In this situation, De Smedt has to witness the emergence of the positionality of 
the choreographer-master, in this case De Smedt herself, who examines these four 
choreographers as the objects of interpretation. 
What is interesting, however, is the fact that De Smedt cannot maintain a normal 
distance between herself and her objects of examination, as these choreographers are her 
long-time friends and colleagues. Given that she has maintained such long professional 
and personal relationships with them, there would have been many points made by her 
interviewees that would have made it difficult for her to distinguish her own voice from 
theirs. On the other hand, we have to take into consideration what these interviews go 
through in the process of being transformed into a stage performance. Therefore, the 
distance that seems to be reduced due to her special relationship with these four 
choreographers springs back, since this casual talk between friends and colleagues is 
combined with a professional mode of recording and composition. By transforming these 
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interviews into a stage performance, her positionality in relation to the four 
choreographers is once again transformed. 
When De Smedt transforms the interviews into a stage performance, she knows 
that she will not be able to claim authorship over what she is going to perform on stage. 
The movements, speech, and gestures that constitute the performance cannot be claimed 
to be her own creation as they are based on the interviews that she conducted with the 
four choreographers. As these four choreographers are her long-time colleagues and 
friends, it would be confusing for her to draw a neat line between what is hers and what 
is theirs. Therefore, what is highlighted is the citational force inherent in the technology 
of choreography, through which a space of appearance for other bodies opens up. It is 
true that this citational force inherent in the technology of choreography is what provides 
the conditions for the emergence of the subjectivity of the choreographer-master to be 
sustained, even when physically absent from the modern institution of dance. But De 
Smedt cannot acquire the master’s positionality, as what is hers and what comes from the 
interviewees never becomes clear. Therefore, the subjectivity on stage is something that 
only comes into being with the form of a solidus, as in De 
Smedt/Platel/Burrows/Salamon/Le Roy.  
In this light, I want to highlight the tactical operation in De Smedt’s deployment of 
the technology of choreography. By deploying the citational force inherent in the 
technology of choreography on multiple levels, and to its maximum capacity, to the point 
where the distinction between what De Smedt says and what De Smedt cites on stage is 
not clear, De Smedt does not allow the instalment of an authentic author as the foundation 
of all the meaning produced. At this point, it is interesting to notice that, despite the fact 
that De Smedt initially called her performance Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic Portraits, in the 
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interview that I conducted with her a year after its premiere, she insisted that it was no 
longer about portraits. 130  Historically, portrait-making is based on a judicious 
examination of the subject that necessitates the objectification of the very subject one 
examines. Self-portrait-making is an especially scrupulous and static practice of self-
examination through which the process of subjection, thus the position of mastery, is 
internalised. In contrast, De Smedt’s choreographic portraits refuse to be captured within 
this split subjectivity, and constantly attempt to reconstitute their subjectivity as a truth 
game.  
In attempting to avoid being captured within this split subjectivity inherent in any 
portrait-making, De Smedt plays with the nature of theatre that generates subjectivity as 
a truth game. As opposed to the simple denigration of theatre as an illusion-producing 
machine, the production of subjectivity in theatre is not as simple as it seems. Here, I 
would like to elaborate further by considering the eighteenth-century French 
philosopher Denis Diderot’s notion of the paradox of the actor. Diderot argues that a good 
actor is one who can manage to distance himself from the role that he plays. In other 
words, an actor only comes into being through ‘the erection of a barrier’ within himself. 
For instance, an actor in a play has first to negate his real self in order to actualise the 
character on stage. Therefore, a process of negation is essential to become an actor. But 
this negation does not automatically allow an actor to become a character. There are 
constant struggles between oneself (the actor) and the character. Regardless of how good 
an actor may be, he can never achieve a state of becoming entirely somebody else within 
a particular time and space. At best, the actor will become good at playing a given 
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character. In short, this is what Diderot calls ‘the paradox of the actor’. On stage, he is 
neither himself nor the character: he is a self who goes through the endless role-playing 
of a character. I will come back to this paradox of the actor when I discuss the first part 
of Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic Portraits, based on De Smedt’s interview with Alain Platel. 
De Smedt highlights the fact that the ‘paradox of the actor’ is inherent in the theatre as a 
particular subjectivity machine. By copying, imitating, assuming, identifying, 
appropriating, desiring, empathically listening to, and directly and indirectly citing the 
interviews that she conducted, De Smedt evokes the following questions: Who’s 
speaking? Who’s moving? Who’s talking about whom? And does any of this matter in the 
end? 
 
Neither De Smedt Nor Platel 
When the door at the Kaaitheater finally opens, I first notice that there is no concrete 
boundary between the stage and the auditorium.131 Instead, a couple of low, iron-framed 
wooden benches have unevenly been put in the space, causing momentary confusion 
among the audience regarding where to sit. Moreover, the choreographer and performer 
De Smedt is already onstage, standing at the rear near the back wall of the theatre space. 
There is neither a curtain call nor lights out to give the habitual signal for the beginning 
of the performance. Instead, the audience find that as soon as they enter the theatre, De 
Smedt is already busy reading a script, holding a microphone connected to an amplifier. 
This is ‘I would leave a signature’, the first part of De Smedt’s Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic 
                                         
131 The premiere of Christine De Smedt’s Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic Portraits was at Kaaistudio in Brussels 
on 17 April 2012.  
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Portraits, where she enacts her interview with the Belgium choreographer and founder 
of les ballets C de la B, Alain Platel, with whom she has worked for a long time.132 
At first, it is not clear what she is reading. Slowly, the audience realise that it is 
about how communication of the meaning of performance can take place between the 
audience and the performer on stage. But what is never made clear is whether this script 
is De Smedt’s direct citation from her interview with Platel or De Smedt’s rearticulation 
of Platel speaking. This is what we hear from De Smedt/Platel: 
 
Especially in encounters with people after a performance, 
they ask questions like, What do you mean by … 
And very often I ask the question back, 
What do you think it meant? 
And very often they give an answer that we already had in mind. 
But they just don’t trust their own answer, 
because you know … they think they saw something strange on stage,  
what they understand is too strange, 
so they just assume this is what the meaning was. 
And then, also, when you see an audience, a big audience,  
differences in how they experience a performance are quite minor. 
I did not like very much or they like so and so or they did not like it. 
It is only three options. It is not a lot.  
We can divide thousands of people in the audience, on those levels. 
So it is not much, huh? 
                                         
132 De Smedt has been associated with les ballets C de la B since 1991. 
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So it is not much, huh?133 
 
At this very moment, above her live voice, a recorded version of the same script begins to 
play simultaneously. It is also her voice that is speaking, and the script seems to be the 
same, but since she cannot speak exactly in synch with the recording, the chasm between 
the live reading and the recorded version ends up creating an echo effect. If I could 
express this in a written format, it would be something like this: 
 
In in fact fact, it it is is not not so so diverse diverse,  
It it is is more more united united than than we we think think.  
People … people … you you know know… 
If if you you talk talk to to people people… 
 
These versions of her voice that echo within and against one another seem to highlight 
the split subjectivity presented to the audience. Moreover, here De Smedt talks about the 
split subjectivity created within the theatre by the division between the auditorium and 
the stage. Therefore, what is presented on stage is a doubling of the split subjectivity of 
De Smedt and Platel taking place on stage.  
This De Smedt/Platel subjectivity is not the outcome of an accumulation of Platel 
and De Smedt. Yet, at the same time, despite the fact that the subjectivity of the two 
choreographers presented on stage is inevitably partial, refractive, and mediated, neither 
does this mean that the De Smedt/Platel on stage is the product of a reductive process of 
what is, supposedly, two self-sufficient subjects. Instead, what De Smedt’s presentation 
                                         
133 Transcribed by me from the DVD version of Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic Portraits.  
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aims to do is to break down both subjectivities into elements, reassemble some of them, 
and transform them into something neither De Smedt nor Platel can claim. Therefore, 
what the audience encounters is neither Platel nor De Smedt. And by becoming neither 
subject, De Smedt successfully escapes from constructing any positionality of the master 
inherent in any subject-making process. In other words, De Smedt never practises being 
Platel nor expresses herself via Platel. This is the point where I want to revisit the paradox 
of the actor mentioned in an earlier part of this chapter. As opposed to the common anti-
theatrical thoughts prevalent in Western critical thinking, theatre is not a place where 
illusion conquers reality. 134  Instead, as the paradox of the actor clearly illustrates, 
theatre is where any attempt to establish a solid subject is never successful. In this context, 
the fact that De Smedt decides to transform her interview with Platel into a stage 
performance reveals contemporary choreographers’ relationship with theatre, one 
which differs from that of the historical avant-garde. For them, theatre and theatricality 
are not an ultimate evil to be eradicated but something that can be tactically deployed 
and reassembled as a truth game.  
The emergence of this new subjectivity, that always fails to acquire sustainability 
and fixity, is emphasised when De Smedt puts down her microphone after several rounds 
of reading the prepared script. As if attempting to distance herself from this complex 
subjectivity, De Smedt places herself close to the audience. While standing next to us, she 
looks back at the place where she stood a minute before. This change in position is a 
repeated tactic that can be detected throughout Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic Portraits. 
                                         
134 Nicholas Ridout, “The Undoing of Theatre: The Politics of Effect on the Contemporary Stage” (PhD 
diss., University of London, 2004).  
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Throughout the performance, De Smedt is never satisfied with her given position as a 
performer on stage.  
As De Smedt is never satisfied with her position, our given positionality as the 
audience is also heightened. We, as the audience, have the full right to observe the 
performer on stage. Although our power is underestimated, as passive and impotent 
spectators, it is our gaze that dominates the performers on stage. We can see them, but 
they cannot see us due to the strong lighting that hampers their vision. This is enormous 
power. But, when De Smedt moves to a position next to the audience, we realise that this 
may no longer be the case. Standing right next to the audience, De Smedt is looking back 
at the trace of the complex subjectivity created by her. And in so doing, De Smedt occupies 
the place of the spectator. Thus we, the audience, realise that we are not simply 
spectators; we are a spectator’s spectators. 
 
De Smedt/Platel/Burrows/Salamon/Le Roy 
 
The last part of De Smedt’s performance is called ‘Self-reliance’. It is based on her 
interview with Xavier Le Roy. This performance comes after ‘The son of a priest’, that is 
based on her interview with Jonathan Burrows, and ‘A woman with a diamond’, based on 
her interview with Eszter Salamon. Thus, the audience has already encountered De 
Smedt/Platel/Burrows/Salamon. Yet, in this last part of the performance, De Smedt 
drives the citational force inherent in the technology of choreography to its maximum, to 
the point where she attempts to become Xavier Le Roy herself via the format of a question 
and answer session.  
After a short break, when the audience are allowed to enter the theatre again, De 
Smedt also walks in and sits on a chair in the stage area. Then, she says that she is 
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proposing a post-performance talk for 40 minutes. At first, I did not even realise that this 
part of the performance was about Xavier Le Roy, as I had not read the leaflet before 
entering the theatre. Therefore, I assumed that she was actually proposing a question and 
answer session with the audience. But it did not take long for me to realise that she was 
speaking on behalf of Le Roy, as there were specific clues that I could immediately relate 
to Le Roy’s practice. 
For instance, De Smedt’s suggestion to have a question and answer session as part 
of the performance itself reminds me of Le Roy’s Low Pieces (2010), in which De Smedt 
participated as a performer. Low Pieces begins with a question and answer session before 
presenting the prepared performance on stage. Le Roy proposes a specific time duration 
to the audience, and after this time the lights automatically dim and this is a sign for the 
beginning of the stage performance. When De Smedt begins the last part of Untitled 4. 4 
Choreographic Portraits, she appropriates Le Roy’s way of incorporating a question and 
answer session, and allows the audience to participate in the actual staging of the 
performance. This means that the last part of her performance is always different, as each 
performance depends on what kinds of questions a particular audience asks and how De 
Smedt responds to those questions.  
In the performance that I participated in, one audience member asked a question 
about De Smedt’s shoes. He asked whether her change of shoes after the first part of the 
performance (I had not even realised that she had changed her shoes after the first part) 
was based on a conscious decision. People laughed. And this helped to break the ice. And 
the way in which she dealt with this question was to turn it back on the person asking it, 
saying, ‘Would you expect me to change my shoes?’ And for a while, a conversation that 
began with what might initially be considered silly, continued. Here, the kinds of 
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questions that were asked were not important. In other words, the content of the 
questions was not the point. Instead, what has to be considered are the ways in which she 
dealt with the questions raised. De Smedt constantly redirected the questions asked of 
her so that the answers could hardly be about what she thought, judged, felt, or believed. 
And in this constant attempt to redirect the questions posed to her, what she attempted 
to include was an unexpected moment when the conversation became about Le Roy. This 
is how the emergence of the subjectivity of the choreographer on De Smedt’s stage 
became an event that could not be predicted or announced, prior to its arrival.  
For instance, after a few minutes of discussion about De Smedt’s shoes, another 
audience member asked a different question. This time, it was about her shorts. Everyone 
laughed again. This is what she asked: 
 
Are those shorts your private shorts that you just bring in to the performance or part 
of a costume for your performance? If this question is not interesting enough, maybe 
you can elaborate more on this relation between bringing something private into a 
performance? 
 
And from this simple question that seemed to have nothing to do with Le Roy, we 
witnessed how De Smedt introduced Le Roy:  
 
These shorts are my private shorts.  
As you asked me to elaborate a little on that, 
private and work, for me there is no difference.  
Everything for me is related to work. Everything is working.  
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It has to do with a moment in my life when I decided to go from one way of living to 
another way of living. So it is a story that I tell a lot. It is a story about going from 
science to dance.  
It is a big story with lots of little stories inside. It is not only about a story about work. 
But about love and leaving France. This story has been formalised. It is a show... 
 
At this moment, I immediately notice that it was De Smedt/Le Roy speaking, as the story 
about Le Roy being a molecular biologist before he decided to become a choreographer 
is a famous one. And the show that De Smedt refers to here is Product of Circumstances 
(1999), which was the very first stage performance given by Le Roy, and which explains 
his biographical story of deciding to change his career from molecular biologist to 
choreographer. De Smedt/Le Roy continued to speak:  
 
If people ask me my story, it is the story that I tell about... 
Not wanting to be in a situation where I am in a job or forced to work from nine to 
five or seven... 
I want a place where you cannot draw a line between private time or free time and 
work. 
And if you want to draw a line, you have to draw it by yourself. 
It is always changing. It is always a question, how to draw that line. 
 
What seems to be problematic is not just whether there should be a division between 
work time and free time. The problem for Le Roy is the fact that this drawing of a line is 
done by an institutional framework that is given and perpetuated.  
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So it was a decision to go to a place where work is not the opposite of free time where 
we understand … free time is the heritage we inherited from the thirties or the 
forties. But I want to go to this place where there is a constant permanent exchange 
between whatever I do and work and life. That was a kind of resistance towards a 
way of living where I did not feel good and that I felt was imposed on me … It was an 
act of rupture, an act of resistance… 
 
Here, De Smedt/Le Roy further explains how the choice of becoming a choreographer 
was an act of resistance against the given division of time in the field of science. De 
Smedt/Le Roy argues that what seems to be a natural division between work time and 
leisure is only a modern invention intended to legitimise the dialectical reorganisation of 
life. I will return to this issue of the particular distribution of time in Chapter 4. Here I 
want to pay attention to the fact that this problematisation of the conditions that produce 
us as the modern subjects is shared by this group of choreographers that I examine in this 
thesis. Therefore, although I know that De Smedt was referring in particular to Le Roy’s 
performance Product of Circumstances, what never became clear in that question and 
answer session was who was referring to whom, and who was speaking for whom. For 
instance, one audience member posed the following question in the middle of the 
conversation: 
 
Would you die if you don’t work? 
 
Then, De Smedt/Le Roy replied: 
 
No, I think everything I do, I really enjoy it. 
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The way in which I live and also work is still a big luxury... 
Because I still enjoy being in this state of permanent exchange... 
 
Here, the question to be asked is the following: When the audience member used the 
pronoun ‘you’, to whom was this question addressed? And when De Smedt/Le Roy 
replied with the pronoun ‘I’, to whom was this ‘I’ referring? When everyone seemed 
confused, one of the audience members interrogated De Smedt by asking why she chose 
not to include Xavier Le Roy’s story, but have this question and answer dialogue instead. 
This is how De Smedt/Le Roy replied: 
 
Maybe, somebody else in the audience can make a comment on that … huh … So, the 
question is why I choose not to show Xavier Le Roy and propose this talk … why is 
this, in your opinion? 
 
Once again, instead of swiftly replying to the question posed, De Smedt attempted to 
redirect the question to the audience. When the audience were not willing to respond to 
the question redirected to them, De Smedt/Le Roy finally spoke: 
 
I think the situation, which is related to the situation of an interview, is a situation 
related to the way I work with people. If you ask me for words about how I work 
with people … listening, talking, negotiating, thinking together … which is an 
interview or a situation … One can even say this is part of the ethics of my life. It is 
important to be in another mode of exchange. I think it is important to be in a 
situation where you can develop ideas and understanding, and in this way we cannot 
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really do it alone. You can listen, negotiate and talk together. This is also why we 
have this talk. 
 
In this situation, when De Smedt/Le Roy says ‘I’, to whom is this ‘I’ referring? When De 
Smedt/Le Roy talks about the ‘ethics of my life’, whose ethics are referred to here? And 
lastly, when De Smedt/Le Roy says ‘this is why we have this talk’, who is ‘we’ here? In this 
context, the title ‘Self-reliance’ is very ironic as De Smedt can never rely upon herself in 
constituting this performance. Instead, the subjectivity that is revealed on stage by De 
Smedt/Platel/Burrows/Salamon/Le Roy is always more than what is defined in the first 
place. This surplus subjectivisation of the choreographer is what I want to highlight by 
scrutinising De Smedt’s choreographic experiment in this chapter. In an attempt to avoid 
being captured within the dialectical constitution of the choreographer-subjectivity as 
the master that sustains the particular process of subjection, I would argue that De 
Smedt’s choreographic experiment suggests a thought-provoking theoretical model so 
that a new possibility of conceiving the choreographer-subjectivity can be tested.  
In the contemporary experiments by this new generation of choreographers 
examined in this thesis, the choreographer is no longer perceived as a unilateral force of 
oppression that necessitates and internalises a process of subjection. In this context, it is 
no coincidence that the conventional notion of a dance company, where there is a definite 
hierarchical division between the choreographer-subject and the dancer-subject, has 
been replaced by collaborative projects between colleagues and circles of friends on 
many contemporary dance stages.135 In these various types of collaborative projects, 
                                         
135 In this thesis, apart from Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker, the choreographers whom I examine do not 
operate in the conventional sense of a dance company. Although some of them run a certain type of 
organisation, it is more like having a platform rather than a dance company in a conventional sense.  
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what stands out is the fact that the constitution of the choreographer-subject becomes an 
event where a truth game rearranges and rearticulates the conditions that produces us 
as subjects.  
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Chapter 4. What Makes Choreography Research? 
– De-Signifying the Body within the State of Not-Yet-Knowing 
 
Reconstituting the Field of Knowledge via a Foucauldian Conception of Power 
In previous chapters, I examined how the particular disciplinary logic that demands the 
submission of the body to the master’s speech-acts has been devised, legitimised, and 
institutionalised, thanks to the tactics of binding the body with the technology of writing. 
At the same time, I also investigated how a particular set of critical engagements has been 
raised to deconstruct the choreographer-subject by rethinking the conditions that have 
normalised the imperatives of the modern institution of dance. In doing so, I have turned 
to Michel Foucault’s rethinking of the mechanism of power that takes place at the 
intersection of the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self. 
In rethinking the relationship between those who write the bodies of others and 
those who perform, I have ultimately aimed to highlight the need for a different 
understanding of the operation of power. As opposed to the conventional tactic of 
resistance, positioned outside the operation of power, and inevitably installing a binary 
system, a Foucauldian rethinking of power allows us to review the conventional tactic 
against the operation of the institution that we inhabit. For instance, what has drawn my 
attention most in contemporary choreographic experiments is the fact that their critical 
engagement with the institution that they inhabit illustrates a different understanding of 
the operation of power from that of the historical avant-garde. Thus, for the new 
generation of choreographers, the choreographer-subject as a position of power always 
operates at the intersection between the technologies of domination and technologies of 
the self, through which the body becomes reformulated according to particular canons. 
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In other words, this reformulation of the body does not mean that the body is only 
captured under the negative force of oppression. Instead, the reformulation of the body 
is achieved by a wilful submission of individuals that correspond to the particular 
disciplinary logic. But why has there been a voluntary submission of one’s body to the 
master’s speech-acts? This is how Foucault explains it: 
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.136 
 
For Foucault, discipline as a mechanism of power, which regulates the behaviour of 
individuals in society, not only produces the positionality of the master, but also induces 
a productive network through which a particular set of knowledge can be induced. 
Therefore, the discipline of dance should be understood as more than the oppression of 
the body. It has brought about pleasure, discourses, and knowledge in its 
institutionalisation. But, the question to be asked here is the following: What do we mean 
by knowledge? 
In order to comprehend the Foucauldian understanding of knowledge, it is 
necessary to bring up Foucault’s power/knowledge configuration.137 This Foucauldian 
configuration of power/knowledge ruptures our conventional understanding of power 
                                         
136 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(London: Penguin Books, 1986), 61. 
137 Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 67–79. 
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as the unilateral source of oppression and violence. Instead, as the solidus between power 
and knowledge indicates, this Foucauldian model emphasises the mutual 
interdependence between the two. In other words, the Foucauldian power/knowledge 
model is based on the presupposition that there is no power relation without the 
constitution of a field of knowledge.138 Therefore, when there is a specific constitution of 
knowledge, there must have been a specific operation of power that determines what can 
remain within the realm of knowledge. In other words, it is a specific power relation that 
enables, legitimises, and sustains a specific truth claim, through which a specific belief 
system is internalised and constituted as knowledge. In this context, Foucault argues that 
far from preventing knowledge, power produces it. 139  For Foucault, power not only 
controls knowledge but also supports, applies, and exploits it. On the other hand, Foucault 
claims that a specific constitution of knowledge shapes power relations in accordance 
with a specific intention. Therefore, it is knowledge that defines the conditions, scope, 
and parameters of a specific power operation. This is why, within the Foucauldian model 
of power/knowledge, the conception of knowledge is always implicated in the conception 
of power. 
In this light, there is nothing surprising that the problematisation of power 
operations in the institutionalisation of dance has led this new generation of 
choreographers to become involved with the problem of the (modern) system of 
knowledge production. As we saw in previous chapters, the problematisation of the 
positionality of the choreographer has become a common departure point from which 
contemporary choreographic experiments have begun. And I would argue that this 
                                         
138 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), 27. 
139 Ibid., 194. 
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necessarily raises questions about the modern system of knowledge production that 
conditions and predetermines the scope and parameters of the particular power 
operation in the modern institution of dance. In other words, contemporary 
choreographic experiments become a critical force, opposing the modern system of 
knowledge that has normalised the operation of a specific hierarchical system within the 
modern institution of dance. 
Contemporary choreographers attempt to challenge how dance as a particular 
discipline has been institutionalised within the modern system of knowledge production 
by presenting their dance-theatre as a form of research that highlights the state of not-
yet-knowing. In order to develop this discussion, I would first like to discuss further what 
I mean by research. But considering the fact that the term can be deployed in manifold 
ways, in attempting to define what I mean by research, it would be quicker to outline 
what I do not want associated with my discussion. 
 
Dance-Theatre as a Form of Research 
First of all, in discussing contemporary choreographic experiments as a form of research, 
I do not want to associate with the recent debates on ‘artistic research’, especially in the 
field of visual art. In recent years, with the proliferation of international biennales and 
their loud claims for globalisation, we have witnessed artistic practice being rearticulated 
with the term ‘research’. And there have been many critical attempts to define and 
redefine what is special about artistic research. 140  I have, however, no intention of 
adding an extra slant to what artistic research is, or to categorise the different vectors of 
                                         
140 Tom Holert, “Art In the Knowledge-Based Polis,” e-flux 3 (2009):  
http://www.e-flux.com/journal/art-in-the-knowledge-based-polis/. 
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studies on artistic research. Instead, I want to point out here that the recent debates on 
artistic research tend to focus on what artistic research could be or should be. In 
consequence, I would argue that the debates have been captured by the institutional and 
managerial desire to encompass the specificity of research-based art within the existing 
framework, in order to sustain the existing operational mechanism of the institution of 
art. In this context, I want to focus not on what is special about the artistic research 
conducted by contemporary choreographic experiments but on why and how 
contemporary choreographic experiments present their dance-theatre as research. Many 
contemporary choreographers do not see their stage performance as a finished work that 
is inevitably captured within the specific system of representation, but rather as part of 
research activity, by highlighting the state of not-yet-knowing. 
For instance, one of the common features of contemporary choreographic stages 
since the late 1990s has been the presentation of choreographer as narrator. She or he is 
no longer the transcendental master, but rather a tangible narrator who is willing to 
reveal the structure of the performance to the audience. In this context, I would like to 
discuss Xavier Le Roy’s Product of Circumstances (1999). In this performance, Le Roy 
decided to talk about why he became interested in becoming a choreographer. In other 
words, Le Roy decided to expose himself and his positionality as a choreographer as much 
as possible. In the process, he interweaves his unusual professional trajectory, from being 
a molecular biologist to becoming a choreographer, into the very structure of the 
performance by integrating parts of his doctoral thesis in biology into his lecture-
formatted performance. Thus, on stage, he inevitably moves between different modes of 
research and disciplines. In this process of mediating and negotiating between different 
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modes of research and disciplines, Le Roy creates an unexpected epistemological link 
while oscillating between being a biologist and a choreographer. 
Such a mode of presentation as seen in Product of Circumstances evokes a post-
Fordist mode of operation whereby new epistemological paradigms, such as reflexivity, 
transdisciplinarity, and heterogeneity, dramatically change the structure, status, and 
shape of the knowledge system. The term ‘post-Fordism’ obviously comes from the 
system devised in Henry Ford’s automotive factories that were characterised by the 
assembly line. Within the assembly line system, what is guaranteed is standardisation of 
production.141 But opposed to this standardisation guaranteed by Fordism, post-Fordist 
society redefines the frame of the systems of consumption and production. If one can say 
that Fordism is about mass production, post-Fordism is about mass customisation, 
thanks to globalised markets and the development of information technology that allows 
unprecedented fluidity in the consumer market, where diversification and flexibility 
seem to be guaranteed. What I want to highlight here, however, is that this post-Fordist 
structure under a neo-liberal culture of fluidity and the destabilisation of categories and 
disciplines are not necessarily emancipatory. As De Smedt/Le Roy admits in ‘Self-
reliance’, Le Roy’s resistance to the specific partition of time does not liberate him, as now 
he is caught up in a neo-liberal regime that demands that one works all the time. 
Therefore, a once decisive upheaval is now captured within another power operation that 
controls one’s subjectivity and mode of operation. 
 
                                         
141 Sonja Lavaert and Pascal Gielen, “The Dismeasure of Art. An Interview with Paolo Virno,” Open 17: A 
Precarious Existence, Vulnerability in the Public Domain (Amsterdam: SKOR, 2009), 17. 
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But this way that I tried, I also felt it started becoming imposed by the 
surroundings because now it prescribes that we work all the time, it is also the 
result of this push-up economy … it is also the ideal way of living, it is the concept 
of progress.142 
 
In this context, I want to briefly return to Christine De Smedt’s performance, Untitled 4. 4 
Choreographic Portraits (2012), that I examined in Chapter 3. Especially in the last part, 
‘Self-reliance’, based on her interview with Xavier Le Roy, one of the issues that De Smedt 
raises is why Le Roy decided to become a choreographer after gaining a PhD in molecular 
biology. De Smedt/Le Roy explains that it is due to Le Roy’s problematisation of the 
existing distribution of time within the specific field of his profession: 
 
Not wanting to be in a situation, where I am in a job or forced to work from nine 
to five or seven… 
I want a place where you cannot draw the line between private time or free time 
and work. 
And if you want to draw a line, you have to draw the line by yourself. 
It is always changing. It is always a question, how to draw that line.143 
 
Here, what is highlighted by De Smedt/Le Roy’s problematisation of the existing 
distribution of time within a specific profession is two contradictory terms: free time and 
work. De Smedt/Le Roy argues that this line between free time and work is not natural, 
                                         
142 A quotation from De Smedt/Le Roy’s reply to a question from the audience in Untitled 4. 4 Choreographic 
Portraits (2012), performed at the Kaaitheater, Brussels, 17 April 2012, transcribed by me. 
143 Ibid. 
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as it comes into being via the specific operation of power that controls and determines 
one’s mode of production and organisation of living. Therefore, problematising the 
existing distribution of time and space becomes about problematising the specific 
operation of power (the master’s voice that predetermines the ways in which one 
organises one’s time) that defines the conditions, scope, and parameters of what can be 
produced and legitimised. In other words, problematising the existing distribution of 
time and space implicates Le Roy in the matter of the modern system of knowledge 
production. In the forthcoming part, I will examine further De Smedt/Le Roy’s 
problematisation of the distribution of time, and its potential as a force of resistance that 
can disturb the smooth operation of the modern system of knowledge production. I will 
also examine why Le Roy locates his problematisation within the modern institution of 
dance, and how this disturbs the positionality of the choreographer that has been 
sustained by the specific knowledge system of the modern institution of dance. 
 
Free Time and/or Work Time 
 
…free time is the heritage we inherited from the thirties or forties. But I want to 
go this place where there is constant, permanent exchange between whatever I 
do and work and life. That was a kind of resistance towards a way of living…144 
 
De Smedt/Le Roy’s problematisation of the division between free time and work aims to 
open up the possibility of reorganising one’s way of living so that there can be constant 
and permanent exchange between work and life. This explains why Le Roy decided to 
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become a professional choreographer, as he believed that art was a place where work did 
not have to be the opposite of free time. In other words, the problematisation of the 
existing distribution of time in his own profession becomes the departure point for Le 
Roy’s practice as a choreographer, and for his resistance against the master’s voice that 
aims to capture his subjectivity within a manageable scope. When your job is producing 
art, how can you distinguish between what is free time and what is work time? Given the 
inspiration, experience, and dialogues that constitute one’s time, how can you know in 
advance what will be part of your artistic practice and what will remain as your own 
private material? 
This problematisation of the distribution of time within the institution of art, 
which is already captured within the neo-liberal mode of management, is further 
developed in Le Roy’s Product of Other Circumstances (2009). Its title obviously refers to 
his performance, Product of Circumstances, a decade previously. In this performance, Le 
Roy intensifies his enquiry into the specific distribution of time. He claims that he has 
worked on this performance during his free time. On stage, Le Roy ironically makes the 
following statement: ‘Isn’t it nice to be paid for what you perform as a hobby?’145 
What makes Le Roy’s radical claim more problematic lies in the fact that, from the 
beginning, this performance was not Le Roy’s idea. The idea for this performance came 
from the choreographer Boris Charmatz, Le Roy’s long-time colleague and friend. On 
stage, Le Roy reads an email from Charmatz from his laptop. In his email, Charmatz 
reminds Le Roy of his previous assertion that anyone can learn butoh in two hours.146 
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Then, Charmatz asks Le Roy to support his previous assertion by inviting him to an event 
entitled Rebutoh that Charmatz curated at the Musée de la danse in Rennes.147 But the 
positionality of Charmatz is not fully articulated within the conventional notion of 
choreographer as master. What becomes clear is that instead of directing Le Roy, 
Charmatz creates a problem. Having read the email aloud, Le Roy turns to the audience 
to tell them that what he is going to present tonight stems from this provoking invitation. 
I will return to the provocative claim of Le Roy, that he can learn butoh in two hours, in 
the forthcoming part, but first I want to go back to Le Roy’s radical statement that he 
worked on this performance during his free time. He claims that he decided to conduct 
research on butoh dance during his free time from his main work as a professional 
choreographer. What does this mean? Can an artist have free time that does not involve 
the process of making art? 
Kai van Eikels, in ‘Learning from Xavier Le Roy Means Learning to Work. On 
Dilettantism and Professionalism in 21st Century Performance’, points out that an artist 
is considered as one who knows no distinction between ‘work’ and ‘off work’: he is one 
who is always ready to be inspired, ready to create, and ready to work.148 In other words, 
everything he does, at least in part is, or contributes to, the production of art. In this light, 
Van Eikels points out that what Le Roy is claiming in Product of Other Circumstances by 
arguing that he produced this performance during his free time, is that he produces art, 
                                         
audience. There is, however, no set style, and it may be purely conceptual with no movement at all. Its 
origins have been attributed to Japanese dance legends Tatsumi Hijikata and Kazuo Ohno. 
147 “Rebutoh, edition 2009,” Muse e de la danse, http://www.museedeladanse.org/fr/articles/rebutoh-
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but it is not work. By separating work from art, does he aim to resist being captured by 
the neoliberal regime under which we end up working all the time? 
What is at stake in Le Roy’s argument that his performance is produced in his 
spare time is the conventional notion of professionalism that has unified the notion of 
work to that of art within the modern institution of art. Especially in modern dance-
theatre, such as ballet, it is not possible to separate art from work. In such theatre, the 
customised operation of a production system, whereby specific tasks at each stage of 
production have a specific timetable, has been established. Therefore, one has not only to 
work to a specific timetable, but also to train oneself to the point that one can reach a 
state of art. In other words, the state of art is the product of numerous hours of work and 
painful training. For at least the last three hundred years, in the history of ballet there has 
been the pedagogical operation of institutional mastery that predetermined the course of 
training for a professional ballet dancer. It comes from a preset relationality between a 
master’s knowledge of dance and the mode of embodiment of that knowledge.149 This 
relationality has been safeguarded by choreographic manuals for generation after 
generation. Therefore, if one wants to become a professional dancer, one must go through 
a predetermined process, first embodying the movements in these manuals. It is about 
submitting oneself to the forces of choreographic demands. It is about becoming the 
object in a structure of commands, and following someone else’s rules. In doing so, one 
yields to the citational force of choreographic manuals. 
Yet, as Le Roy himself claims, his art is not produced through work. What he is 
claiming here is that he does not follow the customised operation of a production system 
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whereby specific tasks at each stage of production have a specific distribution in time. In 
doing so, I would argue that he attempts to escape from the pedagogical operation of 
institutional mastery that is circumscribed in the professional production system of 
conventional dance-theatre. Moreover, the fact that he works with butoh dance makes 
his radical claim more persuasive, as butoh has a different notion of mastership and 
professionalism from that of the modern Western institution of dance. In this context, I 
would like to investigate further Van Eikels’ scrutiny of the notion of professionalism, as 
it allows us to see a different picture of professionalism to that which we have now. Van 
Eikels argues that the notion of professionalism, based on the idea of hours of labour and 
work, only began in the middle of the nineteenth century.150 In other words, the notion 
of professionalism that we have is actually a relatively modern invention. 
In this context, Van Eikels pays attention to the term ‘virtuoso’, which is often 
perceived as the basis of the notion of professionalism. In explaining why this term has 
been associated with professionalism in a modern sense, Van Eikels argues that the 
virtuoso has been exclusively associated with a small number of celebrity stage 
performers since the nineteenth century. Since this perception of virtuosi continues to 
occupy the collective memory, this associates the term with values of extreme 
specialisation and professionalisation. As opposed to such an understanding of the 
virtuoso in a modern sense, Van Eikels points to the fact that, from the Renaissance until 
the late eighteenth century, the words ‘dilettante’ and ‘virtuoso’ were used synonymously 
to refer to non-professional forms of knowledge. Van Eikels explains that it was Goethe 
who devalued the concept of the virtuoso-dilettante, opposing it to the concept of artistic 
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genius. Goethe believed that the virtuoso-dilettante transforms ‘aesthetic pleasure’ into 
the ‘pleasure of practice’. And what was problematic for Goethe regarding the pleasure of 
practice was that it inevitably evoked the egalitarian message that everybody could 
become a virtuoso: 
 
Everybody can start practising everything that can be practised, and [as] for 
becoming virtuosic (the stress on becoming) no more will be needed: you just 
have to start practising and go on practising, be it for a lifetime, a couple of years, 
or two hours – as long as the pleasure continues to empower you.151 
 
What must be further scrutinised is why the egalitarian message once inherent in the 
notion of the virtuoso-dilettante has been captured by a specific pedagogical strategy 
within the institutionalisation of dance, such that endless training according to a specific 
canon has been normalised. In this context, it is necessary to go back to Le Roy’s claim 
about learning butoh in two hours. I will argue that what seems to be an empty promise 
is, in fact, a radical criticism of the system of production of the modern institution of dance. 
 
Can One Learn Butoh in Two Hours? 
When Le Roy makes the radical claim that he can learn butoh in two hours, it is obvious 
that his claim cannot be understood within the conventional professionalism that has 
governed the modern institution of dance. If someone claims that he or she can learn 
ballet in two hours, it would be an insult to the numerous classical ballet dancers who 
train endlessly in order to create virtuosic performances. Despite butoh having a different 
                                         
151 Ibid., 5–6 
151 
 
cultural and historical background from ballet, a performance like that of a great master 
of butoh, that I have experienced myself, does not seem to be something that can be learnt 
in two hours. So then why does Le Roy make such a claim? It was this provoking premise 
that concerned me, through the feeling of discomfort that I too was implicated by Le Roy’s 
problem, provoked by Charmatz. 
In the theatre, it is possible that there were experts in butoh other than me or Le 
Roy. Or there could have been individuals who actually practise butoh or have done so in 
the past. Alternatively, there might have been people in the audience who had never 
experienced butoh before. In other words, everyone’s experience, and thus knowledge of 
butoh, would have been different. Moreover, everyone’s experience with dance in general 
would have also been different, despite the fact that the audience for this particular 
performance seemed to be, more or less, a group of professionals in the field of the arts. 
In a conventional dance-theatre, these different systems of knowledge are harmonised 
by the rule of a virtuosic performer who knows better than the people in the auditorium. 
And of course, a virtuosic performance is perceived as being the product of a man of 
instruction whose transcendental subjectivity allows him to operate on stage, despite his 
physical absence. But with Le Roy’s performance, his arbitrary and casual relationship 
with butoh disturbs the harmonised system of knowledge in the modern institution of 
dance. For instance, when I saw Product of Other Circumstances at the Kunsten Festival 
des Arts in 2011, I experienced an unusual incident.  
‘Shouldn’t butoh dance be about Hiroshima?’ shouted an audience member to Le 
Roy, in the middle of the performance. From his tone, it was reasonable to conclude that 
this person was annoyed with Xavier Le Roy. With his question, he not only challenged 
Le Roy on stage but also interrupted the performance. Following this interruption, the 
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audience’s attention focused on that audience member. At the same time, people waited 
to see how Le Roy would respond to this interruption from the auditorium. At first, Le 
Roy responded to this person in French, presumably because Le Roy was not prepared 
for this situation and unconsciously reacted to it in his mother tongue. Then, several 
audience members, including the person who raised the question in the first place, asked 
Le Roy to speak in English, as they did not understand French. Le Roy immediately 
translated his answer into English, arguing that he did not see a cause-and-effect 
relationship between butoh dance and the bombing of Hiroshima. In observing this rather 
unusual improvised conversation between an audience member and a performer on 
stage, I was curious to know what kind of urgency might have provoked that person to 
interrupt the performance in that way. I supposed he might have been implying that Le 
Roy’s casual regard for butoh dance and the bombing of Hiroshima was not politically 
correct. He might have been protesting against Le Roy’s arbitrary presentation of butoh 
dance. Normally, if one does not agree with the content of a performance, one leaves the 
theatre. But he chose to remain. In my opinion, the reason why this person spoke up in 
the middle of the performance, instead of leaving the theatre, was to correct Le Roy on 
his supposedly ‘wrong’ attitude towards butoh dance. He chose not to leave the 
performance, but to stay for the entire duration, as if he had a responsibility to make sure 
Le Roy delivered the essence of this great art of butoh well and correctly. 
As opposed to this positionality of the audience member, Le Roy made it clear 
that he does not position himself as a virtuosic performer (in the modernist sense) who 
knows better than the audience. He is a performer whose knowledge does not necessarily 
exceed that of the audience. This is the same for Charmatz, who provoked Le Roy in the 
first place. What Le Roy was presenting on stage, and what Charmatz prompted Le Roy 
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to engage with was not based on what they had already mastered or resolved. What is 
interesting is that each of them presented his problem, including the way in which he 
planned to deal with it. This allowed the audience to become involved with what was 
happening on stage in a direct manner. When the performer seemed not to have any clear 
answer to a problem posed on stage, this inevitably invited the audience to contribute 
something as they began to feel an obligation to help resolve the problem presented on 
stage. In other words, this provoking premise of how to learn butoh in two hours became 
a burden for everyone in the theatre. 
But at the same time, Le Roy’s casual relation to his own premise of the project, 
learning butoh dance in two hours, relaxed the audience who were under pressure to 
resolve the problem. Obviously, Le Roy had spent more than two hours researching butoh 
dance, so the premise of the performance had already failed. But Le Roy did not seem to 
be bothered by this failure. As if the point of the performance was for the premise to fail, 
his easy-going attitude spread to the audience. As he proceeded with his presentation, I 
no longer cared about the provoking premise of learning butoh in two hours. My concern 
shifted from whether it was possible to how we were managing to address the given task 
together. It became clear that the point of the performance for those who participated in 
it was not about achieving what seemed to be an impossible mission. 
In order to understand the positionality of Le Roy in this performance, it is 
important to remember that the performance was in response to a curatorial invitation. 
In many contemporary choreographic experiments, such as this performance by Le Roy, 
the role of the curator as the initiator of a performance becomes highlighted more than 
ever. In other words, the conventional positionality of the choreographer seems to be 
rearticulated with the role of a curator who initiates choreographic research that is often 
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presented on stage. But this does not mean that this emergence of the choreographer-
curator actualises the egalitarian ideal. It is still the choreographer-curator who explicitly 
or implicitly formulates the criteria. This often has direct consequences for the final form 
of the performance. Yet, it was the choreographer-curator’s interaction with his friend 
that determined how he formulated the criterion. As it was Charmatz’s friendship with 
Le Roy that enabled him to suggest the criterion for the production of the work, the 
operation of a choreographer-curator replaced the hierarchical positionality of the 
choreographer-master. 
Moreover, Le Roy’s decision to research butoh dance, based on resources available 
to everyone, highlighted his intention to problematise the conventional positionality of 
the choreographer as the master who owns the knowledge of dance. On stage, Le Roy 
explained to his audience that he decided to utilise online resources, books, memories, 
and anecdotes, which most people have easy access to. Then, he shared with the audience 
the resources that he worked with and how he conducted his research using those 
resources. He projected images of some of the websites onto a screen behind him, and 
demonstrated how he found the websites he used, simply inserting the word ‘butoh’ into 
a search engine. He also talked about his experience of attending a butoh performance 
given by the legendary butoh master Kazuo Ohno, and he said that one of the most 
memorable scenes of Ohno’s performance was the moment when Ohno dressed like a 
little girl. He said that when Ohno appeared on stage, it was not clear whether it was Ohno 
dressed like a little girl or a little girl who looked like Ohno. Le Roy then proceeded to talk 
about a book on butoh dance that he had studied. He even read aloud from some of the 
sections he had highlighted. And he showed some video clips from YouTube to the 
audience, explaining that he had learned some butoh movements from these clips. From 
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YouTube clips to a book about a butoh master, it is clear that Le Roy tried various methods 
to learn butoh dance – everything apart from taking direct lessons from a butoh master. 
Following a presentation (lasting about an hour and a half) on his decision to learn 
butoh dance and the process which he followed to learn the dance, Le Roy finally 
performed a butoh dance himself as a virtuoso-dilettante. He performed the part that he 
thought he could manage to copy from some YouTube clips. But what he presented on 
stage was precarious and vulnerable. His demonstration on stage seemed to be far from 
a stereotypical butoh dance, and the overly charged atmosphere of his seriousness, with 
butoh’s uncanny visual imagery, dominated any other communicational possibilities. As 
its popularity continues to grow, especially in Europe, butoh dance has been increasingly 
particularised by a specific vocabulary and grammar of movements that set out the 
parameters of what butoh dance should be. Thus, butoh dance is epitomised by 
representational schemata, such as white make-up or slow but hyperbolic movements. A 
highly minimalistic black or white stage with exaggerated dramaturgy has been every 
butoh dancer’s manual for the last few decades. In this context, Le Roy’s precarious 
performance was far from stereotypical butoh. It was, however, Le Roy’s arbitrary 
performance that made me to realise that I did not have any grounds to judge Le Roy’s 
performance on stage as not being butoh dance. I recognised that my initial judgement of 
Le Roy’s performance was based on contemporary hyperbolic and representational 
productions of butoh dance which have overshadowed the notion of what butoh dance 
could be. 
Historically, butoh dance emerged from such charismatic masters as Tatsumi 
Hijikata and Kazuo Ohno. Yet, in principle, there is no set style for butoh dance. Everyone 
can create their own butoh. It may be purely conceptual, with no movement at all, with 
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or without an audience. Thus, one does not necessarily go through a pedagogical process 
of embodying existing knowledge of what butoh dance used to be. Yet, such arbitrariness 
inevitably brings with it a fundamental paradox to butoh dance. If everyone can create 
their own butoh, then there cannot be any parameters that identify dance as butoh dance. 
In other words, if one wants to create one’s own butoh, how does one claim it is butoh? 
In order to identify it as butoh, one has to deal with what has been set out by the great 
masters. But if one follows the example of the great masters, one cannot create one’s own 
butoh dance. In other words, what makes butoh butoh is this availability that 
continuously provokes the question of what butoh dance can be. This egalitarian message, 
inherent in butoh dance, does, in fact, mirror Le Roy’s positioning of himself as a 
dilettante-virtuoso. In doing so, Le Roy attempts to challenge the institutional framework 
that controls and defines the system of knowledge within the modern institution of dance. 
And what Le Roy ultimately disturbs is the specific power/knowledge operation inherent 
in the very formation of the modern institution of dance. Le Roy resists the given 
pedagogical premises that bring about endless stultification. Therefore, he attempts to 
transform the positionality of the pupil into a virtuoso-dilettante so that an egalitarian 
message can be manifested. In other words, instead of the pedagogical process sustaining 
the position of the pupil, Le Roy attempts to open up the possibility of everyone becoming 
a teacher of him or herself. It is in this context that I would like to interweave my 
discussion of Le Roy with works by the French philosopher Jacques Rancière. 
 
Joseph Jacotot’s Radical Pedagogy 
Rancière’s diverse intellectual trajectories head towards problematising the specific 
power/knowledge operation that naturalises the hierarchical institutional framework. 
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This is particularly well-expressed in his archive-based work The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
(1987), via the figure of Joseph Jacotot. I would argue that Rancière’s problematisation of 
the position of mastery within a specific institution, and his philosophy of equality can be 
theoretical grounds to articulate further Le Roy’s egalitarian operation against the 
specific powers/knowledge operating within the modern institution of dance. In this 
context, I will attempt to draw a parallel between Le Roy’s positioning of himself as a 
dilettante-virtuoso and one of Rancière’s protagonists, Joseph Jacotot, who positions 
himself as an ‘ignorant schoolmaster’. But before discussing Joseph Jacotot, it is important 
to understand why Rancière embarked on a series of archive-based projects in the 
1980s. 152  Thus, it is necessary to take a brief detour via his unusual intellectual 
trajectories. 
Rancière was one of the most brilliant students of Althusser at the École normale 
supérieure in the 1960s. He even contributed an important section to Reading Capital at 
the age of 25. What was problematic for Rancière about Althusser’s Reading Capital was 
the fact that the given role of pioneers automatically put participants of the project in a 
position of mastery, as those who know.153 In fact, it was this position of mastery that 
was maintained throughout the emancipatory discourse of the Althusserian project. 
According to the Althusserian concept of ideology, people are exploited because 
they are blind to the law of exploitation. A positive formula for this presupposition would 
be the intervention of an agent who is in a position of mastery because he already knows 
about the law of exploitation. Within this configuration, the fight against domination 
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becomes a matter of knowledge and ignorance, through which a specific form of 
hierarchy is inevitably installed. Rancière argues that what underlies this configuration 
is the presupposition that people are incapable of understanding the complexity inherent 
in the sociopolitical system.154 Furthermore, the inequality that is presupposed, between 
those who know and those who do not, in turn legitimises the top-down transmission of 
knowledge through the intervention of agency.155 And it is this top-down transmission 
of knowledge that inevitably necessitates pedagogical practice. People are exploited 
because they do not understand the law of exploitation. This Althusserian premise, in fact, 
retained pedagogical practice so that those who already possessed the knowledge were 
able to ‘transmit a determinate knowledge to subjects who do not possess this 
knowledge’.156 
For Rancière, this is how inequality is sustained. This is the inevitable 
consequence of positioning equality as a goal to be achieved, instead of as a point of 
departure. As the Althusserian emancipatory project automatically installs another form 
of inequality, between those who already possess knowledge and those who do not, any 
attempt to abolish inequality inevitably falls into the trap of sustaining inequality in the 
name of emancipation. La leçon d'Althusser, published in French in 1974, was Rancière’s 
first step in his turn against the Althusserian emancipatory project. From that moment 
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on, he embarked on a new journey, in a search for the possibility of reconfiguring the 
relationship between domination and knowledge. 
After La leçon d'Althusser, Rancière became immersed in early nineteenth-century 
workers’ archives in order to reconfigure a relation between domination and knowledge 
which differed from the Althusserian scheme. By engaging with the journals, newspapers, 
and diaries of artisans, anonymous thinkers, and worker-poets, Rancière attempts to 
open up a new topography where these exploited individuals devise their own 
emancipatory system without the intervention of any agent. This is why these archival 
projects are at the heart of Rancière’s egalitarian mode of operation. By configuring a 
topography different from that of the Althusserian emancipatory project, Rancière is able 
to verify his own premise of equality without falsification. In other words, Rancière does 
not attempt to create his own theory of equality by falsifying Althusserian theory. This 
way, Rancière is able to avoid falling into the trap of reproducing a position of mastery. 
Instead, Rancière decides to take a detour via the stories of real people that demonstrate 
the performance of equality. In this process of restaging the emancipatory system devised 
by the exploited themselves, the simple fact that people are where they are not because 
they are ignorant of the law of exploitation, but because they are incapable of being 
elsewhere, is able to resonate. Without a process of falsification, the real stories re-
enacted by Rancière create a dramatic contrast to Althusserian science that disguises this 
simple matter of incapacity as a matter of knowledge and ignorance.157 
In this light, I now consider the story of Jacotot in Rancière’s The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster. Here, via the story of Joseph Jacotot, a revolutionary pedagogist in early 
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nineteenth-century France, Rancière attempts to open up a new topography where a 
different relation between domination and knowledge can be verified without 
falsification. The story begins when Jacotot is driven into exile, to Brussels, in the middle 
of political turmoil. The King of the Netherlands graciously offers him a job at the 
Université catholique de Louvain, teaching French to Dutch students. But Jacotot does not 
speak Dutch himself. Therefore, he becomes an ‘ignorant master’. In other words, his 
dominating positionality does not guarantee that he has the necessary knowledge. 
Despite Jacotot being an ignorant master, the students find a way to learn French 
themselves. All Jacotot does is find a bilingual edition of Fénelon’s 1699 Les Aventures de 
Télémaque, which was published in Brussels at that time.158 He delivers the book to the 
students. Then, through an interpreter, he asks them to learn the French text with the 
help of a translation. When the students make it through the first half of the book, he asks 
them to repeat what they have learned over and over again and then tells them to read 
through the rest of the book until they can recite it. When he tests the students, by asking 
them to write in French what they have learnt from the book, Jacotot expects a complete 
lack of ability from his students. But he finds that he is totally wrong. The students have 
learnt French by themselves. This experience turns Jacotot’s original view of pedagogical 
practice upside down. He becomes convinced that pedagogical practice does not work 
towards eradicating the schoolmaster and his pupils, but towards sustaining the distance 
between the two. 
In conventional pedagogical practice, the schoolmaster is presupposed as one 
who already knows what his pupils do not know. Therefore, the role of the schoolmaster 
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is to abolish or reduce the distance between his knowledge and that of the ignoramuses. 
In other words, the ultimate goal of pedagogy is to transform ignorant pupils into 
knowledgeable ones, so that any further necessity for pedagogy can be discarded. This is 
why self-vanishing mediation is at the core of any pedagogy. 159  But throughout his 
pedagogical experiment, Jacotot realised that the schoolmaster could only reduce the 
aforementioned distance on condition that he constantly recreates it. The reason is 
simple. To replace ignorance by knowledge, the schoolmaster must always be one step 
ahead. This instils a new form of ignorance between the pupils and himself. In 
pedagogical logic, the ignoramus is not simply one who does not yet know what the 
schoolmaster knows. The ignoramus is one who does not know what he does not know, 
or how to know it. In contrast, the schoolmaster is not only one who already possesses 
the knowledge unknown by the ignoramus; he is also one who knows how to make it an 
object of knowledge. 
Of course, there is no ignoramus who does not already know a plethora of things, 
who has not already learnt them by himself, by listening and looking around him, by 
observing and repeating, and by being mistaken and corrected. But for the schoolmaster, 
such knowledge is merely an ignoramus’s knowledge, knowledge that cannot be ordered 
in accordance with the ascent from the simplest to the most complex. Therefore, what the 
pupil will always lack, unless he becomes a schoolmaster himself, is ‘the knowledge of 
ignorance, that is to say, knowledge of the exact distance separating knowledge from 
ignorance’.160 It is this knowledge of ignorance that sustains the position of mastery, as 
the pupil can never obtain the knowledge of ignorance unless he becomes master himself. 
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This is at the heart of the paradox of any pedagogical intervention. Instead of eradicating 
the distance between the master and his pupils, any pedagogical intervention requires 
the ignorance of the pupil to be sustained. 
In contrast, for an ignorant schoolmaster, such tautology in the knowledge of 
ignorance is unknown to him. It is his ignorance of the distance between knowledge and 
ignorance that allows him to break away from this stultifying pedagogy. There is no 
longer a gulf between the ignorant schoolmaster and his pupils. Instead, between the 
schoolmaster and his pupils there is now a third thing, in this case a bilingual edition of 
Télémaque. It is alien to both, and both schoolmaster and pupil can refer to it to verify, 
between them, what the pupil sees, what he says about the book, and what he thinks of it. 
This system of verification does not, however, have the position of mastery that falsifies 
what one has verified. It is because this third thing is owned by no one. It only subsists 
between them, thus excluding any pedagogical transmission from one to the other.161 
In thinking about the possibility of creating this third thing that is owned by 
neither pupil nor master, I want to go back to the Le Roy’s egalitarian operation in Product 
of Other Circumstances. As the students in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, who are given the 
bilingual edition of Télémaque, become their own teacher, Le Roy’s choice of positioning 
himself as a virtuoso-dilettante allows him to be the teacher for himself. In neither case 
is anybody allowed to take the position of pupil. In doing so, the position of mastery can 
be eliminated. In other words, the shift from ‘the distribution of learning’ to ‘the 
distribution of teaching’ allows collective emancipation whereby no one remains in the 
position of pupil. In this light, I would like to examine Le Sacre du Printemps (2007), 
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another problematic performance by Le Roy. Le Roy’s strategy in this performance 
illustrates how the distribution of teaching, or becoming the ignorant schoolmaster, could 
actualise what Rancière calls the ‘third thing’, as opposed to the conventional 
positionality of the choreographer-master. 
 
Turning Knowledge of Ignorance into an Epistemological Game 
In Le Sacre du Printemps, Le Roy stands alone on a seemingly empty stage. Suddenly, the 
sound of an orchestra fills the theatre. It is Stravinsky’s famous music from The Rite of 
Spring. Le Roy begins to move his hands. It is obvious that he is imitating the movements 
of the conductor, a man of instruction who leads the playing of the entire orchestra. 
According to the conductor’s interpretation and reading of the text, the orchestra 
produces a specific rhythm and gives a specific performance. 
But the audience soon discover something strange. Although it is the conductor 
who leads the orchestra on a conventional stage, the audience is not supposed to see his 
movements. The conductor has his back to the auditorium because his movements are 
supposed to be watched and interpreted only by members of the orchestra. When the 
audience begins to wonder why Le Roy, who is performing the role of conductor, is facing 
the audience, they realise that they are a part of an epistemological game set up by Le Roy. 
They begin to sense that it is they who are involuntarily playing the role of an orchestra. 
For instance, at a specific moment, the audience notices that the brass suddenly sounds 
further away and the sounds of the drums get stronger under their seats. In other words, 
each audience member is playing a role of a specific musician in the orchestra. At the 
same time, the audience notice that Le Roy changes direction and engages with different 
sets of movements. Therefore, instead of remaining within the conventional role of 
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passive audience, the audience members realise that they are playing different roles that 
somehow contribute to making the performance what it is. 
This does not mean, however, that they are becoming real musicians who are 
easily captured within the specific hierarchical system of the institution of music. Most of 
the audience do not have any capacity to translate what seems to be the complex 
codification of orders that the performer, Le Roy, seems to be delivering. In other words, 
it is the ignorance of the audience regarding the musical score that causes the hegemonic 
operation of Le Roy as a conductor to fail. Instead, the movements of Le Roy, that are 
undone by the ignorance of the audience, are opened up to a new possibility whereby 
they become more than musical codification. Of course, knowledgeable eyes, trained in 
this codification of music, would have felt different towards Le Roy’s movements than 
would uneducated eyes. What is interesting here is the fact that the possibility of 
understanding Le Roy’s movement as dance is more apparent to ignorant eyes. 
Later, in his interview with me, Le Roy explained that this experiment began with 
a documentary that he received for free from the education department of the Berlin 
Philharmonic a couple of years earlier.162 This documentary is called Rhythm Is It! and is 
directed by Thomas Grube and Enrique Sánchez Lansch. The film documents a project 
undertaken by the Berlin Philharmonic’s principal conductor, Simon Rattle, and a 
choreographer, Royston Maldoom, who decided to share their knowledge of classical 
music by staging a performance of Igor Stravinsky’s ballet The Rite of Spring with a cast 
of 250 underprivileged children recruited from Berlin’s state schools. Van Eikels argues 
that in their pedagogical desire for the distribution of learning among underprivileged 
                                         
162 My interview with Xavier Le Roy on the occasion of the Bo:m Festival in Seoul in 2010. See also Kai 
van Eikels, “Learning From Xavier Le Roy,” 9. 
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people, with no previous background in classical dance or music, there is an obvious top-
down transmission of knowledge. In other words, what conductor Rattle and 
choreographer Maldoom have is knowledge of ignorance, as opposed to the children who 
simply have not had a chance to taste the pleasure of music. Moreover, this documentary 
attempts to show that this schoolmaster not only shares what they now taste, which is 
pleasure in music or pleasure in knowing, but also manages to change the lives of those 
who participate. As Rattle sets out to teach his young students the importance of music, 
Maldoom shares with the children his passion for dance, and how he came to ballet 
relatively late in life, as the youngsters slowly coalesce into a dance ensemble. In this 
context, it is not surprising that this DVD caught the attention of Le Roy, whose mode of 
egalitarian operation has produced many critiques of pedagogical attempts to sustain 
given hierarchical, institutional frameworks. However, what captivates Le Roy is not the 
tear-provoking story of underprivileged children being granted access to the world of 
classical music, but the gestures of the conductor that direct Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring. 
The gestures of the conductor were not originally meant to draw the audience’s 
attention, as they are meant to serve as an internal modus operandi communicating 
specific musical orders to the orchestra. Yet, because Le Roy was ignorant of all the 
different kinds of codes and signs in music, he realised that the gestures of the conductor 
could not convey any specific instructions to him. Thanks to this knowledge of ignorance, 
to his eyes the gestures of the conductor seemed to be reacting too late or too fast to the 
music that he was listening to. Le Roy realised that it was his ignorance that caused the 
hierarchical system of orders in music to fail to operate. As Le Roy says in the interview, 
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this failure was only possible as he was not even an amateur musician.163 However, it 
was this failure that opened up a new possibility for the gestures of the conductor to be 
more than the transmitters of specific orders. 
After Le Roy realised that his ignorance could be an important asset for creating 
dance, he decided to learn the gestures of the conductor by himself, again without 
professional training. But in order to imitate the gestures of the conductor that he saw on 
the DVD, he first had to learn how to read a score. Without an understanding of the 
operational mechanism of the specific language of conducting, it was almost impossible 
to copy movements that have such complex organisational principles. Despite his efforts, 
Le Roy could not learn everything about the complex system of codes and signs within a 
limited period of time. Therefore, whenever he failed to match the score and the 
movements of the conductor, Le Roy turned to Millicent Hodson’s reconstruction of 
Nijinsky’s movements as a secondary source. Through Nijinsky’s interpretation of the 
music, Le Roy attempted to reconstruct the movements of the conductor.164 When Le Roy 
failed to imitate via this secondary source, he developed his own movements, in addition 
to copying the gestures of the conductor from the documentary. Through this process, Le 
Roy reached a point where he could transform what used to be the mechanical orders of 
the conductor into open signifiers, not owned by anyone. 
In addition, Le Roy worked with a sound engineer, Peter Boehm. He took the music 
from a filmed recording of the Berlin Philharmonic and piped it strategically through a 
matrix of speakers placed beneath each seat of the auditorium. Each speaker came to have 
                                         
163 My interview with Xavier Le Roy on the occasion of the Bo:m Festival in Seoul in 2010. 
164 Vaslav Nijinsky (1890–1950) was a Russian ballet dancer and choreographer. He was celebrated for 
his virtuosity and for the depth and intensity of his characterisations. His ability to perform seemingly 
gravity-defying leaps was legendary in the development of modern dance-theatre. 
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a different percentage of instruments so that the audience heard some instruments 
playing louder than others, depending on where she or he was seated. In this way, the 
audience came to play an active role in producing Le Roy’s movements, as it was the 
specific sounds of specific instruments represented by each seat that drew specific 
movements from him. Therefore, instead of being merely the audience, the audience at 
this performance become co-professionals. 
What is it then that Le Roy and the audience produced together? Can it be 
automatically embraced as new knowledge about dance? The performance released the 
gestures of the conductor from their heavy duty of conveying and delivering the complex 
knowledge system of music. Thus, the gestures of the conductor became open signifiers, 
attempting to be more than what was allowed to them before. But when the specific 
knowledge system inherent in the gestures of the conductor is undone, so that the 
gestures of conductor depart from their conventional realm of habitation, what is left 
behind? What kind of new possibilities will open up for them? 
When the centrally and hierarchically organised system of knowledge inherent in 
the gestures of the conductor is undone, the movements that inevitably get produced in 
the process of following the signs of the orders lose their ontological, epistemological 
ground. So they become dispersed. Within this dispersed space, rhythms resurface that 
were overshadowed by the codes of signification that dominated the ontological 
condition of those movements. In other words, it is the transitive nature of the 
movements that allows them to be reunited with rhythms. But this does not mean that 
these movements will be automatically welcomed within the discipline of dance. 
To what extent can the movements of a dancer endure their ontological 
vulnerability to the movements made by another system of knowledge? The movements 
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of the conductor, when dismissed by the original system of knowledge, disturb the 
parameters of the discipline of dance that has operated according to a specific system of 
orders and rules. How does one distinguish between movements and dance? When does 
a moving body become a dancing body? What Le Roy’s choreographic experiment 
produces, in challenging the specific knowledge of music, is a set of questions that ask 
what makes dance dance? He is highlighting the fact that our current understanding of 
what makes dance dance is not something pregiven, but rather the product of a very 
specific institutionalisation. 
In examining Le Roy’s performances, I have aimed to reveal how contemporary 
choreographic experiments have attempted to present themselves as open-ended 
processes, such that various systems of knowledge crash into one another. Therefore, as 
opposed to perceiving research as an endless process of authorising the existing 
institutional framework, contemporary choreographers position their practice as 
research through which the normalisation of the boundaries and criteria, that have 
defined and sustained a specific knowledge system, can be called into question. 
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Chapter 5. How Does Choreography Reinvent Spectatorship? 
– Bringing About a Space of Appearance for Other Bodies 
 
An Internal Contradiction in the Victimisation of Spectatorship 
It was at the opening night of Xavier Le Roy’s Low Pieces at Hebbel am Ufer in Berlin, 2011, 
that I heard about The Agora Project (2009–2011) from the Dutch theatre director, 
choreographer, and performer Jan Ritsema, who himself participated in Le Roy’s 
performance that night. He said The Agora Project was a collaborative project that was 
initiated by fourteen artists, including himself, and later incorporated another five 
participants. 165  The fact that there were multiple authors immediately grabbed my 
attention. It was not, however, until I actually experienced a performance at the 
Steirischer Herbst festival in Graz in 2011 that I could understand how nineteen artists 
might work together without a conventional hierarchical model, whereby the director-
master dictates the content of the entire production. 
As soon as I climb the stairs to the Dom im Berg, a theatre built inside a natural 
cave under Schlossberg, the famous castle in Graz, I see people gathering in front of the 
black curtain dividing the theatre space from the waiting area. There, I coincidently come 
across a friend whom I had met in the kitchen of the Performing Arts Forum in St-Erme-
Outre-et-Ramecourt, France, a self-organising artistic platform initiated by Jan Ritsema, 
where The Agora Project was first conceived.166 He happens to be a friend of several 
                                         
165 The names of the participating artists are as follows: Perrine Bailleux (FR), Christine De Smedt (BE), 
Marcus Doverud (SE), Atlanta Eke (AU), Luís Miguel Félix (PT), Maria Hassabi (CY/US), Krõõt Juurak (EE), 
Emma Kim Hagdahl (SE), Xavier Le Roy (FR), Neto Machado (BR), Berno Odo Polzer (BE/AT), Jan Ritsema 
(FR/NL), Mårten Spångberg (SE), and Tea Tupajić (BA). 
166  In 2006 Jan Ritsema created the Performing Arts Forum (PAF) in Saint-Erme-Outre-et-Ramecourt, 
France, an alternative artists’ residency run by artists, where every year some 700 international artists 
exchange their experiences and knowledge, and create new works, see www.pa-f.net. 
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artists participating in The Agora Project, so I am able to learn how the project developed 
while waiting for it to start. At that moment, I realise that I am in some way sharing a 
particular discursive space with these multiple authors of The Agora Project. Among these 
authors and me, there is already a neutral friend, a common reference point and place of 
interest and, moreover, a common source of information and knowledge. In other words, 
I am implicated in the project even before I play my role as a spectator. 
The black curtains in front of us that maintain the separation between the world 
and the theatre finally open. But there is no conventional auditorium where the 
spectators can sit. Instead, what awaits us is a series of brown paper lunch-bags placed 
upside down on the ground. Dozens of them are placed close together, so if we want to 
get into the theatre we have to crush the bags into the ground. The noise of dozens of 
empty, brown bags being squashed is surprisingly loud, as they are stood on 
simultaneously. And this violent sound coalesces with the remembered sounds hovering 
in my head: the sound of guns firing, the sound of an ambulance, the sound of screaming, 
the sound of a reporter with the background noise of people from every corner of the 
streets, broadcast on television to us every day. As if a moment of now is claiming its right 
in the theatrical operation, as if a moment of reality is squeezing into the world of the 
theatre, our entrance to the theatre space signals the contamination of the normative 
ideal of theatre as an autonomous representation machine. 
Instead of being plunged into darkness, we, the spectators, are asked to make our 
entrance to the theatre loudly and violently. By trampling on simple brown paper lunch-
bags placed upside down on the ground we listen to the noise that we ourselves make in 
the space. The traditional ethics of ‘being there without being there’, legitimised by a 
specific hierarchy of power in the theatre, no longer apply here. Moreover, the fact that 
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there are no seats reserved for the spectators does not allow us to adhere to this 
unspoken demand. I am not quite sure where I should go. Not only is there no auditorium, 
there are no marks that even indicate the places where the action will occur, and where 
viewing can take place. At first, I try to move into a corner. But I soon realise that that 
would not work either, as every corner of the theatre is a potential site for action. There 
is no longer a dichotomy that predetermines the relation between stage and audience 
through which, as Jacques Rancière calls it, the ‘victimisation of spectatorship’ can be 
sustained. 
Before getting into Rancière’s discussion, I would like to highlight the fact that the 
victimisation of spectatorship is a symptom of what Jonas Barish refers to as the 
‘antitheatrical prejudice’ inherent in Western thoughts.167 This has been legitimised by 
the obvious division between stage and auditorium within the modernist discourse of 
theatre. The stage is where the action takes place, while the auditorium is where passive 
spectators are located or subjugated. In fact, the word spectator identifies the position of 
those who only passively watch the spectacle in front of them. As passive voyeurs, 
spectators are bodiless and invisible, in contrast to the spotlit stage. In other words, it is 
the invisibility of spectators that makes them powerless. Therefore, the logical conclusion 
to this problem is to transform passive voyeurs into active participants so that they can 
be located in the ‘space of appearance’, to borrow Hannah Arendt’s words.168 
In ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, however, Jacques Rancie re argues that this logic, 
                                         
167 Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1981), 3. In Nicholas Ridout’s “The Undoing of Theatre”, Ridout discusses a sequence of what Barnish calls 
the ‘antitheatrical thought’, from its apparent foundations in Platonic thought, through Christian Puritanism, 
towards the modern conception of the antitheatrical prejudice as revealed in Peter Handke’s confession 
that theatre ‘has always possessed its own saving salt of antitheatricalism’. See Nicholas Ridout, “The 
Undoing of Theatre” (PhD diss., Birkbeck College, University of London, 2003), 2–5. 
168 Arendt, The Human Condition, 198. 
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which is embedded in the emancipatory claim of the historical reformation project in 
theatre, exposes an internal contradiction that is inherent in the notion of emancipation 
itself.169 This notion of emancipation necessitates an intervention by the agency that 
emancipates the victims who cannot help themselves. Rancie re explains that in order for 
this emancipatory strategy to operate, there are specific conditions to be met. First, the 
subjects must not be able to help themselves. Secondly, the subjects must not even know 
what they do not know. Thus, a knowledgeable agent should intervene in the situation 
and teach the ignorant subjects how their positionality can be transformed. For Rancie re, 
the problem here is that the position of mastery never actually disappears. Instead, the 
existing position of mastery is simply replaced by a knowledgeable agent, so that the 
inferiorisation of the subjects is never interrupted. 
In this context, Rancie re points out that the emancipatory strategy of the historical 
avant-garde of theatre resembles the existing political emancipatory strategy that is 
engineered to subvert inequality through the intervention of an agent who already knows 
about the laws of exploitation. For Rancie re, the intervention of an agent is problematic, 
as this sustains the position of mastery, instead of eradicating it. Thus, Rancie re’s 
juxtaposition of the emancipatory strategy of the historical avant-garde with the 
conventional political emancipatory strategy highlights the internal contradiction 
inherent in the notion of emancipation. Whether it is in the theatre or politics, any 
emancipatory claim presupposes the victimisation of the people as those who cannot help 
themselves, thus perpetuating a particular pedagogical machine that reproduces the 
position of the master. Therefore, the question to be asked is how can we open up a new 
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topology, so that the supposed inferiorisation of the people in the theatre or in politics 
can be rethought? 
In this context, I find it interesting that Rancie re’s critique of the victimisation of 
spectatorship shares the theoretical ground on which he problematises the demonisation 
of the demos in Platonic political philosophy. For Rancie re, the inferiorisation of the 
spectator stems from the specific Platonic demonisation of the demos that aims to ‘keep 
the people present in their absence’, so that the position of mastery can be sustained.170 
In the coming part, I will first examine Rancie re’s archaeological research on the Platonic 
political philosophy that demonises the demos. In On the Shores of Politics (1995), 
Rancie re brings up the famous story of Plato’s cave in order to explain how the 
demonisation of the demos is justified in Platonic political philosophy. Then, I will 
highlight the fact that this Platonic political project has never been interrupted, even in 
the emancipatory project of the historical avant-garde in the theatre. In doing so, I will 
juxtapose the Platonic demonisation of the demos with the victimisation of the spectator 
in historical reformation projects in the theatre. 
 
Archaeology of the Demonisation of the Demos  
In the preface to On the Shores of Politics, Rancie re begins by rethinking the Allegory of 
the Cave as described by Plato in the Republic. Rancie re argues that through the symbolic 
act of Socrates entering the cave, Plato successfully buries the sea beneath the earth and 
bids farewell to the fatal, seductive seascape. Rancie re asks why Plato is eager to hide the 
sea and change its nature by turning it into a cave. What is at the core of Plato’s hatred or 
                                         
170 Jacques Rancie re, On the Shores of Politics, trans. Liz Heron (London and New York: Verso, 1995), 93. 
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even fear of the sea? 
Rancie re points out that the story of Plato’s cave in the Republic is not something 
exceptional among Plato’s dialogues. In fact, it is not difficult to spot anti-maritime 
dialectics pervading many of Plato’s dialogues. For instance, when Plato speaks through 
the mouth of the Athenian and says that the distance of eighty stadia which separates the 
city of Clinias from its port is barely enough, it is not just because of the smell of the brine. 
For Plato, the sea smells bad. It is because the sea smells of sailors: it smells of democracy. 
Plato identifies democracy with maritime sovereignty, where the beast of the populace is 
only controlled by the lust for possession, which ‘sails the seas doubly threatened by the 
buffeting of the waves and the brutality of the sailors’.171 
Throughout many of his dialogues, it is clear that Plato did not believe that 
democracy was a perfect organic mechanism that could run itself. But after he failed in 
his efforts to guide a tyrant’s rule in Syracuse, he began to engage with the practical side 
of operating a democracy as a possible regime, without any longer pursuing his passion 
for actualising the regime via a philosopher-king.172 Plato’s struggle to make democracy 
a reliable regime is recorded in the Laws. Here, he focuses mainly on the discussion of 
how democracy can be engineered as a possible governing principle. It is in this context 
that Plato introduces the term ‘theatrocracy’. In doing so, Plato attempts to create a 
dramatic contrast to a ‘good democracy’, in which the demos is under control and 
prevented from becoming the ochlos, the mob and the drunken sailors. Plato’s successor 
Aristotle explains this to us: 
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A bad democracy is a democracy true to its name, where the demos exercises 
power, where it inhabits the centre of the city, has but a few steps to take in order 
to sit in assembly and can lay claim to the archai. A good democracy, by contrast, 
which comes as close as possible to the ideal regime of the politeia, contrives to 
distance the demos.173 
 
This process of preventing the demos from transforming into the ochlos begins with 
bracketing the participating entities, and its first project is to turn the demos into the 
union of a centripetal force. Rancie re argues that this is not to create a centre that is being 
pulled in either direction, between itself and the periphery. Rather, it is a way of ‘keeping 
the people present in their absence’.174 
Therefore, in the Platonic political project, philosophy anchors its journey in a 
laboratory, inventing artifices that prevent the demos from being true to democracy. It is 
through these artifices that democracy is finally transformed and becomes capable of 
fulfilling ‘the old feudal dream of the great collective body divided into orders.’ 175 
Rancie re calls the operational mechanism of this artifice, that distributes and legitimises 
a specific role, ‘policing’, in order to distinguish it from what he refers to as ‘politics’, where 
the surplus activities of subjectivisation take place. 176  Policing is about establishing 
orders that set up procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectives is 
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achieved, the distribution of places and roles is conducted, and systems for legitimising 
this distribution are established.177 
In this context, we can understand why theatrocracy is a real threat to the Platonic 
political project. Theatrocracy disturbs the existing policing order, and the pregiven forms 
of perception and utterance are reopened to the possibility of reconfiguration. Therefore, 
anti-theatricality is a crucial project in Platonic philosophy so that the demos can be 
prevented from being true to democracy. In this context, I would argue that it is not 
coincidental that the development of theatre, as a distinctive artistic genre in Western 
history, has paralleled the isolation of theatre architecture in its move away from the 
street corners of the agora where theatrocracy can be actualised.178 In other words, the 
development of theatre under the specific political project called Western modernity aims 
to suppress theatrocracy, under which the demos could perform and be true to their name. 
Evoking the Platonic ‘policing’ project of the demos, theatre in the West has 
increasingly confined itself to abstract spaces, such as the court or private salons. With 
the arrival of modernity, this drive was epitomised in the manifestation of theatre as a 
black box.179 This claustrophobic black box that always maintains its dichotomy is no 
different from the theatre we know today. In it, what becomes actualised is the ultimate 
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ideal of the Platonic philosophy of keeping the demos present in their absence. And this 
centripetal demos is called the spectator within the institutionalisation of theatre in 
Western modernity. 
The dramatic scene described by Socrates of the cave in Plato’s Republic gives us a 
clue to how spectatorship in the West has been devised and developed. And in the 
dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon in Republic, Plato explains what Socrates 
witnesses after entering the cave. In retelling Plato’s description of the cave, Rancie re 
argues that, for Plato, when the sea is buried beneath the earth, men in chains replace the 
brutality of the sailors, while the whims of tides are replaced by the dullness of shadows. 
 
Picture people as dwelling in a cavernous underground chamber, with an 
entrance opening upward to the light, and a long passageway running down the 
whole length of the cave. They have been there since childhood, legs and necks 
fettered so they cannot move: they see only what is in front of them, unable to 
turn their heads because of the bonds. But light reaches them from a fire burning 
some distance behind and above them. Between the fire and the prisoners, 
picture a track a bit higher up, and a little wall built along it like the screens in 
front of the performers at puppet shows, above which they show the puppets. 
I see it, he said… 
A strange image, he said and strange prisoners. 
Like ourselves, I replied. For first, do you think such prisoners see anything of 
themselves or one another except the shadows cast by the first one on the wall of 
the cave in front of them? … whenever one of them was released, and suddenly 
compelled to stand upright and turn his head and walk and look upward to the 
light, he would feel pain in doing all this, and because his eyes were dazzled, he 
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would be unable to discern those things yonder whose shadows he had seen 
before…180 
 
In this dialogue, Socrates explains to Glaucon that the prisoners in the cave have been 
fettered by their legs and necks from childhood. What is interesting here is the fact that 
these fetters are imaginary. The prisoners in the cave are, however, unaware of this. Unlike 
Glaucon, who believes this scene is strange, Socrates accepts that these prisoners are ‘like 
us’. Even though their fetters are imaginary, because they believe them, they are unable to 
release themselves. All they can do is see shadows on the walls that are cast by themselves 
from the fire behind them. Socrates points out that the shadows are as close as the 
prisoners get to seeing reality. He then explains how the philosopher is like a prisoner 
who is freed from the cave and comes to understand that the shadows on the wall do not 
constitute reality at all. Therefore, the ultimate task of philosophy is to rescue people who 
are imprisoned by their own shadows. It is only through philosophy that the prisoners in 
the cave can escape their illusory chains. 
Socrates’ description of the cave scene bears a striking resemblance to the 
conception of theatre in the historical reformation of the theatre. What is particularly 
intriguing about this story is how the Platonic political project of burying the sea, or 
democracy, inevitably brings about an endless chain of pedagogical operations that rely 
on the presupposition that people cannot help themselves. The populace is buried, as it is 
believed to be dangerous on its own. But once it is buried, it becomes the very subject to 
be saved from its own delusion. This ever-defeating formation of the demos is echoed in 
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the historical reformation project in theatre that aims to emancipate the spectators from 
their illusory chains. 
The reason why this archaeology of the theatre first grasped my attention was 
because this particular discourse on theatrical illusion has not been interrupted by any of 
the historical theatrical reformation projects. In fact, Plato has proved to be a valuable ally 
for historical reformers of theatre. Every programme of reformation in the history of the 
avant-garde that corresponds to this urgent need of theatre has had to be rescued from 
the evil operation of illusion. In ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, Rancie re argues that 
whether it is Brechtian’s epic theatre or Artaudt’s theatre of cruelty, they inherit the 
logical formula that sustains and maintains the derogation of the spectator by 
predetermining their positionality as the victims of a theatrical spectacle. 181  The 
spectators are the ones who separate themselves from the truth by remaining within the 
operation of the spectacle. And even though the spectators are the original sin of theatre, 
theatre cannot be sustained without them. 
Rancie re calls this ‘the paradox of the spectator’.182 In order to overcome this 
paradox, the condemned spectators must be transformed into emancipated spectators 
who are ready to be mobilised for the revolution to come. In other words, the conventional 
pedagogical machine comes to be in tune with the reformation project of modern theatre. 
Under the operation of this pedagogical machine, spectators should be educated to resist 
the theatrical illusion by those who already know of its danger, so that spectators are no 
longer subjugated objects. Thanks to the agent’s rescue operation, the spectators are 
emancipated and are now active subjects of their own experiences. In other words, the 
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condemned spectators are finally transported to the ‘space of appearance’, where they are 
transformed into a living community. 
Taking a detour via Rancière’s archaeological investigation and the theoretical 
ground on which the demonisation of the demos is legitimised, I have attempted to 
highlight the uninterrupted operation of a particular pedagogical machine that 
perpetuates the ever-defeating formation of the spectator. In other words, I would argue 
that the ever-defeating formation of the spectator shares the same theoretical ground as 
that of the formation of the demos. It is in this context that I want to go back to The Agora 
Project, with which I opened this chapter. I have already discussed how, in The Agora 
Project, the conventional dichotomy between stage and auditorium, that sustains the 
modernist pedagogical impulse, has been eliminated. When the conventional dichotomy 
is no longer available, the ever-defeating formation of the spectator loses its ground. In 
this light, I want to highlight the particular operation in the technology called 
choreography that is deployed as a structural tactic to reconfigure spectatorship, through 
which an alternative model of theatre production can be envisaged. 
 
The Unrealisation of Given Roles 
The Agora Project was initiated by the choreographer, dancer, and theatre director Jan 
Ritsema. But in the end, it was actualised by nineteen artists. And not all of them identify 
themselves as choreographers. Yet, the reason why I define this project as a 
choreographic experiment is because its structural composition can be analysed via its 
tactical deployment of choreography, the technology that brings about spaces of 
appearances for the bodies of others. For instance, in eradicating the physical and 
symbolic dichotomy of theatre, The Agora Project produces multiple layers and spaces of 
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appearances not only for the authors of the performance but also for every participant, 
including the technicians, who are meant to document the performance, and the 
spectators, who are meant to view the spectacle passively. The emergence of spaces of 
appearance on multiple levels, at unexpected moments, brings about a constant 
unrealisation of the structure, so that the monopolistic frontal viewpoint in the 
conventional theatre context can be diverted. In other words, by strategically deploying 
the technology of choreography, The Agora Project makes sure that its structural 
composition remains as flexible as possible so that participants in the performance, 
including the spectators, can be more than they are allowed to be in the conventional 
theatre framework. In so doing, The Agora Project successfully challenges the existing 
configuration of spectatorship as bodiless voyeurs that necessitate pedagogical 
intervention.  
‘Scene 1. Take 1!’ While I am still trying to work out a suitable place for myself as 
a spectator (there is no auditorium), suddenly someone shouts and multiple banks of 
cameras start rolling in every corner of the theatre. Then, I realise that I will not have the 
privilege of hiding in a dark auditorium. As the cameras start rolling, some of their 
operators are professional cameramen who are documenting what is happening in the 
here and now. But some of them are participating artists who take on the role of 
cameraman while waiting for their turn to perform. On top of that, there are some 
spectators who are friends of the performers and who decide, on the spot, to help them 
by holding microphones or lighting equipment. And there are other spectators who hover 
among these cameramen and begin to take pictures for their own memory or research. 
In this intermingling of different layers of the gaze, with different aims, the existing 
representation machine, based on the usual dichotomy between stage and auditorium, 
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becomes impotent. In this context, the question of who is watching whom becomes 
meaningless. Therefore, the conventional vanishing point of a stage performance, that 
sustains the representational structure, is being contaminated. When this conventional 
system is contaminated, the victimisation of spectatorship can no longer be sustained. 
And this allows the space of appearance to emerge in multiple ways among the 
participants at every level. It is not just the nineteen artists who have worked on this 
project who emerge on stage. It is also film crews and spectators, who are meant to ‘be 
there without being there’, and who begin to occupy the space of appearances. In other 
words, The Agora Project becomes a choreographic experiment where the unrealisation 
of the rigid representational system of theatre is achieved by bringing about multiple 
spaces of appearances. 
As the multiple banks of cameras start rolling in every corner of the theatre, I see 
Mårten Spångberg, a Swedish choreographer, running with the cameramen. He is one of 
the participating artists, but for this particular scene he is watching his fellow artists 
perform on stage, voluntarily playing the role of a spectator, and standing right next to 
me. I recognise him as I met him at the Performing Arts Forum. When the intense running 
around is finished, he comes to me and asks me what I am writing. He saw me running 
with him and the other cameramen, taking photos and notes of the performance. I tell 
him it is for my own research and why I am interested in this project. I realise that I am 
involuntarily locating myself in the space of appearance, despite the fact that my given 
role is that of a spectator. 
Moreover, this dialogue, in the middle of the performance, does not disturb the 
other spectators at all, as it takes place during a pause between two scenes. In fact, there 
are many pauses between scenes. Therefore, in these in-between times, I am definitely 
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more than a passive voyeur. I am able actively to engage in discussions with some of the 
performers or other spectators. And through these discussions, I can learn about how this 
performance was conceived. I ask questions and express my thoughts on stage. My 
learning experience takes place on stage, with nineteen authors, instead of in a secluded, 
black box where I am only allowed to contemplate what I see on stage. Moreover, this 
learning experience is more or less a mutual experience that also involves the nineteen 
performers on stage. 
As the structural composition of the performance, this allows the performance to 
be open-ended via the constant deployment of the technology of choreography. The given 
dichotomous structure of theatre becomes vulnerable to constant unrealisation; all of the 
participants are exposed to unexpected situations in which they have to negotiate their 
given positions. I would argue that all the participants become choreographer-spectators 
who bring about spaces of appearances for the bodies of others, and also for themselves. 
And I would argue that this interchangeability inherent in the structural composition of 
The Agora Project highlights the possibility of theatre as an open-ended process that is 
not captured within the conventional representational system. 
 
The Agora Project as the Process Itself 
The Agora Project at the Steirischer Herbst festival in Graz was presented as an open-
ended process that, like any other theatre, had to end at some point. It lasted for two 
hours. Yet, it continuously evolved into something else so that, as a project, it became a 
process itself. For instance, as already discussed, The Agora Project was first suggested 
by the theatre director, choreographer, and performer, Jan Ritsema. But since its 
initiation, it has been expanded by numerous internal seminars, workshops, talks, and 
184 
 
discussions. Since its premiere in Brussels at Kaaitheater in 2011, this project has 
travelled to PACT Zollverein in Essen and to Graz on the occasion of the Steirischer Herbst 
festival. Over three years, it has been through various stages of production and 
presentation, including stage performances, and public and private workshops. A 
particular performance, ‘Shakespeare’s As You Like It, A Body Part’ presented at the 
Steirischer Herbst festival in 2011, was the last stage performance. The stage 
performances have been added to, by including another layer of coming together, along 
with the provision and organisation of numerous public workshops, seminars, meetings 
and talks, on top of the already existing channels of communication between multiple 
authors. Therefore, it was inevitable that each stage performance should be radically 
different from the others, as the different dynamics of relations brought about different 
sets of negotiations. For instance, an intensive summer seminar prior to the Steirischer 
Herbst festival and a week-long public workshop during the festival resulted in a new 
format for the stage performance that appropriated a film-making process, whereby the 
accumulation of takes was made into one film at the end. 
As the multiple banks of camera were rolling on stage, I realised that what was 
happening in front of me was not the representation of a finished work, but the very 
process of making itself. Later, I learnt that this particular stage performance at Graz was 
to be made into a film as the next stage of the performance.183 But despite the fact that I 
did not have this information, I knew that what I witnessed was not something that could 
be captured within the conventional logic of representation in the theatre. First of all, 
what I immediately noticed was the fact that the structure of this performance was based 
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on the compilation of independent scenes that did not seem to have any logical causal 
relationships. And the fact that multiple banks of film cameras were rolling made it 
apparent that it was appropriating the film-making process. Yet, what was different from 
normal film-making was that it did not really converge into a harmonious storyline. It 
was as if a film director was randomly taking each cut, and pasting them all together so 
that the scenes would end up being disassociated from each other. In other words, it was 
clear that The Agora Project was deliberately resisting any omnipresent directorship by 
deploying a technology of choreography that constantly brings about spaces of 
appearances for participants in the performance as multiple layers. At the same time, it 
was the appropriation of the film-making structure that allowed the project to become 
coherent enough to be represented on stage. In other words, although it was flexible 
enough to encompass unexpected emergences of spaces of appearances, it still had a 
structure to hold everything together. This mirrors the operational mechanism of the 
Performing Arts Forum that aims to have no rules for running an institution. 
The Performing Arts Forum (PAF) was initiated by Jan Ritsema in 2006. Ritsema 
explains that it was a time when institutional support for new experiments in theatre and 
dance was becoming less available in Europe. But the Performing Arts Forum is neither a 
public institution nor a private studio. 184  Ritsema never wanted to form another 
institution which would stimulate new practices to go in a specific direction. Instead, he 
brought an old, long-abandoned school, in St-Erme-Outre-et-Ramecourt, north of Paris, 
and set up a physical space where people could engage in their own artistic and 
knowledge production, instead of only responding to opportunities afforded by the 
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institutional market. Of course, Ritsema’s friends and colleagues, with more than 30 years 
of shared artistic experiences and collaborations, were the first ones to participate. But 
as time passed, these circles of friends multiplied, and they formulated a new public space 
where people could gather together to go beyond the physical boundaries of the 
Performing Arts Forum, without any specific intentions. 
What allows the Performing Arts Forum to be an ever-elastic platform seems to 
be that it aims not to have any organisational principles. There are no staff, unlike most 
other artistic residency programmes where the responsibility for space and material 
generally rests on others. Anybody can organise or suggest any activity, but it is they who 
take full responsibility. In other words, the Performing Arts Forum can only operate as 
an artistic platform if people, while there, take an active part in shaping their own 
activities. 
Mirroring the operational mechanism of the Performing Arts Forum, and despite 
the fact that The Agora Project was initiated by Jan Ritsema, Ritsema did not specify any 
type of organisational principles for the project. In fact, it was his intention to have as few 
governing principles as possible. 185  Here, Ritsema explains his intentions to Florian 
Malzacher, co-programmer of the Steirischer Herbst festival: 
 
Malzacher: ‘Shakespeare’s As You Like It, A Body Part’ is part of The Agora Project: 
a project in which originally 15, now even 19, artists, some of them renowned 
choreographers themselves, not only work together – which is quite unusual in 
itself – but at the same time constantly negotiate the modes of their work. It is a 
                                         
185 From Jan Ritsema’s interview with Florian Malzacher in the leaflet published for the occasion of the 
Steirischer Herbst festival in Graz in 2011. 
187 
 
project about what it means to do theatre. How can such a group find common 
ground, how does it organize itself? 
Ritsema: [It is a place] where we try to find out things precisely and not to 
organize. Where we try to develop a process that might lead to something that 
we do not yet exactly know. We are not heading for a formulated goal. All the 
people involved constantly influence, develop, challenge and intensify the 
project.186 
 
Ritsema explains here that the reason why he and nineteen artists with distinct artistic 
trajectories gathered together was to try out new things. Therefore, it was important not 
to keep to the same organisational methods whereby a specific type of production is 
presupposed. But the reason why this experiment with no rules works is precisely 
because, by not having organisational principles, it does not negate any rules. They still 
have the rule of not having any rules. And this general principle of not having any rules 
allows the participants to have common ground based on which the project takes shape. 
Yet not having any rules does not mean the eradication of responsibility. Later, when I 
interviewed Christine De Smedt, one of the nineteen artists in the project, she told me 
that there was a rule that whoever suggests something takes full responsibility for what 
is put on the table.187 Moreover, what should be emphasised here is the fact that this act 
of proposing something is not done in an isolated private studio but in a continuous 
process of discussion and communication. On numerous occasions, and in private and 
public workshops, not to mention informal conversations and communication between 
the artists, numerous ideas are suggested and followed, one after another. In other words, 
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claiming copyright for an idea in a conventional sense would not be possible. 
The general rule of not having any rules can accommodate a complex network of 
people and allow exchanges of information to take place among those who operate inside 
and outside the physical and symbolic space of the Performing Arts Forum, which does 
not have a clear dividing line between members and non-members. Therefore, The Agora 
Project itself becomes an agora. In other words, the circulation and feedback of ideas 
always goes beyond the physical boundaries of workshops and seminars as these 
nineteen multiple authors are already part of larger networks of contemporary cultural 
producers. And it is the deployment of choreography that provides the basic technology. 
I have argued that it is the particular appropriation of the film-making process by 
The Agora Project that interweaves different ideas and information into a single project 
within a theatre context. By organising different spaces for appearances by participants 
in the project at every level, the film-making process allows for the compilation of 
independent scenes, and so the compilation of multiple layers of spaces of appearance is 
made possible in this project. And despite the fact that there is a general rule of having no 
rules, the fact of being accountable for an idea provides a sustainable structural basis for 
this project to take shape. And this is different from claiming copyright. 
For the artists who participate in The Agora Project, staging a theatre production 
means being accountable for an idea that cannot be owned by one individual under the 
conventional notion of author. This is how the multiple spaces of appearance become 
actualised while no one is in ultimate control. This is why I would argue that there are no 
authors in this project, but rather ‘author-functions’. 188  And the reason why I pay 
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attention to this shift from author to author-function is because it ultimately dismantles 
the dichotomy inherent in theatre, so that a shift from spectator to spectator-function can 
occur too. Moreover, what seems to me most interesting is the fact that these shifts do 
not come from the conventional pedagogical operation but from the decisive upheaval of 
the participants in reframing the space and time allotted within a specific institutional 
framework. In other words, it is the nineteen artists who create a structure that is flexible 
enough to encompass unexpected emergences of spaces of appearance, but it is the 
decisive upheaval of the normal given roles of all participants in the project, including the 
spectators, that successfully subverts what Rancière calls ‘the given distribution of the 
sensible’. 
In this context, I would like to examine further Rancière’s notion of the 
distribution of the sensible in order to articulate how conventional spectatorship can be 
reconfigured without the conventional pedagogical operation, through which the 
ontological and epistemological conditions required for theatre to be theatre are called 
into question. And in order to examine this specific notion of the distribution of the 
sensible, I need to take a detour via Rancière’s problematisation of the conventional 
emancipatory strategy, because he creates this particular concept by envisaging an 
alternative to the conventional notion of emancipation that is always subordinate to 
pedagogical intervention. 
 
An Aesthetic Revolution: Subverting the Given Distribution of the Sensible 
The unique contribution from Rancière to rearticulating the modernist discourse on 
spectatorship comes from his attention to the pedagogical impulse inherent in the 
conventional emancipatory operation in the historical reformation of theatre. For 
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Rancière, this pedagogical impulse legitimises the inequality between the one who is the 
subject of emancipation and the one who is capable of emancipating the subjugated 
subject in the conventional emancipatory operation. In fact, problematising the 
presupposed notion of inequality inherent in the existing emancipatory discourse in 
political philosophy has been the penetrating element of his maverick intellectual journey 
for more than thirty years. For instance, his very first trilogy, The Night of Labor: The 
Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France; The Philosopher and His Poor, and The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster, was an attempt to open up a new topography where the 
discussion of emancipation could find a different platform.189 
Turning to Foucault for methodological inspiration, Rancière’s intellectual 
itinerary began with a series of archive-based projects in the 1980s. The Night of Labor 
was Rancière’s first attempt to re-enact the stories of real people, prior to the birth of 
Marxism, in order to reveal a new topology that problematises the existing understanding 
of emancipation. In the dusty archives of various kinds of newspapers, journals, and 
private diaries of workers from the 1830s and 1840s, Rancière began a painstaking 
exploration, revisiting a time prior to the birth of Marxism. In doing so, he attempted to 
open up a line of flight from the pedagogical presupposition inherent in the Althusserian 
formalisation of the notions of workers and workers’ movements.190 Contending that 
workers were not rebelling against specific hardships and conditions but against the 
unyielding predetermination of their subjectivity, Rancière attempts to reveal how the 
given positionality of workers, or the proletariat, was subverted by a process of 
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reconfiguring the very experiences within the working-class tradition, prior to Marxism’s 
interpretation and distortion of them.191 In the process, Rancière came to suspect that 
the Marxist notion of ‘the working-class proletariat’ was primarily ‘a name or a set of 
names rather than a form of experience’.192 Moreover, he realised that these names did 
not express an awareness of a condition. As Rancière argues: 
 
Being a ‘worker’ wasn’t in the first instance a condition reflected in forms of 
consciousness or action; it was a form of symbolization, the arrangement of a 
certain set of statements or utterances. I became interested in reconstituting the 
world that made these utterances possible.193 
 
In reconstituting the world of the worker, among the conditions that Rancière pays most 
attention to is the specific partitioning of time that is imposed on the workers. In 
scrutinising this issue of the partitioning of time, Rancière recounts the story of Gauny, a 
carpenter in early nineteenth-century France, and one of the main protagonists in The 
Nights of Labor. 
The Nights of Labor portrays the lives of early nineteenth-century workers who 
were also proletarian intellectuals, poets, and artists. At night, these worker-intellectuals 
gathered to write journals, poems, music, and letters, and to discuss issues. Unwilling to 
give in to sleep at night, to repair the body for more manual labour the next day, these 
‘migrants who moved at the borders between classes’ regarded the night as their real life. 
They sought to appropriate for themselves the nights of those who could stay awake. 
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Once these workers and those whom they represented had glimpsed other lives, they 
fought for the possibility of living those other lives. The following is an extract from one 
of Gauny’s texts that Rancière introduces in The Nights of Labor:194 
 
This man is made tranquil by the ownership of his arms, which he appreciates 
better than the day-laborer because no look of a master precipitates their 
movements. He believes that his powers are his own when no will but his own 
activates them. He also knows that the entrepreneur is hardly upset by the time 
he spends at his work, provided that the execution is irreproachable. He is less 
aware of exploitation than the day-laborer. He believes he is obeying only the 
necessity of things, so much does his emancipation delude him. But the old 
society is there to treacherously sink its horrible scorpion claws into his being 
and ruin him before his time, deluding him about the excitement of the courage 
that he uses for the benefit of his enemy. But this worker draws secret pleasure 
from the very uncertainty of his occupation.195 
 
In this passage, immediately noticeable is the fact that Gauny refers to himself as ‘this 
man’. And this man frees himself by becoming less aware of his exploitation. In other 
words, this man frees himself by nurturing the power of self-delusion. This power makes 
him work against his own employment and the preservation of his own health. But 
resulting from Gauny’s way of reframing space and time, and the exercise and force of his 
labour, is the source of a new pleasure, ‘the pleasure of a new freedom’.196 This is why 
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Rancière pays attention to the description of delusion that Gauny mentions in the text. 
The efficacy of this delusion enables Gauny to go beyond the boundaries predetermined 
for working-class people. In other words, Gauny does not believe in the sociocultural and 
political boundaries that set specific timetables for the working-class proletariat. Instead, 
he allows himself to indulge in a ‘secret pleasure from the very uncertainty of his 
occupation’. Of course, this secret pleasure does not immediately change the fact that 
Gauny has to go back to work the next day. But the moment that Gauny becomes less 
aware of exploitation, another possibility for his mode of operation opens up. Rancière 
argues that this is the moment when intellectual equality is actualised. It is the conquest 
of the night that sets up a drama of emancipation free of any pedagogical operations. 
In this context, we can understand that Gauny’s decisive upheaval is enabled by 
the subversion of a given distribution of the sensible. In Rancière’s notion of distribution 
of the sensible, (le partage du sensible), the French word partage commonly translates as 
‘distribution’ in English, but it also includes the meanings ‘partake’ or ‘share’.197 And the 
word sensible in Rancière’s writing refers not only to sense as opposed to logic, but also 
to a sense of perception that predetermines what is sayable, audible, and thinkable.198 
Hence the concept of the distribution of the sensible operates as a system of self-evident 
facts of sense perception that simultaneously govern the matrix of distribution and the 
partaking of respective parts and positions.199 In other words, it defines a set of relations 
between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it.200 
                                         
197 Yves Citton, “Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible,” in Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, 
Aesthetics, ed. Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2009), 
121–122. 
198 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004), 12. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Jacques Rancière, “Afterword: The Method of Equality,” 275. 
194 
 
This is why the distribution of the sensible as a system always gravitates towards a 
particular formation of certain sets of representations and arrangements. Therefore, by 
activating the concept of the distribution of the sensible, Rancière is attempting to reveal 
the fact that there is nothing natural about one’s position. Instead, it is the result of the 
specific operation of a set of representations and arrangements that governs the 
particular mode of one’s subjectivity. 
In this context, by subverting the given distribution of the sensible, what is 
overturned for Gauny is what is not allowed to him by the existing distribution of roles 
and places. As he is a worker, he is not allowed to enjoy the pleasure of writing. The 
empirical reason for this seems to be simple: he does not have any time, apart from that 
needed to do his work. But Rancière argues that the performance of inequality is 
sustained only as long as Gauny believes in it. When Gauny becomes less aware of what 
is not allowed of him, Gauny’s nights become the places where the performance of 
equality is enacted. This is not done by those who already know the laws of exploitation, 
but by Gauny himself who is less aware of what he is excluded from. Therefore, a specific 
realm, in this case the intellectual life that is denied him, becomes available in the 
common sphere so that he can have access to it once again. The common sphere is not 
what is given beforehand. It is a place that one gains access to through the performance 
of equality, and it is constantly being battled for through confrontation between opposite 
ways of framing. 
 
The Performance of Equality: Reactivating Spectatorship 
In the previous part of this chapter, I discussed how Gauny’s subversion of the 
distribution of the sensible allowed him what he was not allowed before. By fighting 
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against the specific distribution of time that was allotted to him, Gauny was able to enact 
the performance of equality without any intervention from a knowledgeable agent who 
could teach him the laws of exploitation. When Gauny becomes less aware of what he is 
not allowed, he also becomes less aware of what he is excluded from. Therefore, a specific 
realm, in this case an intellectual life, becomes available in the common sphere for him to 
access. In other words, Gauny is emancipated via his own performance of equality 
without any pedagogical intervention. This is why the ontological conditions for 
Rancièrian political actors are inevitably ‘theatrical’.201 
In ‘Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible’, Yves Citton gives an 
account of his interview with Rancière. Here, Rancière himself explains the ontological 
and epistemological conditions for his political actors: 
 
…I think that politics always takes, more or less, the shape of the constitution of 
a theatre. It means that politics always needs to constitute small worlds on which 
units take shape; I would call them ‘subjects’ or ‘forms of subjectivation’; they 
stage a conflict, a litigation, an opposition between various worlds…202 
 
Peter Hallward, in ‘Staging Equality: Rancière’s Theatrocracy and the Limits of Anarchic 
Equality’, expands on Citton’s discussion by articulating Rancière’s conception of politics 
as a theatrocracy that can be compared with Plato’s hatred of theatre.203 Plato believed 
that the operation of theatrical mimesis would ‘set up in each individual soul a vicious 
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constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favour 
with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the 
same thing now one, now the other’.204 By refusing to speak within the given boundaries 
of one’s position and role, pre-decided by society, Plato asserted that actors and poets 
were a threat to the very foundations of authority itself. Thus, Plato concluded that 
‘theatre is nothing other than the place in which such vicious indifference to functional 
place takes on its most seductive shape.’205 Plato’s hostility towards theatre resided in 
the fact that theatre allowed people to speak outside of their given name. Yet the same 
fact is accepted as a new possibility for Rancière, so that multiple processes of 
subjectivisation can take place. Thus, for Plato, theatre was a place for the out of place, 
one that threatened the harmonious distribution of roles and positions in society, while 
for Rancière it is a place for politics.206 
The Rancièrian conception of politics does not supplement the existing power 
structure. Through various writings, Rancière makes it clear that the notion of politics 
cannot be reduced to the form of a governmental or institutional structure. In other 
words, politics is not only about the struggle for an alternative structure and opposing 
the current political institution. This rationality in Rancièrian thinking cannot, however, 
simply be labelled anarchic or in ‘the form of a fantasy of politics without politics’. This is 
because Rancière’s aim for rethinking politics does not concern dismantling established 
political institutions. 
Rancière’s conception of politics is as a means to ‘undermine the great “police” 
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project’, which is also the ambition of historians and sociologists – the ambition to see 
people properly ‘rooted in their place and time’. 207  Therefore, what we see is the 
emergence of an unusual interface between theatre and politics in the process of 
Rancière’s unrealisation of politics. This interface between politics and theatre exceeds 
the rationality that limits them to being a spatial property, such as a form of government 
or a form of artistic expression in a black box. Moreover, what this interface highlights is 
the coherent principle inherent to both politics and theatre: its performative nature. 
Politics comes into being only through a constant process of conjunction or disjunction 
of different properties, such as power, justice, ethics, or people, while theatre comes into 
being via the constant blurring of the boundaries with that which is not theatrical. 
In this context, it is important to pay attention to Citton’s scrutiny of the 
performative nature inherent in Rancière’s conception of politics by juxtaposing it with 
the theatre of the jester.208 In the theatre of the jester, the jester never speaks under his 
given name. In fact, the jester is hired to speak under a different name. The jester, from 
the lowest part of the kingdom, dares to speak to the king directly as his professional 
licence allows him to be other than himself. Sometimes, the jester even mocks the king 
and makes a joke of his sovereignty, while telling real stories about people who do not 
have such access to the king. But as Citton points out, the theatre of the jester cannot 
operate as an agent for any type of political struggle in a conventional sense as it betrays 
the very system of representation. Yet, it disturbs the very ground on which the system 
of representation can be constructed. For instance, when the jester brings real stories to 
the stage, his performance is in a constant process of negotiation between what is 
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theatrical and what is not. In other words, the fundamental mechanism of the theatre of 
the jester is governed by the conflict between onstage and offstage. 
In the theatre of the jester, there is a distinct interplay between offstage and 
onstage. On the stage, no matter what the jester is performing, it becomes only a theatrical 
matter. Nothing that happens onstage is ever more than an illusion, and never has any 
consequences in real life. But what is ironic is the fact that the ontological condition 
required for what occurs onstage to remain as mere theatre depends on its interplay with 
offstage. In other words, if there is no tension offstage, there will be no conflict between 
what is theatrical and what is not, which makes the jester’s theatre great theatre. But 
when there is too much prominence given to that which occurs offstage, the jester must 
quickly retreat onstage, as he is only tolerated as long as his theatre does not become a 
real threat to the king’s sovereignty. It is this constant transition between onstage and 
offstage that is ultimately responsible for the contamination of the system of 
representation that operates based on a concrete ontological distinction between life and 
fiction, or between reality and illusion. Therefore, the theatre of the jester tips the balance 
only through its operation of ‘as if’ scenarios. This is why the theatre of the jester is too 
real to be theatre, while it is too theatrical to be political. In this light, the theatre of the 
jester, as a conceptual model, visualises a new topography where the system of 
representation can no longer pin down what is, or what is not a proper place for either 
politics or theatre. In the theatre of the jester, both politics and theatre are in a constant 
process of unrealisation. In this context, Citton argues: 
 
Within Rancièrian theatrical politics, it is no longer a group of (un)representative 
jesters, but the subjects who invite themselves to play the fools at the king’s table. 
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If there is a betrayal, it will come from the ranks of the spectators rather than 
from those of the actors, since the latter speak for themselves. Rancière thus 
answers Gayatri Spivak’s question: yes, within certain historical junctures, the 
subaltern can speak. These moments are relatively rare: politics, for Rancière, 
like thought for Deleuze and Guattari, is the exception, not the rule.209 
 
What draws my attention to Citton’s argument is the fact that Rancière’s conception of 
politics successfully eradicates the agency whose operation perpetuates inequality. 
Although Rancière’s actors speak under the masks that they have painted on their faces, 
they invite themselves to the theatre of the jester in order to speak directly to the king.210 
In other words, Rancière’s political actors do not subject themselves to the conventional 
pedagogical operation. 
In scrutinising the Rancièrian configuration of political actors via the conceptual 
model of the theatre of the jester, I aim to establish a theoretical model for a new 
possibility of spectatorship that is not subject to the conventional pedagogical operation. 
And like the jester in Rancièrian theatrocracy, who goes through a constant process of 
negotiation between what is theatrical and what is not, the spectators in The Agora 
Project go through a constant unrealisation of the given role, so that they disturb the given 
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system of representation. In this context, how can we critically review the theory of 
conventional emancipatory strategies, while putting forward the theory of the jester 
whose strategies of invention contaminate the conventional representation system in 
theatre? In attempting to answer this question, once again I will go back to The Agora 
Project. I find that this project illustrates the possibility of a form of spectatorship that 
goes through a constant process of unrealisation of the given role by strategically 
bringing up multiple layers of spaces of appearances. And in these spaces of appearances, 
the participants in this project, whether it is the authors or the spectators, all have to 
enact the performance of equality by subverting the given distribution of the sensible. 
But like the jester, who is only allowed to be subversive as long as he is on stage, the fact 
does not change that there are nineteen authors who set up a specific structure. Therefore, 
the interchangeability of The Agora Project is not about transforming the spectators into 
authors but transforming the spectators into what I would call ‘virtuosic spectators’. 
 
Becoming a Virtuosic Spectator in the Process of Negotiation 
In one of the scenes of The Agora Project at the Steirischer Herbst festival, an actor was 
making a speech about the stereotypical importance of love, trust, and union, while 
playing the role of a divorce lawyer. I was in front of him, and so I got to play the role of 
an extra actor for this scene. The camera crew filmed us together. I knew the camera crew 
were filming me but I did not feel that I had to exit the scene. Once I was released from 
the auditorium, I was open to other possibilities of participating in the performance that 
were not allowed to me before. I was part of the mise en scène for this particular scene. 
But this brief moment in which I played the role of an extra actor could not last 
long. Suddenly, I saw a person running around the perimeter of the theatre with multiple 
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cameras following the actor in order to film him running. As soon as one person finished 
running into the four corners of the rectangular space of the theatre, the next person 
repeated this action. Again, the focal point was diverted. I was not really sure what to look 
at or where to be. Because a vanishing point was no longer available in this theatre of 
multiple authors, the series of scenes and acts often overlapped with one another. And it 
was this seriality inherent in the structure of the performance that produced specific 
rhythms and dynamics. From these sets of rhythms and dynamics, the spaces of 
appearances between nineteen multiple authors and the spectators were constantly 
negotiated, and both authors and spectators had to go through a constant unrealisation 
of their given roles within the conventional system of representation in theatre. In this 
process of negotiating, theatre becomes an open-ended platform where the specific 
system of representation in theatre is contaminated. Instead of limiting itself as a finished 
work, The Agora Project becomes a process, and within this process spectators are 
allowed to be more than they are used to being, despite the fact that these are only 
momentary role-switching situations. 
Here, I would like to articulate the constant unrealisation of the given roles as 
demonstrated in The Agora Project via the notion of the virtuoso-dilettante, which was 
discussed in Chapter 4 when I examined Xavier Le Roy’s Product of Other Circumstances. 
In articulating the positionality of the ignorant dancer, in which Le Roy locates himself, I 
borrowed Kai van Eikels’ discussion of the virtuoso-dilettante.211  As opposed to the 
professionalism defined by the modern institution of dance, Van Eikels explains that the 
terms ‘dilettante’ and ‘virtuoso’ were used synonymously until the late eighteenth 
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century.212 As opposed to the understanding of the term ‘virtuoso’ in a modern sense , 
Van Eikels explains that from the Renaissance to the late eighteenth century, both terms 
referred to non-professional forms of knowledge in a wide range of fields, from science 
to engineering, or crafts. Against this backdrop, I described Le Roy’s resistance to the 
conventional configuration of the choreographer as a master by using the term ‘virtuoso-
dilettante’ in order to highlight his attempt at an open-ended configuration of the 
choreographer. In this context, I would argue that a spectatorship which does not know 
the limits imposed within the specific representation system of theatre can also be 
articulated using the term ‘virtuoso-dilettante’. The virtuoso-dilettante spectator is one 
who does not know the limits that are predetermined for him. He is one who is willing to 
exercise more than what is allowed within the existing institutional framework.  
For instance, as a spectator in The Agora Project, I was literally on stage with 
nineteen other artists and a camera crew. And the whole structure of the performance 
was flexible enough to encompass my role as something more than a spectator. Moreover, 
the performers themselves took the place of spectators and the spectators took the place 
of performers. Again, this does not mean that there was no distinction between spectators 
and performers. What has to be highlighted is the fact that nobody was left impotent in 
this project: all of us became co-professionals who learned how to perform and how to 
organise ourselves in the course of the performance.213 
The emergence of a collective of co-professionals is what I witnessed in The Agora 
Project, and I would like to articulate further this notion of co-professionals via Kai van 
Eikels’ notion of the ‘porous collective’. To explain what he means by this he juxtaposes 
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it with Dana Gooley’s observations on jam sessions in jazz from the 1930s to the 1950s, 
‘where everybody can participate, where leading and supporting roles constantly change, 
where playing is based on listening and responding to the others, and where decisions 
are made in improvisational interactions building on spontaneous alliances’. Eikels 
points out that despite the fact that there is always an inevitable structure to some extent, 
the jam session has been repeatedly praised as a model for the democratic political 
process. Within this democratic structure, the musicians in a jam session do not play for 
an audience. In other words, ‘the performers themselves took the place of the 
audience’.214 
The Agora Project was not, however, constituted through improvisation. Yet, the 
structure of The Agora Project is porous enough to encompass improvisational 
interactions. In The Agora Project, both performers and spectators are allowed to be more 
than what is defined within the modern institution of theatre. And in this unrealisation of 
both roles, The Agora Project provides a practice ground for different forms of spaces of 
appearances to emerge, so that we can envisage a new form of collective, within and 
against the given theatrical framework. 
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Chapter 6. How Does Choreography Reconfigure the Body as an Event? 
– Slipping Away From the Logic of Representation 
 
Rethinking the Body via a Space of Appearance 
In examining The Agora Project in the preceding chapter, I have attempted to highlight a 
situation where both performers and spectators are allowed to be more than they are 
defined to be within the modern institution of theatre. In doing so, I pointed out that it is 
the tactical deployment of choreography that brings about a space of appearance for 
other bodies, so that both performers and spectators can open up spaces for each other. 
By opening up spaces for each other I mean occupying a place that was not allowed before. 
For instance, a spectator can be in the place of a performer, and vice versa. When a 
spectator is located in the place of a performer, the performer is, conversely, allowed to 
be located in the place of the spectator. In this constant production of spaces of 
appearance for other bodies, the dichotomy of the prescribed roles within the theatre 
apparatus becomes questionable. This allows for the possibility of being a spectator but 
acting as a performer, and vice versa; a possibility that is not captured within the 
institutional pedagogical operation. In fact, the emergence of spectators as performers 
and performers as spectators is not something found only in The Agora Project. It is not 
difficult to find spectators who perform as the performers or to find performers who play 
the role of spectators in recent choreographic experiments, and they loudly proclaim that 
the dichotomous concept of the roles laid out within the specific institutional framework 
is not as rigid as was supposed. 
In this context, I would like to highlight here the fact that the space of appearance 
is not something that has a physical boundary that can be examined in an empirical sense. 
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Instead, it comes into being as an event when my body brings about spaces of appearance 
for other bodies.215 This understanding of the term ‘space of appearance’ is also apparent 
in the original deployment of the term by Hannah Arendt.216 Arendt mentions the term 
‘space of appearance’ when she conceptualises the polis as a space ‘where I appear to 
others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate 
things but make their appearance explicitly’. The reason why I pay attention to Arendt’s 
argument in the first place is the fact that a space of appearance is not something to be 
given but something to be created by the active intervention of a political actor as a form 
of subjectivisation. This is why Arendt argues that such a public space of appearance can 
always be open to recreation wherever individuals gather together politically, or 
‘wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action’. 
But since setting up a space of appearance depends on the creation of action, 
Arendt acknowledges that this space of appearance is by its nature both fragile and 
temporary. In other words, a space of appearance only comes into being via performances 
involving doing, or uttering words. In this context, Arendt points out that the space of 
appearance ‘does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, 
but disappears not only with the dispersal of men – as in the case of great catastrophes 
when the body politic of a people is destroyed – but with the disappearance or arrest of 
the activities themselves. Wherever people gather together, it is potentially there, but 
only potentially, not necessarily and not forever.’217 
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In light of this, I would like to juxtapose Arendt’s conception of a space of 
appearance with Yves Citton’s notion of the theatre of the jester that was discussed in the 
preceding chapter.218 When Citton discusses the spatial ontology of the political actor 
inherent in Jacques Rancière’s thinking, Citton uses the term ‘theatre of the jester’. And 
like Arendt’s concept of a space of appearance, Citton’s notion of the theatre of the jester 
is also fragile and temporary.  
Yet, there is also an obvious conceptual discordance between the theatre of the 
jester and a space of appearance. Citton’s theatre of the jester presupposes a position of 
mastery that can unilaterally terminate the performance of the jester. In other words, in 
the theatre of the jester, when a prearranged form of subjectivisation goes off-track, for 
example when the jester attempts to be more than a jester, the theatre of the jester is no 
longer sustained and may infuriate the king. Therefore, all the jester can be is a jester who 
plays the role of the powerful, but he can never be powerful himself. In a space of 
appearance, the prescribed roles are also sustained. For instance, even if a performer 
plays the role of a spectator, as discussed in The Agora Project, this does not change the 
situation whereby the performer remains an author while the spectator remains a 
spectator. However, what I pay attention to in the space of appearance resides in the fact 
that the unilateral operation of power is not possible. It is because the space of 
appearance is not a contractual arrangement between the participants, as is the case for 
the theatre of the jester. Instead, a space of appearance comes into being as an event, a 
form of subjectivisation, which is open to the contingent interactions between the 
participants who are corporeal beings. In the space of appearance, my appearing to 
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others conditions other bodies that appear to mine. In other words, the coming into being 
of a space of appearance is a coming into being as a corporeal being in relation to other 
corporeal beings, thus it is necessarily contingent and slipping away from the logic of 
representation. This is why I would argue that Arendt’s conceptualisation of the space of 
appearance already implies a different conception of the body from that of Western 
modernity, where the body is understood as a self-contained object to be reformulated. 
In a space of appearance, the body is not a mere object to be examined or controlled; it is 
what comes into being as an event that disturbs the logic of representation. 
In this context, I would like to address further how this new possibility of thinking 
about the body offers us a different possibility for understanding choreography. As I 
discussed in Chapter 1, within the institutionalisation of dance, the development of the 
technology of choreography presupposes a particular conception of the body. And based 
on this particular preconception, choreography has developed as an institutionalised 
technique for articulating bodies according to the specific pedagogical demands. But as I 
have discussed in previous chapters, in what I refer to as contemporary choreographic 
experiments by a new generation of European choreographers, what is apparent is their 
attempt to rearticulate the possibilities of choreography as a technique of offering the 
space of appearance. Especially in Chapter 5, I have attempted to rearticulate 
choreography as a technique for bringing about a space of appearance for other bodies 
by discussing The Agora Project. And if this space of appearance can only be perceived in 
terms of an event, choreography can no longer be sustained as a pedagogical tool that 
demands a particular reformulation of the body. Instead, what was once deployed as a 
pedagogical technique, choreography now can be recognised as a tactical operation 
which is open to different possibilities of thinking about the body. Thus, I would argue 
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that contemporary choreographic operations by a new generation of choreographers 
have become about highlighting the impossibility of capturing the body within the logic 
of representation. In the coming part, I will attempt to articulate further how 
contemporary choreographic experiments open up different understandings of bodies, 
and how these highlight different possibilities for understanding choreography as an 
emancipatory tactic opposing the conventional conception of the body that is devised, 
legitimised, and sustained within the modern institution of dance. 
 
Rethinking Choreography via Nancy’s Conception of the Body 
The body has been a dominant preoccupation of much recent critical theory that often 
comes under the umbrella term ‘cultural studies’. But what I find problematic lies in the 
fact that in its attempt to reveal a complex power operation, it presupposes the body as 
an object of representation so that it is deployed as a means of signification. This 
understanding of the body not only fails to engage with its material reality but also, as Ian 
James argues in The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc 
Nancy, fails to ‘engage with or think fully [about] the limits of the symbolic or of 
signification’.219 What James refers to as the limit of signification of the body highlights 
the fact that the body is always already slipping away from a system of representation. 
Daniele Rugo, in his doctoral thesis Powers of Existence: The Question of Otherness in the 
Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, agrees with James’ problematisation of a particular 
understanding of the body as a means of signification. In reflecting on the body that 
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always slips away from the logic of representation, Rugo points to the fact that it is not 
possible to think about the body from a distance as an object of examination. 
 
The difficulty [in] thinking [about] the body is that [the] ‘body’ can never be 
before me.220 
 
In attempting to trace the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s rethinking of the body, 
Rugo argues that the limit of signification of the body lies in the fact that it can never be 
the object of representation, because any attempt to capture the body within the logic of 
representation is already always happening within the body. In other words, thinking 
about the body cannot take place outside of it. In this context, Rugo turns to Nancy’s 
rethinking of bodies.221  
For Nancy, his rethinking of the body begins with rethinking the classical ontology 
of the body that attempts to fix it within the logic of representation. But Nancy’s problem 
with conventional thinking about the body is not just the fact that the classical ontology 
of the body highlights the materiality of the body while ignoring the possibility of it being 
translated into a discursive factor. Nancy aims to go beyond the signification of the body 
because the body as a means of signification also exposes its limits. If Nancy wants to go 
beyond both, in terms of signification and materialisation, what else is possible when 
rethinking the body? At this point I would like to turn to Jacques Derrida’s engagement 
with Nancy’s rethinking of the body in On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy. 
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Here, Derrida pays attention to how Nancy opens up a new possibility for thinking 
about the body via the philosophical concept of touch that allows Nancy to hold together 
different components of thinking about the body.222 First of all, Derrida points out that 
Nancy’s deployment of the philosophical concept of touch is distinct from what Derrida 
calls ‘haptology’, from the Greek root haptein ‘touch’. As conventional metaphysics is 
obsessed with making things present, Derrida argues that ‘haptological metaphysics’ is 
also obsessed with making the untouchable present. In other words, what Derrida calls 
‘haptology’ is subordinated to the Western tradition of the metaphysics of presence, that 
privileges identity over alterity, homogeneity over heterogeneity, immediacy over 
mediation.223 But Derrida argues that Nancy’s conception of touch marks a break or 
‘rupture’ from haptological metaphysics: 
 
Nancy appears to me to break with, or at least take his distance from, forms of 
haptocentric metaphysics. His discourse on touch is neither intuitionist, nor 
continuist, nor homogenist, nor indivisibilist.224 
 
Derrida perceives Nancy’s philosophical concept of touch as a rupture because Nancy 
conceptualises the moment of touch as an ‘experience of the material existence of the 
body that is other than that inherited from the Western school of metaphysics’.225 In 
other words, for Nancy, the moment of touch is what enables the experience of the body, 
but this experience of the material existence of the body does not deliver an experience 
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of immediacy, continuity, and totality, but rather ‘discontinuity, fragmentation, partition 
and sharing’. In delivering an experience of the body that can never be complete but only 
fragmentary, via touching, in Nancy’s rethinking of the body, taking the place of bodies 
manifests itself as an event whose coming and slipping away cannot be announced prior 
to its arrival. 
For Nancy, the body is not a mere object, as it is constructed within discourse or a 
social symbolic order, nor is it simply material reality that is indifferent to the process of 
signification. Instead, the body is what comes into being at the limit point, or at the point 
of touching between discourse and matter.226 In Corpus, Nancy argues that bodies ‘take 
place neither in discourse nor in matter’.227 In this context, James argues the following: 
 
[Bodies] inhabit neither ‘the mind’ nor ‘the body.’ They take place at the limit, 
as the limit: limit – external border, fracture, and intersection of the unfamiliar 
within the continuity of sense, within the continuity of matter.228 
 
Here, James explains that ‘sense’ for Nancy cannot be thought of as a conventional 
dichotomy between the sensible and the intelligible, rather sense is what comes into 
being with materialistic or bodily reality.229 Therefore, for Nancy, the body can also be 
understood as the limit point at which sense and matter touch each other.230 In other 
words, the body comes into being when taking the place of sense coming into contact with 
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matter at its limit. And it is at this limit point, or this point of touching, that what Nancy 
calls ‘the opening of the world’ or the ‘event of being’ takes place.231 
Here, Nancy’s notion of the event of being already presupposes embodiment. It is 
because, for Nancy, existence cannot be thought outside bodily finitude. Moreover, 
conceiving in terms of embodiment via touching allows Nancy to conceive of being always 
in terms of ‘being-with’.232  We are beings only inasmuch as we are ‘being-with’, by 
touching others and being touched by others. And because this touching cannot be 
announced prior to its arrival, it can only be understood in terms of the ‘event of being’. 
In other words, we are beings only insofar as we are bodies that are touched by and touch 
other bodies. 
This taking place of bodies (being touched by and touching other bodies) is not 
something that can be planned in advance or controlled from a position of mastery. 
Neither can it be delimited in a specific spatiotemporal condition. In this context, James 
argues that, for Nancy, the body is itself a space worth paying attention to. James does 
though emphasise the fact that here the term ‘space’ does not refer to a ‘three-
dimensional extension as measured by geometry’. 233  Instead, here, the term ‘space’ 
implies the ‘spacing’ of space, or espacement in a Derridean sense, that already implies a 
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‘spatiotemporal unfolding’.234 In this light, the argument that the body is itself a space 
means that the body is a spacing of space that cannot be delimited as an essence or finality. 
This is why, for Nancy, bodies do not have a teleology or finality, because the body has no 
essence, nothing that can be determined beforehand. Instead, the body is something that 
takes place by being touched by other bodies and by touching other bodies in this spacing 
of space. Hence, Nancy’s rethinking of the body in terms of space offers us an awareness 
that the body is a space that we have for each other. 
Nancy’s conception of the body enables me to rearticulate choreography as a 
technique of offering instead of a technique of domination. The reason is simple. 
Choreography is what brings about a space of appearance for other bodies. And because 
the body is a space that we have for each other, the act of bringing about a space of 
appearance for other bodies can always surpass the pedagogical logic that aims to 
subordinate other bodies according to specific institutional demands. Therefore, 
choreography now can be perceived as a technique of offering through which my body is 
touched by other bodies while touching other bodies. What must be highlighted here is 
the fact that this taking place of bodies for other bodies comes into being as an event.  
Arriving at this articulation of choreography via Nancy’s conception of the body is 
important as I find it runs in parallel with contemporary choreographic experiments 
discussed in this thesis. In highlighting the possibility of choreography as a technique for 
                                         
234 Ibid. James contends that this way of perceiving space represents a rupture from the classical debate 
about space that is essentially ontological, and it revolves around the question, does space exist? In this 
context, James argues that the Cartesian perception of space as an extension is revolutionary as it rejects 
the locating of space as a function of categories that allows us to name or classify sensory experiences. The 
Cartesian conception of space allows us to depart from the classical ontological question that seeks an 
objective existence of space as an entity independent of other entities. This paves the way for a 
phenomenological discussion of space so that the ontological question about space becomes a question 
about experiences of space. 
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offering that only takes place as an event, contemporary choreographic experiments 
successfully open up a different possibility for body-writing (by which my body is being 
touched by other bodies while others are touched by mine). In doing so, choreography 
emerges as a deconstructive strategy against the logic of representation according to 
particular pedagogical demands.  
In this light, I would like to discuss some of Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker’s recent 
choreographic projects, where choreography is no longer conceived as a pedagogical 
technique but rather emerges as a deconstructive tactic that allows us to rethink the given 
spatiotemporal conditions of dance within a specific institutional context. Via discussing 
Work/Travail/Arbeid (2015), I will focus on the fact that De Keersmaeker’s rethinking of 
the given condition of the modern institution of dance takes place in a white-cube context. 
In doing so, I will attempt to highlight how choreography emerges as a deconstructive 
strategy not only rethinking the theatre-apparatus but also the exhibition-apparatus. But 
first, I would like to discuss 3Abschied (2010), De Keersmaeker’s collaborative project 
with Bel that shows how she disturbs the smooth operation of the modern institution of 
dance by revealing her doubts and questions on stage.  
 
Rethinking the Spatiotemporal Conditions of Dance 
3Abschied (2010) is a recent collaborative project between Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker 
and the French choreographer Jérôme Bel. I will pay particular attention to the structure 
and strategy that De Keersmaeker and Bel deploy in order to highlight the particular 
temporalisation devised and legitimised within the modern institution of dance. Instead 
of building up the structure of climax, De Keersmaeker and Bel constantly reveal 
uncertainty over what they are doing, including De Keersmaeker’s desire to work with 
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Gustav Mahler’s ‘Der Abschied’ from Das Lied von der Erde. Therefore, instead of 
presenting a finished version or the solution that they could come up with in their 
uncertainty, they decide to try one option after another as a way of eliminating the 
possibilities that are available to them. This structural tactic creates pauses that disturb 
the smooth operation of the particular temporality that is geared towards a structure of 
climax, legitimised within the modern institution of dance. 
3Abschied begins when De Keersmaeker comes onto stage and explains what she 
is going to present, and how she came to conceive of this production in the first place. She 
is not afraid of exposing the structure of their production. Rather, it seems that her aim is 
to make the code for the construction of the dance-theatre as transparent as possible, so 
that the structure of dance-theatre, including its fragility, becomes clear to the audience 
from the beginning. What I want to point out here is that this way of structuring dance-
theatre already disturbs the positionality of the choreographer-master, secured in what 
De Keersmaeker refers to as the old school. 
De Keersmaeker walks to a small mixing table on stage and dims the lights. Then, 
she picks up a CD and puts it in a player. We, the audience, get to listen to a fragment of 
Gustav Mahler’s ‘Der Abschied’. When De Keersmaeker turns the music off, she begins to 
talk. This is the first time she talks on stage. First, she wants everybody to read the lyrics 
to ‘Der Abschied’ that were distributed at the entrance. What is written in the handout is 
the last part of Das Lied von der Erde. Then, she explains why she played this particular 
recording by the legendary opera singer Kathleen Ferrier, the conductor Bruno Walter, 
and the Vienna Philharmonic. De Keersmaeker draws parallels between the theme of the 
song, the acceptance of death, and the story of the legendary singer Kathleen Ferrier, who 
knew she had cancer at the time of the recording.  
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Then, De Keersmaeker talks about a meeting she had with the composer Daniel 
Barenboim and how she discussed her desire to choreograph a dance to go with this song. 
But Barenboim discouraged her, saying that the score was impossible to dance to and 
warning that she would lose its magic if she insisted upon it. Instead, Barenboim 
suggested that she try other composers, such as Stravinsky, Satie, or Debussy, whose 
music was intended for dance from the beginning. But the reason why De Keersmaeker 
wanted to work with this music by Mahler was not because it was made for dance but 
because she was genuinely moved by it. When an artist is genuinely moved by something, 
how do they transform their desire into a specific form that can be identified as artistic 
practice, an operation which has to deal with various sets of restrictions and limits 
imposed by the existing disciplinary hierarchy? When De Keersmaeker shared with 
Barenboim her desire to work with ‘Der Abschied’ as a dancer and choreographer, he 
clearly expressed his doubts. Where did these doubts come from? His point was that this 
music was not written for dance-theatre. Should there be specific music that is written 
for dance? Or are there specific dances for music? In other words, the question that De 
Keersmaeker attempts to share with the audience becomes clear: what are the conditions 
for the possibility of making dance? She reveals her frustration with the conditions given 
to her that predetermine the relationship between music and dance, and it is this 
frustration that provokes further questions. And by revealing these questions on stage, 
De Keersmaeker brings about the very structure of a dance-theatre that is not geared 
towards moments of climax. And this structure produces a whole new possibility for the 
audience to think about the problem that De Keersmaeker puts on the table, and to 
become involved in it. 
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After De Keersmaeker’s brief explanation of how she began to work with this 
music, the orchestra come onto the stage and are finally ready to play the song to the 
audience. They start playing ‘Der Abschied’ and De Keersmaeker begins to dance on her 
own. But as the orchestra are sitting in the centre of the stage, there is little room for De 
Keersmaeker to move around. So she dances in between the musicians, cautiously at first, 
within the space allowed to her. Later, she finds more room at the back of the stage. De 
Keersmaeker seems unsure where to start. She initially works with upper-body 
movements that do not require much space. Therefore, her hands become particularly 
expressive and make it look like she is painting pictures against the black background. As 
her dance develops she sails around the musicians. Thus, her dance also comes into being 
through another set of negotiations, between what she really feels and her own 
vocabulary of embedded dance, such as her well-known metronomic style, including 
swinging arms and sharp turns. 
After this short performance, she leaves the stage and Jérôme Bel walks on. He 
explains why, during rehearsals, he did not think that what we have just seen was an 
entirely satisfying performance. He shows the audience some other versions he tried out 
during those rehearsals with De Keersmaeker. For instance, he says he suggested that the 
orchestra get up and leave, one by one, as the piece ends and she still dances. Then, he 
asks the orchestra to re-enact this version that they had tried in a rehearsal. After they 
have performed as Bel had just explained to us, Bel returns to the stage and talks about 
another option they considered during rehearsals. This time, Bel suggests that the 
orchestra die on stage, as Mahler’s music is about death. Again, Bel asks the orchestra to 
show what they did during rehearsals. The first musician hits the floor with quite a thud, 
and it quickly becomes quite hilarious as others follow. 
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What is Bel doing here? He is demonstrating the series of possibilities available 
to them in the beginning. But by exhausting one possibility after another, while explaining 
why they do not work to the audience, he ends up presenting the series of failures they 
had during rehearsals. By staging one failure after another, what he reveals is the 
structure of this dance-theatre. From a simple point of departure, De Keersmaeker’s 
desire to work with this piece, Bel and De Keersmaeker together exhaust a whole series 
of possibilities that were open to them. In doing so, they unrealise a given temporality of 
dance-theatre that is geared towards a certain moment of climax. In this process of 
unrealisation, Bel and De Keersmaeker locate the dancing body within a different 
temporal condition that deviates from the smooth linearity inherent in the conventional 
temporalisation of dance. 
In 3Abschied, Bel finally introduces their last version of ‘Der Abschied’. First, the 
pianist, Jean-Luc Fafchamps, plays a piano. This time, De Keersmaeker not only attempts 
to dance but also begins to sing. It is very sincere, but obviously a struggle for her as 
singing is outside her comfort zone. Her movement and voice, the latter very faint, are 
loaded with uncertainty. She struggles to come to terms with the music by which she is 
moved so much. And in doing so, she leaves herself open to something that she has never 
tried. It is clear to me that the reason why they decide to present this as the final 
performance of this series is not because they consider this version to be more successful 
than other versions they had tried. While De Keersmaeker is still unsure about how she 
should deal with this particular music, her struggle to come to terms with it takes her to 
a contingent situation. And it is only through a series of failures, that exhaust the 
conditions of possibility given to her in the initial stages, that she is able to deviate from 
the given spatialisation and temporalisation of the modern institution of dance. I would 
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like to highlight here that choreography, or the opening up of spaces of appearances for 
other bodies, is deployed to exhaust the conditions of possibility within a specific 
institutional context instead of sustaining a pedagogical logic according to particular 
institutional demands. In this light, I would like to discuss Work/Travail/Arbeid (2015), 
a recent choreographic experiment by De Keersmaeker in which she exhausts the given 
spatiotemporal conditions for a dance-theatre to the point that she no longer can claim it 
is dance. 
 
Rewriting Dance-Theatre as Exhibition 
Work/Travail/Arbeid began when Elena Filipovic, who was the senior curator at WIELS, 
asked De Keersmaeker to present dance in an exhibition space.235 If I could articulate 
3Abschied as De Keersmaeker’s attempt to exhaust the spatiotemporal conditions that 
were not laid out for her, Work/Travail/Arbeid is her attempt to recreate the 
spatiotemporal conditions of dance by radically displacing the given conditions that have 
made dance dance, to the point that she no longer claims it to be dance-theatre but 
exhibition. 
In displacing the given conditions of dance by locating her dancers in an exhibition, 
one of the most obvious conditions that De Keersmaeker has to deal with in 
Work/Travail/Arbeid is the fact that her dance-theatre has to be exhibited for seven hours, 
every day, for more than nine weeks. This particular temporal condition in an exhibition 
context also brings about a particular spatiotemporal condition where no frontality is 
guaranteed for the dancers as visitors are free to move around. This brings about the 
                                         
235 From the talk Dance and the Exhibition Form: Conversation with Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker, Xavier 
Le Roy and Elena Filipovic, at WIELS, Brussels, on 22 March 2015. 
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possibility of a form of proximity that is not found in a normal theatre context. In other 
words, the way in which De Keersmaeker deals with the displacement of the 
spatiotemporal conditions of dance becomes the very structure of her choreographic 
experiment to rewrite dance-theatre as ‘exhibition’. 
When I visited De Keersmaeker’s exhibition at WIELS in Brussels, it was a Sunday, 
late in the afternoon. I was a bit surprised that there was a huge crowd in front of the 
ticket office. Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker’s exhibition Work/Travail/Arbeid was already 
on. Unlike The Agora Project discussed in the preceding chapter, where the spectators’ 
entrance to the theatre marks the beginning and end points, at first, De Keersmaeker’s 
Work/Travail/Arbeid seems to be disinterested in the presence of the spectator-visitor. 
The exhibition is open as long as the art centre is open, regardless of the presence of the 
spectator-visitor.236 
Work/Travail/Arbeid is not the first time that Keersmaeker has presented her 
dance-theatre in a so-called white-cube context. Yet, her previous presentations in white-
cube spaces took the form of either a conventional exhibition, in which her drawings and 
objects, accumulated over thirty years of practice, were exhibited (as at BOZAR, Centre 
for Fine Arts in 2001), or theatre that took place in a museum. For instance, when she 
presented her 1982 theatre piece ‘Violin Phase’, part of Fase, at MoMA in 2011, a frontal 
situation was still sustained. And in her recent presentation of Fase at Tate Modern in 
2012, although the frontal situation was absent and spectators were able to sit much 
                                         
236 At first glance, the exhibition seems to be disinterested in the presence of the spectator-visitor as 
opposed to the theatre situation where it is the presence of the audience that makes theatre theatre. But 
whether it is a black box or a white cube, being bodiless applies as the ontological condition for a spectator 
to be a spectator. 
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closer to the dancers, it was still a theatre presentation where performances were given 
in fixed slots. 
What was significant about Work/Travail/Arbeid at WIELS was not the fact that 
it was taking place in a white-cube space, but that taking place in a white cube became a 
condition for its coming into being. In other words, this project was not about exhibiting 
her previous dance in a double-construction situation, where a black box is installed in a 
white cube. Rather, what De Keersmaeker presented here was ‘dance as exhibition’ or 
‘exhibition as dance’. This inevitably contaminates the spatiotemporal condition, both for 
the black box and the white cube. For instance, De Keersmaeker had to work with the 
condition that her dance was to be exhibited for seven hours every day for more than 
nine weeks. In other words, her dancing bodies had to occupy a duration that dance is not 
normally designed to sustain. The particular temporalisation and spatialisation of an 
exhibition required a radical rethinking of De Keersmaeker’s body-writing, as the dancing 
body is not capable of sustaining this particular spatiotemporal condition. But this does 
not mean that De Keersmaeker’s challenge was simply to make her dance longer than 
usual. The fact that De Keersmaeker should now work under different spatiotemporal 
conditions meant that she had an opportunity to rethink the given spatialisation and 
temporalisation that sustain the smooth operational machine, not only of the black box 
but also of the white cube. In this light, I would like to briefly outline the particular 
spatiotemporal conditions predetermined by the black box and the white cube. 
I have, in the previous chapter, already discussed the particular spatiotemporal 
conditions of the black box as an actualisation of the ultimate ideal of the Platonic 
philosophy of keeping the spectator present in their absence. In analysing the 
spatiotemporal conditions of the white cube, I would like to depart from Brian 
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O’Doherty’s analysis where he defines this particular term in Inside the White Cube: The 
Ideology of the Gallery Space, originally published as a series of three articles in Artforum 
in 1976, and subsequently collected in a book of the same name.237 I would argue that 
O’Doherty’s argument allows us to conceive the notion of a white cube as going beyond 
its distinctive architectural components, such as white walls or a minimal interior. He 
argues that the white cube is a historically constructed, aesthetic object in the West. 238 
This particular development of gallery space as an aesthetic object implies that the white 
cube not only has architectural conditions, but also overpowers artworks themselves in 
its shift from placing content within a context to making the context itself the content. But 
this emergence of context is primarily enabled through its attempted disappearance. The 
white cube is conceived as a place free of context, where time and social space are thought 
to be excluded from the experience of artworks. It is only via the apparent neutrality of 
appearing outside of daily life and politics that artworks within the white cube can appear 
to be self-contained – only by being freed from historical time can they attain their aura 
of timelessness.239 This is why the white cube is a spatialisation of timelessness that is 
born to resist the passage of time. 
In this timeless space where ‘no more time’ is spatialised, what is produced is a 
bodiless body whose eyes only hover in this vacuum space. In other words, it is only these 
bodiless eyes that are allowed to enter the white cube. Nothing is to be touched; one 
should be quiet and reverent; nobody is to laugh; it is eerily still; nobody is allowed to 
talk loudly. In this light, I would point to the fact that these bodiless eyes are nothing new 
                                         
237 Brian O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
238 Ibid., 7. 
239 Ibid., 49. 
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in the institution of theatre. In the development of theatre in the form of a black box in 
the West, bodiless eyes, called spectators in the institutionalisation of theatre, were also 
produced. Of course, the spectator-body in the white cube is not meant to confront living 
bodies, unlike in the black box. But whether it is a spectator-body in a black-box context 
or a spectator-body in a white cube, they are both mere voyeurs whose mode of being can 
be explained by this paradoxical institutional demand of ‘being there without being 
there’.240 
In De Keersmaeker’s choreographic experiment involving the rewriting of dance-
theatre as exhibition, the spectator, however, is no longer capable of meeting this 
institutional demand, as the spectator-body is constantly disturbed by unexpected 
situations and contingent encounters with the dancers and other spectator-bodies. For 
instance, despite the fact that I, as a spectator-visitor to De Keersmaeker’s exhibition, 
tried to limit the exposure of my own body, I found my body constantly located in the 
space of appearance. This is because De Keersmaeker’s dancers were located in an 
exhibition context where no particular spatial focal point was guaranteed, unlike the 
black-box situation, so that every spot was a potential spot for action. Moreover, when 
my body appeared in the space of appearance, the attention supposedly paid to the 
dancers was inevitably distracted and dispersed. This dispersion of attention no longer 
secured the specifically idealised representation of time that is sustained in either the 
black box or the white cube. In this context, what failed in De Keersmaeker’s 
choreographic experiment was the normative deployment of the spectator-body, devised 
and legitimised in either a black box or a white cube. In other words, De Keersmaeker’s 
                                         
240 Rancie re, On the Shores of Politics, 93. See also Chapter 5 of this thesis where I follow Rancie re’s 
genealogical investigation of the demonisation of the demos, 6–13. 
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choreographic experiment became an experiment that contaminated the ontological 
condition of being a spectator-body. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the ontological condition of the spectator-
body is highlighted in the process of bracketing spectators and turning them into a union 
with centripetal force. As Rancière explains, this centripetal force does not exist to create 
a centre that is being pulled in either direction, between itself and the periphery. Rather, 
it is a way of ‘keeping the people present in their absence’. 241  In this context, the 
spectator-body is the spatialisation of being bodiless. In other words, it is a manifestation 
of the presence of absence. Therefore, the spectator-body is not meant to be aware of the 
presence of other spectator-bodies. The spectator-body only exists for its eyes. 
But De Keersmaeker’s choreographic experiment contaminates this ontological 
condition for a spectator to be a spectator. In the white-cube context, where the 
dichotomy between object and subject is dismantled by the confrontation between 
subjects, and where the focal point is eradicated, unlike the black-box context, the 
ontological condition for the spectator-body can no longer be sustained. In this context, 
the question that I would like to consider in the coming part is how De Keersmaeker’s 
contamination of the spectator-body opens up a different possibility for articulating the 
space of appearance that emerges, in which the spatiotemporal condition for the 
spectator-body is no longer secure. 
 
 
 
                                         
241 Rancie re, On the Shores of Politics, 93. I borrow Jacques Rancie re’s analysis of the demos as I find a 
common political strategy in the making of the demos and the spectator. 
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The Event of Being a Body With Other Bodies 
As opposed to the smooth operation of the white cube and the black box, that attempt to 
erase the body, De Keersmaeker’s tactical deployment of the technology of choreography 
brings the spectator-body into the space of appearance, but this only comes into being in 
relation to other bodies. What should be noted is the fact that this bringing of a body into 
the space of appearance is not something that can be planned beforehand. It occurs via 
contingent encounters with other bodies. All De Keersmaeker has control of is a 
particular way of displacing the spatiotemporal condition of the dancing body. In the case 
of Work/Travail/Arbeid, it is about placing the dancing body within a white-cube context. 
When a dancing body is displaced from the spatiotemporal condition legitimised by the 
modern institution of dance, its coming into being as a dancing body is not something to 
be given, but something to be acquired in relation to the spectator-body that is also 
displaced from its given spatiotemporal condition. 
When I entered De Keersmaeker’s exhibition at WIELS, because I entered in the 
middle of one of nine cycles that structure the exhibition, I inevitably gained some 
attention from some of the spectator-visitors. It was the same for me once I was in the 
space. Whenever new spectator-visitors entered the exhibition space, it was hard not to 
notice and gaze at them for a few moments. Of course, these exchanges of gazes between 
spectator-visitors also occur in a normal white-cube context. But when there are only 
other living bodies on which the spectator-visitors’ gaze can be fixed, the exchange of 
gazes between fellow spectator-visitors becomes more immediate. It is this immediacy 
that heightens the attention given to the continuous process whereby spectator-visitors 
perceive the bodies of others and at the same time expose themselves as objects of 
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observation for other bodies. And this attention given to fellow spectator-visitors 
obviously diverts the attention supposedly given to De Keersmaeker’s dancers.  
When I entered the exhibition space, what first captured my attention were the 
bodies of fellow spectator-visitors. I did not immediately notice two male dancers, as they 
were not engaged in any movement at that very moment. Moreover, they were among 
other spectator-visitors. Of course, it only took me a few minutes to recognise them as 
they were wearing particular costumes intended to look like normal, everyday outfits, yet 
obviously different from normal, everyday attire. But even if it took a few minutes, it was 
clear that the privilege given to dancers in a black-box context was no longer evident here. 
Because there was no distinction between stage and auditorium, the attention that the 
dancers normally receive in a black-box situation was not given.  
Once the frontal positionality guaranteed in a black-box situation is no longer 
present, the bodies of the dancers appearing before the spectator are not a given 
condition but something that occurs. At the same time, it is the dancers’ bodies that allow 
the bodies of spectators to appear. Thus, the dancers’ bodies that I witnessed were bodies 
that came into being only when they were in a relationship with other bodies. In a form 
of articulation borrowed from Nancy, the dancing body only comes into being when it is 
touched by a spectator-body, and a spectator-body only comes into being when it is 
touched by a dancing-body. A dancing-body only exists through touching spectator-
bodies that surround it, and installing a theatre situation. 
But these theatre situations are, however, not only temporary structures but also 
contingent structures. For instance, when a child of one of the spectator-visitors ran to 
the centre where two dancers were performing a particular set of movements, obviously 
the theatre situation was momentarily terminated. Moreover, this termination was not 
227 
 
only caused by a child who did not understand the code of conduct in a particular setting, 
but also by the dancers who were participating in De Keersmaeker’s exhibition. For 
instance, as this particular cycle finished and another cycle started, one of the two male 
dancers did not leave the space voluntarily but took on the role of a spectator watching 
his fellow dancers performing a set of choreographed movements. And because I knew 
he was not just a spectator but a dancer, I kept looking at him watching his fellow dancers. 
This constantly distracted me from the theatre situations that emerged. 
Whenever De Keersmaeker’s attempts to install a theatre situation in an 
exhibition context fail, what becomes disturbed is not only the specific temporalisation 
of theatre that is geared towards a moment of climax, requiring a great degree of attention. 
The timelessness of an exhibition is also disturbed, as it becomes open to contingent 
situations whereby the bodies of spectator-visitors emerge by touching other bodies and 
being touched by others in the space of appearance. When theatre situations are 
constantly failing due to contingent encounters between dancers and spectator-visitors, 
or among spectator-visitors themselves, it is the moment when we realise what it means 
to offer a space for each other by being touched by other bodies while touching them in 
return. The space of appearance manifested itself as an event, working against the 
absolutisation of time, which subordinates the space of appearance of bodies under the 
specific system of representation, when my body was touched by others and others were 
touched by mine. 
In this context, it is useful to summon again Nancy’s understanding of the body as 
an event. In Nancy’s rethinking of the body, the taking place of bodies is an event, as it 
only happens when my body touches other bodies while other bodies are touched by 
mine. But this offering of space to each other also means that my body taking place 
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interrupts other bodies taking place in a space of appearance, while other bodies taking 
place interrupt my body taking place in a space of appearance. In other words, being 
touched by other bodies while touching other bodies is inevitably fragmentary and 
discontinuous. This understanding allows us to articulate that opening up a space of 
appearance for each other is not done to bring about a common space where 
homogeneity and harmony coexist, but to bring about a constant process of 
contaminating and being contaminated by the appearance of each other. For instance, in 
De Keersmaeker’s exhibition, it was my body as a spectator that allowed me to take the 
place of the dancers’ bodies but which, at the same time, contaminated the appearance of 
the bodies of the dancers.  
In this context, I would argue that choreography is deployed to deconstruct the 
absolutisation of time by highlighting that the time we share is inevitably fragmented and 
discontinuous. In this fragmentation of time, I pay attention to the fact that a position of 
mastery will always fail to be permanently installed. The fragmentation of time inherent 
in the space of appearance does not allow a position of mastery to have ultimate control 
over bodies taking place. In this context, I will articulate how De Keersmaeker’s 
choreographic experiment demonstrates the failing positionality of De Keersmaeker as 
the ultimate author who has complete control over production. 
 
The Choreographer’s Body as a Tipping Point Between Memory and Anticipation 
As De Keersmaeker revealed in the artist’s talk she gave at WIELS, De Keersmaeker tried 
to be in the exhibition space as much as she could, along with the spectator-visitors, 
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watching her dancers who were inscribing her own movements in time and space.242 But 
what she really witnessed was a failing of her positionality as the ultimate source of 
control, as there will be always be a gap between the choreographer’s instructions and 
what will be performed, via incommensurable, contingent encounters between her 
dancers and spectator-visitors over nine weeks. In other words, despite her meticulously 
planned and organised choreography, De Keersmaeker, as the engineer of specific body-
writing in a given space and time, does not have total control over what will be inscribed 
in time and space over those weeks. 
During my visit to Work/Travail/Arbeid, I saw De Keersmaeker among other 
spectator-visitors. It was already two weeks since the exhibition opened, so it would have 
been a while since she observed her own movements inscribed by her dancers. On the 
floor of the exhibition space, there were numerous traces of circles drawn by her dancers. 
Whenever the dancers engaged in a new cycle, they drew circles in a meticulous way. The 
cycle that finished on the day of my visit began when two female dancers came into the 
centre of the space and drew circles on the ground. While they were drawing circles on 
the floor with chalk, the music began and opened another session. As if they were aware 
of the vulnerability of the stage situation, using chalk and a compass they drew circles to 
mark out the invisible territory of their stage. And a few minutes later, I noticed that a 
male dancer, who was standing right next to me, was preparing to join them for a new 
sequence. And another male dancer from the opposite side also joined the scene and 
began to count out random numbers: 8, 9, 30, 31, 35, 15, 33, 31, 1. There seemed to be no 
rules to these numbers. As time went by, at a certain moment the movements of the four 
                                         
242 From the talk Dance and the Exhibition Form: Conversation with Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker, Xavier 
Le Roy and Elena Filipovic, at WIELS, Brussels, on 22 March 2015. 
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dancers and four musicians were in time with one another, moving backwards and 
forwards in circular turns. Then, even the piano, that was located in the room at the back, 
moved into the first room. The pianist played while the piano was being moved with the 
help of technicians and its wheels. They were all making a vortex pattern in their own 
terms and in a particular circular repetition. 
De Keersmaeker’s exhibition Work/Travail/Arbeid was based on her previous 
dance theatre, Vortex Temporum (2013). Vortex Temporum, as its title implies, is 
specifically concerned with time or, to be more specific, a time of vortex. And De 
Keersmaeker’s decision to stage an exhibition based on this particular dance-theatre 
aims to advance further her thinking about ‘a time of vortex’. As she explains herself, her 
dance-making as exhibition aims to take the ‘time for time’.243 
Vortex Temporum begins with De Keersmaeker’s attempt to install a danced 
counterpoint to Gérard Grisey’s polyphonic music by linking six dancers with six 
musicians in order to ask a question about how one can visualise polyphony by 
dancing.244 Each dancer is linked to one of the six musicians and colours his or her 
dancing with patterns of movement proper to the instrument. Both dancers and 
musicians traverse the stage, following the pattern of a vortex. For De Keersmaeker, these 
patterns of swirling circles reveal the emergence and disappearance of the present, that 
only comes into being as a permanent ‘tipping point that is a balancing act between 
memory and anticipation, leaning back and forth between the ghost image of the past and 
a desire towards the future’.245 
                                         
243 Elena Filipovic, ed., Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker; Work/Travail/Arbeid (Brussels: WIELS, Rosas, and 
Mercatorfonds, 2015), 18. Published on the occasion of the exhibition at WIELS, Brussels, 20 March 2015–
17 May 2015. 
244 “Vortex Temporum,” Rosas, http://www.rosas.be/en/production/vortex-temporum. 
245 Ibid. 
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In her interview with De Keersmaeker on Vortex Temporum, Bojana Cvejić points 
out that Grisey’s music shares some characteristics with De Keersmaeker’s 
choreography: the perpetuation of circles and circular repetitions, spiral movements, and 
mathematical proportions in the construction of form.246 For De Keersmaeker’s Vortex 
Temporum, the dancers and musicians are meant to perform a strictly structured 
choreography that is minutely written and meticulously instructed. These characteristics 
of De Keersmaeker’s Vortex Temporum also apply to the basic spatiotemporal framework 
of Work/Travail/Arbeid. For both Vortex Temporum and Work/Travail/Arbeid, the 
multiplication of circles and their underlying pentagons are constituted based on what 
she refers to as a ‘magic square’, with its ninefold pattern as a structuring device.247 It is 
both a symbolic representation of a cosmological system, whose form is found in many 
ancient cultures, and also a mathematical diagram in which all the numbers in each 
straight line, vertical, horizontal, or diagonal, add up to fifteen.248 The geometric pattern 
is organised in a two-dimensional space and also moves in a three-dimensional volume. 
Numbers determine directions and points in space. The magic square then acts as a 
pattern for trajectories, organising architectural levels and the distribution of energy in 
movement. 249  Based on this spatiotemporal logic, De Keersmaeker’s exhibition is 
structured with nine cycles that repeat every day for the seven opening hours of the 
institution, so that no day begins where it did the day before, for more than nine weeks. 
                                         
246 Bojana Cvejic , Ge rard Grisey and Jean-Luc Plouvier, Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker: Vortex Temporum, ed. 
Bojana Cvejic (Brussels: WIELS, Rosas, and Mercatorfonds, 2015), 7. Published on the occasion of the 
exhibition at WIELS, Brussels, 20 March 2015–17 May 2015. 
247 Filipovic, Work/Travail/Arbeid, 26–27. 
248 Cvejic , Grisey and Plouvier, Vortex Temporum. 
249 Filipovic, Work/Travail/Arbeid. 
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In other words, unlike a white cube or a black box, where one can get a holistic 
perspective of the work, De Keersmaeker’s dance-making as an exhibition does not allow 
the visitor to see a picture of the entire exhibition. De Keersmaeker’s exhibition not only 
begins with a new order every day but also lasts for nine weeks, from Wednesday to 
Sunday, 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. This is why even the choreographer and the participating 
performers will never experience every single moment that the exhibition is open. 
Therefore, the emergence of a new mode of authorship is inevitable when compared to 
theatre, where the choreographer-spectator has more or less complete control of her 
production. No one, including the choreographer, can experience De Keersmaeker’s 
exhibition in its totality. Instead, for more than nine weeks, and for seven hours every day, 
the movements of the dancers will be inscribed and deposited as traces of a 
choreographer’s body. 
When the last sequence of the day has finished, what is left are visible circles 
drawn on the ground by dancers over time. De Keersmaeker is watching the circles on 
the ground drawn by her own dancers who execute her movements. These traces are 
clearly marking out the countless invisible circles drawn by the dancers’ movements in 
space and time. These invisible circles are traces of the choreographer-body, always in 
parallel with the visible circles drawn on the ground by the dancers. This endless chain, 
pairing invisible and visible circles, becomes evidence of the choreographer being there, 
observing her body being a trace of what is inscribed by her own dancers. However, 
despite the fact that the choreographer-body is right there at the very moment of its 
execution, it is failing to come to terms with what is actually inscribed over time. This is 
a time of vortex. It is already struggling as a ‘tipping point that is a balancing act between 
memory and anticipation, leaning back and forth between the ghost image of the past and 
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a desire towards the future’. This paradoxical situation, whereby the choreographer 
observes her body being a trace of what is inscribed in space and time but failing to come 
to terms with what is actually inscribed, reveals the contingent positionality of the 
choreographer who fails to have complete control over her own production. 
When the choreographer fails to be the ultimate author, choreography is no 
longer deployed as a pedagogical technique, but as an emancipatory tactic opposing the 
particular pedagogical demands devised, legitimised, and sustained within the Western 
model of the modern institution of dance. Choreography becomes a technique for 
bringing about a space of appearance for other bodies, through which my body is touched 
by other bodies while other bodies are touched by mine. In these contingent encounters 
via points of touching, we come to be aware of the fact that we, as bodies, are spaces for 
other bodies, as other bodies are spaces for our bodies. Therefore, the choreographic 
body is what comes into being as an event. 
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Conclusion. 
Conditions of the Questions 
In this thesis, I have attempted to make sense of choreography, its particularities as a 
technique of writing the dancing body within a specific institutional context, and its 
potential for opening up a new critical field that will enable us to rethink what writing the 
(dancing) body means and can do. In so doing, I have articulated the performativity of the 
act of writing the body in terms of choreo-graphy. As the hyphen between choreo and 
graphy indicates, I have attempted to highlight the fact that the term ‘choreography’ is, in 
fact, a neologism that reflects a specific sociopolitical demand of writing the (dancing) 
body within a particular institutional framework. Therefore, by putting forward choreo-
graphy as the title of this thesis, I aimed to highlight a deconstructive reading of 
choreography, whereby the desire of writing the dancing body can be analysed in relation 
to the positon of the master. Choreography came into being as a particular manifestation 
of a power structure through which a certain logic of representation is therefore 
institutionalised. Hence my attempt to make sense of choreography via choreo-graphy has 
become an attempt to make sense of this power structure that is created within the 
institutionalisation of dance in the West. 
I have, however, sought to find a different point of contact to engage with the 
problematics of the power structure, one that differs from conventional institutional 
critique. In other words, I have attempted to rethink the conventional mode of operation 
of institutional critique that imposes a binary structure between those who are inside the 
institution and those who position themselves outside it. Especially within our 
contemporary situation, where utopian dreams of revolution have failed us and new 
forms of oppression have constantly been engineered in the name of emancipation, it is 
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important to go beyond these binary opposites. This is one of the reasons why 
contemporary choreographic experiments attracted my attention in the first place. What 
I call contemporary choreographic experiments by a new generation of European 
choreographers demonstrate the possibility of creating a different relationship with the 
very institution that they inhabit, without being captured within a binary system of the 
conventional mode of institutional critique. I call this new model of resistance the 
‘operation within’, as opposed to what I would call the ‘battlefield’ model, where one 
positions oneself against and outside one’s enemy, which necessarily imposes a binary 
structure. If I could argue that the emergence of performance in the first wave of the 
performance turn in post-war Europe and America can be understood within the 
battlefield model, where the avant-gardists marched against the evil institution, the ways 
in which contemporary choreographic experiments do not remain within the binary logic 
that positions oneself outside the institution. This is why I would like to suggest that the 
operational tactics found in contemporary choreographic experiments can resonate 
beyond the disciplinary boundaries of dance studies. 
In order to analyse contemporary choreographic experiments and their suggested 
model of resistance against and within the institution that they inhabit, I have asked six 
questions in this thesis, which also serve as the titles of each chapter: 
 
1. What makes dance dance? 
2. What makes dance choreography? 
3. What makes choreography a truth game? 
4. What makes choreography research? 
5. How does choreography reinvent spectatorship? 
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6. How does choreography reconfigure the body as an event? 
 
In the forthcoming part, I aim to revisit each question and discuss some of the tactical 
decisions that I made in forming dialogues and making connections between different 
theoretical and choreographic projects in order to make sense of the act of writing the 
(dancing) body via choreo-graphy, and its political implications beyond the discipline of 
dance. In so doing, I have to ask another question: what are the conditions of the questions 
that I ask? From which positions have I asked these questions? And what presuppositions, 
what Derrida calls ‘primary affirmations’, have been assumed in asking these questions? 
And last but not least, the question that I want to ask myself: to whom have I addressed 
these questions? 
 
What Makes Dance Dance? 
What appears in the first instance to be a tautological question does not ask what the 
essence of dance is. This was a question I asked myself in an attempt to make sense of the 
rapid embracing of contemporary choreographic experiments in visual arts institutions 
that I observed as a visual arts curator working on ‘live art’ programmes at a newly 
founded art institution in Seoul in the early 2000s. In fact, the museological desire to 
transform what is considered to be the lifeless space of the white cube into something 
alive, vibrant, and full of ‘now’ is not something unknown to us.250 In the first wave of the 
                                         
250 Here, I am referring to what is often called the performance turn in the 1960s and 1970s by post-war 
neo-avant-garde movements. If this performance turn can be called the first wave of institutional critique 
in the postwar period, in the early 2000s there were increasing numbers of exhibitions that reviewed the 
historical relationship between the white cube and the black box at major art institutions in Europe. I would 
call this period the second wave of institutional critique. For instance, Theatre Without Theatre at MACBA 
in Barcelona in 2007 was a survey show that explored how the notion of theatre has played an important 
role in artistic practices since the 1960s. In 2007, Tate Modern hosted Pierre Bal-Blanc’s The Living Currency 
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performance turn in the 1960s and 1970s, we witnessed how ‘performance’ emerged as 
an emancipatory term against everything that was already captured within the existing 
operation of the institution of art. In parallel, I have witnessed how ‘choreography’ has 
emerged as a new term that seems to replace the function which performance had in the 
first wave of the performance turn. In order to understand why choreography has been 
actively embraced beyond the discipline of dance in the second wave of the performance 
turn in the early 2000s, I first had to ask why choreography has been released from its 
disciplinary weight. In doing so, the question of what makes dance dance was an 
important departure point for my investigation into why there has been the rapid 
embracing of contemporary choreographic experiments in visual arts institutions. 
Moreover, this tendency towards choreography, evident in the second wave of the 
performance turn, is not only limited to the European art scene. Thanks to global 
capitalist movements accelerated after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this newly developed 
interest in choreography, stimulated by a set of choreographic experiments by European 
choreographers, has been quickly embraced by increasing numbers of emerging art 
institutions and festivals that have sought to become international. And not to mention 
that with the unprecedented accessibility and flow of information, thanks to the Internet, 
there are resources and networks that were not readily available in previous decades in 
the non-European art scene. Therefore, when I worked on the inaugural festival at a newly 
                                         
that explored the possibility of exhibiting live performances in a museum context. Marina Abramovic ’s 
retrospective Seven Easy Pieces at the Guggenheim Museum in 2005 also evoked the neo-avant-garde 
history of the 1960s and 1970s by re-enacting historical performances. The term ‘re-enactment’ was one of 
the terms that dominated artistic and curatorial practices in the early 2000s; see Christophe Kihm, 
“Performance in the Age of Its Re-enactment,” artpress 0 (2008): 23–29. These are just a few examples of 
what has happened since the early 2000s. And the opening of the Tanks, a new exhibition space dedicated 
to performance and video at Tate Modern, epitomises what is often called the performance turn, which has 
become one of the most evident conditions for artistic and curatorial practices. 
238 
 
founded art institution in the early 2000s in Seoul, there were ever-increasing channels 
for exchanges of information; thus, I was exposed to various artistic experiments in the 
European art scene that were conventionally perceived as being outside the territory of 
the visual arts.251 Among them, the active embracing of contemporary dance by visual 
arts institutions drew my attention the most. Particularly in South Korea, the heated 
notion of interdisciplinarity was rapidly prompting the reorganisation of public funding 
structures in order to meet the new institutional demands. 252  Within these 
infrastructures and resources, ‘internationalised’ visual arts institutions were embracing 
contemporary choreographic experiments faster than in the previous decade, and this 
contributed to the blurring of boundaries between the white cube and the black box, thus 
confirming so-called interdisciplinary practices as the very mode of contemporary artistic 
and curatorial practice.253 
This active embracing of what was conventionally considered to be outside the 
territory of visual arts does in fact echo the first wave of the performance turn of the 
1960s and 1970s, when the notion of the ‘expanded field of artistic practice’ was being 
increasingly debated in the spirit of an institutional critique, with the term ‘performance’ 
standing for everything that was not institutionally captured.254 Therefore, it was not 
surprising that ‘No Manifesto’ was the prevailing spirit dominating the performance 
scene of the 1960s and 1970s around the world.255 In this context, I have argued that 
                                         
251 Since I worked on a live art programme with Festival B:om director Seong Hee Kim in the early 2000s, 
my research focused on experimental performing arts festivals in Europe and Japan. 
252 Since the early 2000s, a new funding category for interdisciplinary practice has been introduced by the 
Arts Council in South Korea. They even opened up a new space dedicated to ‘interdisciplinary practice’. 
253 Hence I was in an environment where I soon came across what was often called non-dance by a new 
generation of European choreographers, at least within a couple of years of their premieres at festivals in 
Seoul. 
254 Krauss, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field,” 276–290. 
255 I am referring to Yvonne Rainer’s ‘No Manifesto’, but this is not to limit the discussion to Rainer. I 
mention Rainer’s writing of the ‘No Manifesto’ because this describes the prevailing spirit of the neo-avant-
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what is contemporary about contemporary choreographic experiments by a new 
generation of choreographers stems from the fact that what I have called a battlefield 
model of resistance (where there is a clear battlefront between two opposing sides) is no 
longer presupposed. 
For instance, as opposed to the anti-theatricality in the 1960s and 1970s that 
resisted the instalment of the black box itself, the choreographers I have examined in this 
thesis question the very institutions they inhabit but, nevertheless, they never position 
themselves outside of them.256 This is why I have argued that their mode of operation 
can be articulated with the Foucauldian understanding of the operation of power, which 
asserts that nothing is outside power because we are all strategic points through which 
certain assemblages of power are manifested.257 In fact, the parallel mode of operation 
between the post-structuralist rethinking of power, institutions, the body, subjectivity and 
knowledge production, and contemporary choreographic experiments that goes beyond 
the battlefield model, is what enables contemporary choreography to be positioned as a 
new field of critical studies that goes beyond the conventional boundaries of dance 
studies based on Greenbergian logic. In this light, it is worth paying attention to the 
discussions of the choreographers themselves about the labelling of contemporary 
choreographic experiments as ‘conceptual dance’.258 
In the conversation between the performance theorist Cvejic and Le Roy about the 
label of ‘conceptual dance’ attached to this new generation of choreographers who have 
gained visibility since the late 1990s, Le Roy refuses to have his work categorised as 
                                         
garde of the 1960s and 1970s. 
256 For instance, Allen Kaprow’s ‘Happenings’ refused to be involved in any theatrical apparatus. 
257 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 194–198. 
258 Le Roy, Cvejic , and Siegmund, “To end with judgment,” 49–56. 
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conceptual dance, arguing ‘I haven’t seen any choreographers who work without a 
concept.’259 Moreover, as Cvejic argues, the term ‘conceptual dance’ encompasses the 
accusation that this group of choreographers betrays the essence of dance, in line with 
American dance criticism influenced by Greenbergian categorisation.260 What is most 
problematic in the art-historical narrative is that it inevitably creates a binary opposition 
within a linear conception of time (ballet or modern, modernist or post-modernist, and 
so on). 
As a visual art curator, this question of the location of choreography in relation to 
the Western art historical narrative was also one of the stimuli that prompted me to ask 
the first question that allowed me to embark on this thesis: what makes dance dance? If 
the new generation of choreographers claims that what is produced is choreography 
rather than dance, then what do they mean by dance? Again, this question does not seek 
to define the essence of dance in order to sustain its autonomous status, as has been the 
case in the institutionalisation of dance. Instead, it is a question that attempts to situate 
my position in parallel with this group of choreographers whose practices began by 
rereading what has been normalised within a specific institutional context of dance. 
In developing and expanding this question of what makes dance dance, I have been 
indebted to the increasing amount of theoretical output that attempts to push back the 
existing boundaries of dance studies in relation to, or privileging, post-structuralist 
thinking. In an attempt to reconfigure or reinvent a new critical language and mode of 
articulation, there have been increasing demands from those practitioners in the field and 
theoreticians who began to ask why contemporary choreography was becoming more 
                                         
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid. 
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than a matter of dance. In a Western academic context, one of the early critical surveys 
that aimed to highlight the critical potential of contemporary choreographic experiments 
was Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement, by New York University 
professor Andre  Lepecki, first published in 2006 and translated into more than fifteen 
different languages worldwide. 
As the title of the book suggests, Lepecki’s attempt to create theoretical dialogues 
with contemporary choreographic experiments begins by highlighting the politics of 
movement in the modern institutionalisation of dance in the West. Lepecki defines 
Western modernity as a particular political project that aims to produce a subjectivity of 
‘being-toward-movement’. For Lepecki, this needs to produce a kinetic subjectivity 
concerning what conditions the institutionalisation of dance in the West. By considering 
the subjectivity of movement as that which jumps up and down in striking poses (the best 
example would be Romantic ballet), dance collaborates with this particular subjectivity 
project called Western modernity, and this is how it gains the ground on which its 
autonomous status as art constructs its legitimacy. Therefore, the modern institution of 
dance became a pedagogical machine whose main goal was to internalise a particular 
disciplinary logic. Against this backdrop, Lepecki argues that by exhausting the 
subjectivity project of Western modernity, contemporary dance opens up a new 
ontological ground for subjectivity that is manifested in the ‘deflation of movement in 
much of contemporary dance’. 
Lepecki’s persuasive argument about the relationship between Western 
modernity and the politics of movement in the Western model of the modern institution 
of dance offers crucial insights that open up new theoretical possibilities for engaging 
with contemporary choreographic experiments. And my thesis would not have been 
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possible without the theoretical ground opened up by this endeavour. Yet, I need to 
highlight the fact that a dialectical structure inevitably emerges in Lepecki’s critical 
attempt. In rethinking the given ontology of dance as a continuum of movement, Lepecki 
creates a morphological contrast between the modern notion of dance, the kinetic, and 
contemporary choreographic experiments, represented by the deflation of movement. 
This inevitably installs a ‘versus’ structure that exposes itself to the danger of simplifying 
contemporary dance. Moreover, it is paradoxical that his morphological methodology, 
which aims to prompt a critique of Western modernity, is the very methodology deployed 
by various types of modernist projects whose desire for categorisation and classification 
ends up by providing support for cultural and scientific notions of evolution and 
superiority of the West over the non-West. In this light, the question that I would like to 
ask here is how can we escape from the modernist logic that constantly reinscribes the 
‘versus’ structure through which our attempts to criticise the given power structure 
become impotent? 
 
What Makes Dance Choreography? 
In Chapter 2, I attempted to articulate the shift from dance to choreography that is evident 
in contemporary choreographic experiments by a new generation of European 
choreographers. In my thesis, this shift is articulated with the term choreo-graphy. In an 
attempt to articulate choreo-graphy, one of the tactical moves that I made in Chapter 2 
was to conduct genealogical research on the term ‘choreography’ itself by asking how and 
why this particular notion of choreography was devised and how it has been 
institutionalised in Western history. And it was in Lepecki’s Exhausting Dance that I 
attempted to revisit the story of the fifteenth-century dance master, priest, and maths 
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master, Arbeau, and his interlocutor, Capriol, in Orchesography. It is in this book where 
the neologism orchesography (from Greek orchēsis ‘dancing’ and an anglicisation of the 
French graphie, inherited from the Latin graphia) was first invented and put forward. 
Here, the dialogue between the master Arbeau and the pupil Capriol reveals a specific 
ontological understanding of dance which sets out the conditions for the rise of a 
particular tactic of binding the body to the technique of writing. When the dance master 
Arbeau complains that nothing remains in the archive of dance, his pupil suggests the 
technique of writing down the movements so that his master’s dance can live on, even 
after the master is gone. This was the moment when the neologism ‘choreography’ was 
suggested for the first time. 
In this light, my ambition was to investigate how rethinking the act of writing the 
body of others allows us to open up a new possibility of understanding choreography in 
terms of choreo-graphy. In so doing, I turned to Derrida’s philosophical project on writing. 
Of course, this project had the specific goal of highlighting the foundational instability of 
the Western institution of philosophy that he belongs to. However, in juxtaposing 
Derrida’s project on writing with my investigation on choreo-graphy in contemporary 
choreographic experiments as a tactical gesture, I attempted to highlight the 
deconstructive reading of choreography that is evident in contemporary choreographic 
experiments. 
As Derrida’s investment in the technology of writing aims to highlight the 
foundational instability of logocentrism, a condition that sustains the Western 
metaphysics of presence, the deconstructive reading that is evident in contemporary 
choreographic experiments aims to rethink the spatial and temporal conditions of the 
institution of dance. And I argue that this rethinking of the given conditions is what 
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underlies the shift from dance to choreography. Moreover, I would like to argue that this 
deconstructive reading, as demonstrated in contemporary choreographic experiments, 
differs from the conventional notion of resistance inherent in any revolutionary operation. 
If the conventional notion of resistance perceives power as a manifestation of repression 
and aims to subvert this operation of power (the ontological ground for revolution), the 
attempt to deconstruct the existing order begins by perceiving power as a medium 
through which a new relationality can be rearranged and rearticulated. And for a new 
generation of contemporary choreographers, creating a new relationality begins by 
paying attention to the ‘internal cleavage’ within the position of mastery that is evident in 
the modern institution of dance.261 
In order for me to explain further what I mean by the ‘internal cleavage’ within 
the position of mastery, I need to take a detour via the term ‘internal cleavage’, which I 
borrow from Shoshana Felman’s The Scandal of the Speaking Body. This book was 
published in 1980, only a few years after Derrida wrote ‘Signature Event Context’.262 
Indebted to Derrida’s rereading of J. L. Austin’s speech act, which does not know the 
conventional hierarchy between speech and writing, Felman highlights the fact that a 
speech act is a bodily act that always ‘says’ too much or too little, more, or less, than it can 
ever know, or intend to say. In order to explain why the speaking body always says too 
much or too little, Felman pays attention to the concept of promise that serves as an 
important conceptual tool for Austin’s theory of speech act. Stanley Cavell, in the 
foreword to Felman’s book, also supports Felman’s reading of Austin, arguing that, for 
Austin, the act and concept of promising are not just yet more performative utterances, as 
                                         
261 Stanley Cavell, forward to The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or Seduction in 
Two Languages by Shoshana Felman, (Stanford: Stanford University, 2003), xiii. 
262 Ibid. 
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they are characterised by Austin’s followers. Cavell points out that Felman infers a subtle 
nuance that promising is somehow privileged in Austin’s view. Cavell explains that this 
privilege, detected by Felman, is evident in How to Do Things with Words, in which Austin 
identifies speaking as giving one’s word, as if ‘I promise’ implicitly resides in every act of 
speech.263 Yet what is particular about Felman’s reading of Austin is the fact that, for her, 
what sustains this concept of promising is not the achievement of a promise but the 
recursive failure inherent in the notion of any promise. This is what she refers to as an 
‘internal cleavage’ in the speaking body.264 In order to articulate further the ‘internal 
cleavage’ created by the notion of promise in Austin’s speech acts, Felman introduces 
Molie re’s Don Juan, who is a compulsive promise-maker, but at the same time a promise-
breaker. Because he is both promise-maker and breaker, he is a perfect manifestation of 
Austin’s ambiguous statement that all speech is a promise. Furthermore, if Don Juan’s 
compulsive act of promising is an illocutionary force, then the threats that he receives 
after breaking promises also constitute a sort of ‘negative promise’. This is what Felman 
explains: 
 
The conflict that opposes Don Juan to his pursuers thus opposes a promise to a 
threat – to a negative promise resulting from Don Juan’s failure to keep a positive 
promise, but also a positive promise not to fail to punish the failure to keep that 
promise.265 
 
                                         
263 Ibid., xiii–xiv. Here, Cavell argues that this view of Felman can challenge Derrida’s virulently influential 
reading of Austin’s sense of language as one that precisely fails to recognise the inherent, say internal, 
possibility of its failures. 
264 Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin or Seduction in Two 
Languages (Stanford: Stanford University, 2003), 3. 
265 Ibid., 12–13. 
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Thus, for Felman, Don Juan is a play about promising. But the paradox of a promise lies in 
the fact that the notion of promise not only brings about conflict but also structures it. In 
other words, the agonistic tension caused by the failure of a promise is a force that 
structures recursive repetition of conflict. It is in this context that Felman pays attention 
to the ‘internal cleavage’ inherent in the notion of promise. This internal cleavage is 
highlighted when Felman reminds us that it is ‘felicity’ or ‘infelicity’ that Austin deploys 
as criteria to decide whether a performative utterance is successful or not. Felman argues 
that, for Don Juan, felicity is nothing other than having ‘no more to say’. In this context, 
Felman argues that the act of promising, which was privileged by Austin, implies the 
capacity of language to fail, and to fall short of accomplishment. Felman argues that, ‘Like 
Don Juan, Austin suspects in his turn that the promise will not be kept, the debt not 
paid’.266 In this light, Felman argues: 
 
If the capacity for misfire is an inherent capacity of the performative, it is because 
the act as such is defined, for Austin, as the capacity to miss its goal and to fail to 
be achieved, to remain unconsummated, to fall short of its own accomplishment.267 
 
In recognising the capacity of speech acts to fail, Felman pays attention to the ‘bodily’ 
dimension of a performative utterance, as exemplified in Don Juan’s mouth that always 
says too much or too little, which the intention of a ‘sovereign’ subject cannot fully control. 
Therefore, Don Juan’s mouth is the ‘internal cleavage’ inherent in the sovereign subject. 
And this is the point that I wanted to arrive at after discussing Felman’s term ‘internal 
                                         
266 Ibid., 15, 46. 
267 Ibid., 55–56, emphasis in original. 
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cleavage’. 
In examining how contemporary choreographic experiments rearticulate the 
position of the choreographer-master, I have noticed that highlighting the infelicity of the 
speech acts of the choreographer-master has been one of the frequently detected 
strategies. In so doing, a new generation of choreographers demonstrate that the master’s 
commands, via speech acts, do not guarantee domination over the body of a pupil. It is 
not simply because the master’s power is not strong enough. Rather it reveals the fact that 
the position of mastery relies upon the felicity of the master’s speech acts, and this 
depends on the performance of the pupil. In other words, because it is the pupil who could 
produce felicitous speech acts of the master and the felicity of the master’s speech acts is 
what brings about the positionality of the mastery, it is ultimately the pupil who can 
effectuate, sustain, and legitimise the position of mastery. 
In this context, the conventional mode of resistance would have been focused on 
the pupil’s performance against the position of the mastery. However, what is evident in 
contemporary choreographic experiments is the fact that a new generation of 
choreographers pay attention to the internal cleavage inherent in the position of mastery 
in order to avoid the binary opposition between the master, who aims to sustain the 
power operation and the pupil, who subverts the existing power operation. The internal 
cleavage inherent in the position of the choreographer-master comes from the fact that it 
relies upon the bodily dimension of a performative utterance inherent in the speech acts 
of the choreographer-master, but this does not guarantee the felicity of the speech acts. 
As Don Juan’s speaking body allows Felman to highlight the fact that the speaking 
body is what ‘guarantees the failure of the speech act’, this new generation of 
choreographers highlight that the speaking body of the choreographer-master always 
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says too much and too little. This idiosyncratic understanding of the relationality between 
the speaking body and the performativity of the speech act, drawn out by Felman’s 
reading of Don Juan, I found to be parallel to Christine De Smedt’s choreographic portraits, 
discussed in Chapter 3, where the speaking body of the choreographer De Smedt fails to 
produce the felicity of the speech acts. 
 
What Makes Choreography a Truth Game? 
If Don Juan’s speech acts aim to achieve the state of marriage, which is never meant to be 
achieved, De Smedt’s speech act’s in Untitled 4 radically claim that she is Alain Platel, 
Jonathan Burrows, Eszter Salamon, and Xavier Le Roy, which we know from the beginning 
cannot be true. Therefore, as much as Don Juan, De Smedt’s speaking body is full of 
promises that cannot be met. And as much as Don Juan, De Smedt’s speaking body 
continues to speak, not because it manages to achieve what is promised, but because it 
fails to achieve what it promises to be. 
In examining the scandal of Christine De Smedt’s speaking body, I attempted to 
rethink the relationship between the body and the particular subjectivity that it claims to 
enact. The scandal of De Smedt’s speaking body stems from the fact that the only thing it 
guarantees is the failure of the speech acts that it promises, as De Smedt’s speaking body 
always claims to be someone else. But because the subjects whom De Smedt’s body claims 
to be are her long-time friends and colleagues, with whom she shares a mode of practice, 
the failure of the speech acts is not completely successful to some extent. In other words, 
what the scandal of De Smedt’s speaking body brings about is a truth game, whereby 
subjectivity is perceived as something that is open to constant reconstitution, rather than 
being a completed version. In other words, a body is a limit point where the truth game 
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of subjectivity is constantly taking place. 
The term ‘truth game’ comes from Michel Foucault’s lecture at Dartmouth College 
in 1980, which I summarised in Chapter 3. In his genealogical research on the formation 
of the subject in the West, Foucault attempts to open up new genealogical ground on 
which the formation of the subject in the West can be rethought. For Foucault, what is 
problematic in the formation of the subject in the Western school of philosophy lies in the 
fact that it is based on a dialectical structure through which a position of mastery is 
inevitably imposed. Foucault argues that the study of the subject in the French school of 
philosophy begins with Descartes and the Cartesian understanding of the subject which 
is based on a split subjectivity: the subject only comes into being via self-reflexive 
examination by a capital-S Subject. However, what is paradoxical lies in the fact that as 
opposed to the Cartesian claim of the subject as the foundation or origin, split subjectivity 
installs a capital-S Subject through which there is a master-subject who is internalised. 
Against this backdrop, Foucault’s genealogical research on the formation of the 
subject in the West exposes us to a different history of subject-making in the West. In 
briefly discussing how the formation of the subject was perceived as a truth game in 
classical antiquity, Foucault highlights the fact that the subject was not to be discovered 
but constituted, through the force of truth.268 In other words, truth is not a pregiven 
entity but a force that does not necessarily correspond with the reality. And if the force of 
truth constitutes the subject, subject-making is a truth game where the conception of the 
subject as the origin or foundation is no longer possible. 
Based on Foucault’s genealogical research, which enables us to perceive subject-
                                         
268 Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” 165. 
250 
 
making as a truth game, I aimed in Chapter 3 to find a theoretical ground on which I could 
articulate the choreographic production of subjectivity as a truth game. It is in this context 
that I aimed to juxtapose Foucault’s truth game with De Smedt’s choreographic portraits. 
When De Smedt’s speaking body claims to be Platel, Burrows, Salamon, and Le Roy on 
stage, what is highlighted is how De Smedt positions her speaking body at the limit of 
representation. De Smedt’s speaking body is no longer a faithful carrier of what it says or 
claims to be. In other words, De Smedt’s speaking body is presented as something that 
always speaks too much or too little. 
What De Smedt’s speaking body performs is based on her interviews with the 
choreographers whom she claims to be when performing on stage. But as I have already 
discussed, the speech acts of De Smedt’s speaking body never fail enough. For instance, in 
the last part of De Smedt’s choreographic portraits, when De Smedt claims to be a fellow 
choreographer, Xavier Le Roy, it is not easy to separate completely which part is De 
Smedt’s own understanding of Le Roy or how Le Roy might respond, and which part is 
actually from her interview with Le Roy. Therefore, although De Smedt failed to become 
Le Roy, as long as she managed not to fail completely what was staged was a truth game 
where the dialectical conception of the choreographer-subject is no longer available. 
This is how I aim to highlight the event of the speaking body that demonstrates the 
paradox within the positionality of the choreographer-master. Here, what I mean by the 
speaking body can also be understood as the writing body, as both speaking and writing 
are ultimately the act of inscription in a Derridean sense. Therefore, the event of the 
speaking body is the event of writing, through which choreography as the particular 
pedagogical technique is deployed to disturb the given positionality of the 
choreographer-master. Like Foucault’s truth game, De Smedt’s truth game is an attempt 
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to negate any instalment of the position of mastery in the production of subjectivity. And 
this problematisation of the position of mastery inherent in the subjectivity of the 
choreographer is what allowed me to expand the question of subjectivity to the problem 
of knowledge production in Chapter 4. 
 
What Makes Choreography Research? 
In Chapter 4, I sought to highlight the fact that the attempt to rearticulate the subjectivity 
of the choreographer in contemporary experiments implicates them in the problem of the 
system of knowledge production, as rethinking the positionality of mastery is a matter of 
knowledge production. In this context, I drew on the Foucauldian model of 
power/knowledge. As the solidus between power and knowledge illustrates, the 
Foucauldian model of power/knowledge articulates the interrelation between a 
particular operation of power and a specific system of knowledge. Foucault argues that 
the particular positionality of mastery is legitimised by a specific knowledge system 
through which knowledge is devised, internalised, and normalised. Hence, there is 
nothing surprising about the problematisation of the positionality of mastery within the 
Western model of the modern institution of dance, which led a new generation of 
choreographers to engage with the expanded issue of knowledge production in 
contemporary society. It is in this light that I engaged with Xavier Le Roy’s choreographic 
practices and attempted to highlight how his problematisation of the positionality of the 
choreographer-master implicates his practice with a wide range of issues concerning 
knowledge production in our time. 
Le Roy’s choreography often begins with a state of not-yet-knowing. And he is not 
reluctant to make it transparent on stage to the audience. Moreover, he is not afraid of 
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presenting an unresolved problem as it is. Instead of presenting himself as a 
choreographer-master or ultimate author, Le Roy welcomes an impossible goal. In fact, 
this is one of the common features often found among this new generation of 
choreographers that I have examined in this thesis. Instead of positioning themselves as 
the ultimate source of final production, they often present unresolved problems on stage. 
In doing so, they are willing to reveal the structure of the performance to the audience. 
This is a dramatic contrast to the modern system of knowledge, where particular ways of 
conceptualising a problem as well as solutions are located within a closed circuit. And this 
closed circuit presupposes the position of an author as a logocentric subject. It is in this 
light that I wanted to juxtapose the open-ended mode of knowledge production often 
found in contemporary choreographic experiments with the post-Fordist mode of 
production, whereby new epistemological paradigms, such as reflexivity, 
transdisciplinarity, and heterogeneity, have dramatically changed the structure, status, 
and shape of the modern knowledge system. Yet I do not mean to imply that the post-
Fordist mode of production is emancipatory per se. When Le Roy problematises a 
particular distribution of time in artistic production, which does not distinguish between 
leisure time and work time in Product of Other Circumstances (2009), he points out that 
this particular distribution of time means the artist works all the time. 
Nevertheless, what the post-Fordist mode of production challenges is the 
conventional understanding of professionalism devised and legitimised in the modern 
system of knowledge production. In highlighting the fact that our understanding of 
professionalism is based on the notion of virtuosos, Kai van Eikels, in ‘Learning From 
Xavier Le Roy Means Learning to Work. On Dilettantism and Professionalism in 21st 
Century Performance’, explains how the particular link between professionalism and the 
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virtuoso is a recent product. In his genealogical research on the term ‘virtuoso’, Van Eikels 
argues that from the Renaissance until the late eighteenth century, the term ‘virtuoso’ was 
not associated with values of extreme specialisation and professionalisation. Instead, the 
words ‘dilettante’ and ‘virtuoso’ were used synonymously, both referring to non-
professional forms of knowledge covering a wide range of affairs, from science to 
engineering, or crafts. For instance, Van Eikels explains that Goethe uses the term 
‘virtuoso’ in opposition to artistic genius to demonstrate a different understanding of the 
term. Goethe argues that the virtuoso-dilettante transforms ‘aesthetic pleasure’ into the 
‘pleasure of practice’. 269  Therefore, being a virtuoso-dilettante is far from being a 
professional artist. Instead, the virtuoso-dilettante is one who evokes the egalitarian 
message that everybody can become virtuosic. It was only in the nineteenth century and 
later that the term ‘virtuoso’ became disconnected from the term ‘dilettante’, and the 
virtuoso began to be associated with high-profile actors and performers. Therefore, Van 
Eikels argues that Le Roy’s reconfiguration of his position as choreographer and virtuoso-
dilettante in Product of Other Circumstances seeks to challenge the notion of 
professionalism as legitimised by the modern system of knowledge production. 
Moreover, in challenging the modern notion of professionalism whereby the 
positionality of mastery is legitimised and a particular pedagogy is normalised, Le Roy, in 
Product of Other Circumstances, sets himself the impossible goal of learning butoh by 
himself within just two hours. Van Eikels argues that Le Roy, in doing so, attempts to 
replace ‘the distribution of learning’ with ‘the distribution of teaching’, through which the 
unilateral positionality of the choreographer-master is challenged and replaced by an 
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ignorant choreographer who is determined to reinvent knowledge on his own terms. On 
stage, Le Roy shares with the audience how he decides to teach himself via resources 
available to anyone, such as YouTube clips, and books. For Le Roy, dance is no longer 
something to spend one’s entire life learning, following a master’s protocols, but rather 
something where everyone can be teacher and self-taught student. This shift in the 
positionality of mastery in knowledge production is, in fact, one of the strategies that the 
French philosopher Jacques Rancie re deployed in his archival research in the 1980s. 
For instance, in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, via the figure of Joseph Jacotot, a 
revolutionary teacher, Rancie re highlights the egalitarian mode of production of 
knowledge whereby the inequality between those who already know and those who do 
not even know what they do not know is no longer sustained in the name of knowledge 
distribution. Rancie re points out that what sustains the gap between schoolmaster and 
pupil is the ‘knowledge of ignorance’ that the schoolmaster possesses. What Rancie re 
means by ‘knowledge of ignorance’ is knowledge of the exact distance separating 
knowledge from ignorance. In other words, the position of mastery is sustained because 
the schoolmaster is the one who knows that the pupils do not know what they do not 
know. In this light, I examined Le Roy’s Le Sacre du Printemps (2007), in which Le Roy 
eradicates the play on the ‘knowledge of ignorance’, that determines the exact distance 
separating what he knows about the professional language of conducting and what he 
does not know. Instead, Le Roy transforms his ‘ignorance’ into a choreographic resource 
from which sequences of movements are generated. Thanks to his ignorance, for Le Roy 
the professional system of knowledge on conducting is not something to learn but 
something to be rearranged. And in rearranging this given system of knowledge, Le Roy 
tactically deploys choreography, the technique of generating movements, so that his 
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choreographic production no longer instils a position of mastery. This tactical subversion 
of the given positionality of mastery in the modern system of knowledge production I also 
find in many contemporary choreographic experiments, and this is why I articulate 
contemporary choreographic experiments as research projects that imply a state of not-
yet-knowing but already teaching. 
 
How Does Choreography Reinvent Spectatorship? 
In Chapter 5, I begin with Rancie re’s ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, in which he 
problematises the victimisation of spectatorship in the narratives of the historical avant-
garde. What he calls the victimisation of spectatorship is an important clue to explain the 
‘paradox of the spectator’ inherent in the historical reformers of theatre, where being a 
spectator is bad, but theatre cannot be sustained without spectatorship. For Rancie re, this 
preconception of spectatorship is problematic as it automatically imposes a position of 
mastery that is responsible for transforming bad spectators into good ones. In other 
words, what is central to the paradox of the spectator is a pedagogical impulse based on 
the presupposition of inferiorisation of the spectator. In order to explain further why this 
‘paradox of the spectator’ is problematic, Rancie re juxtaposes it with the paradox of 
pedagogical practice, where ‘knowledge of ignorance’ sustains the difference between a 
knowledgeable master and an ignorant pupil, instead of eradicating the gap. In creating 
this idiosyncratic juxtaposition, Rancie re aims to highlight the fact that the pedagogical 
impulse inherent in the demonisation of spectatorship in historical reformation projects 
in theatre does not transform the spectator, but sustains the inferior positionality of 
spectatorship. Therefore, while Rancie re attempts to reconfigure the subjectivity of 
masters via the ignorant schoolmaster in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, in ‘The Emancipated 
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Spectator’ he considers the possibility of reinventing a spectatorship that is not captured 
within the pedagogical impulse inherent in historical reformation projects. In so doing, 
Rancie re deconstructs the presuppositions that sustain the inferiorisation of the 
spectator. In arguing that the inferiorisation of spectators predetermines their 
positionality as the victims of theatrical spectacle, Rancie re points out that seeing does 
not imply passivity. In contrast to the term ‘spectator’, which epitomises the identification 
of those who only passively watch the spectacle in front of them, Rancie re argues that 
emancipating spectators is not to transform passive observers into active ones, but to blur 
the boundaries and presuppositions attached to spectators within a particular 
institutional logic. 
It is in this context that I argued that The Agora Project, initiated by Jan Ritsema 
and created with twenty artists, successfully escapes from the paradox of the spectator. 
By coming up with a structural composition constructed by multiple authors, it resists the 
given dichotomy between stage and auditorium. Moreover, by resisting succumbing to the 
normal dichotomy of bourgeois theatre, spectatorship is no longer captured within a 
conventional discourse that presupposes the inferiority of the spectator. Instead, both 
performer and spectator can be more than they are supposed to be. And when both 
performer and spectator take on more than their given roles, they produce a ‘space of 
appearance’ for each other. 
I have borrowed the term ‘space of appearance’ from Hannah Arendt’s discussion 
of the agora in The Human Condition. Arendt mentions the space of appearance when she 
conceptualises the polis as a space ‘where I appear to others as others appear to me, 
where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but to make their 
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appearance explicitly’.270 The reason why I pay attention to Arendt’s argument in the first 
place is the fact that the space of appearance is not something given but something to be 
created by active intervention from a political actor as a form of subjectivisation. This is 
why Arendt argues that such a public space of appearance can always be open to 
recreation, wherever individuals gather together politically. This is why I deployed the 
term ‘space of appearance’ when articulating the way in which The Agora Project was 
organised, one that allowed the spectators to be more than passive spectators, to the point 
that the spectators took the place of performers and performers took the place of 
spectators. In this open-ended process of making theatre, there are no longer 
emancipated spectators (who have been emancipated by a pedagogical programme) but 
rather ‘virtuoso-dilettante spectators’ so that the pleasure of practice of spectators can be 
fulfilled. 
But what should be noticed here is a subtle but definite difference between the 
space of appearance brought about by the virtuoso-dilettante spectator, and Arendt’s 
notion of the space of appearance. For Arendt, the space of appearance is a public space 
that is constituted by individual political actors, and it presupposes some type of totality 
of experience. 271  This totality of experience comes from the reciprocal reversibility 
presupposed in Arendt’s articulation of the stage of appearance for a political actor. In 
explaining the reciprocity inherent in Arendt’s conception of the space of appearance, 
Elena Tavani in ‘Hannah Arendt – Aesthetics and Politics of Appearance’ argues that one 
of the main aesthetic-political characteristics of Arendt’s stage of appearance is her 
understanding of the aesthetic nature of perception in the most immediate and literal 
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sense of aisthesis. Tavani contends that this immediate sense of aisthesis presupposes a 
principle of reversibility that underlines its plurality. In this light, Tavani points out that, 
for Arendt, perceiving is always divided and shared at the same time. In other words, 
perception is the possibility of ‘seeing and being seen’. This means that the world as a 
stage of appearance consists of a plurality of viewpoints and a stage of appearance 
becomes a place not only for displaying a visible political actor, but also a place for him to 
see other political actors. Hence, the space of appearance is where we witness and are 
witnessed from all sorts of different perspectives.272 
The space of appearance that emerges in The Agora Project, however, does not 
guarantee reciprocal reversibility between actor and spectator. Both actor and spectator 
are allowed to be more than they are supposed to be, but this occurs spontaneously and 
contingently, with unexpected intervals between what is planned and what happens. 
Neither is formed by the ‘agreement of many wills and intentions’, as is the case for 
Arendt’s space of appearance. Instead, opening up a space of appearance for other bodies 
via choreography does not presuppose reciprocal reversibility. The reason why this space 
of appearance does not guarantee reciprocal reversibility is because the choreographic 
body that emerges in this space of appearance cannot be identified in terms of Arendt’s 
political actor, who is an autonomous, individual entity who becomes a basic unit for the 
total sum of the world. Then, the question to be asked is how does the choreographic body 
differ from the political actors who become the basis for Arendt’s conception of the space 
of appearance? And what does it mean to say that the choreographic body does not 
guarantee reciprocal reversibility but is more than what it is supposed to be? 
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How Does Choreography Reinvent the body as an Event? 
In an attempt to highlight a situation where we become aware of the emergence of a 
‘choreographic body’, I brought up Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker’s recent exhibition 
Work/Travail/Arbeid (2015) in Chapter 6. Here, De Keersmaeker recreates the 
spatiotemporal condition of dance by radically displacing the given condition that has 
made dance dance within a specific institutional framework, to the point that she no 
longer claims it to be dance-theatre but an exhibition. For instance, because 
Work/Travail/Arbeid is an exhibition, it has to be open for seven hours, every day, for 
more than nine weeks. This particular spatiotemporal condition in an exhibition context 
predetermines a particular spatiotemporal condition for De Keersmaeker’s dancers, 
whereby no frontality is guaranteed as visitors are free to move around whenever and 
wherever they want. And the ways in which De Keersmaeker deals with the displacement 
of the spatiotemporal condition of dance becomes the very structure of her choreographic 
experiment of rewriting dance-theatre as exhibition. 
In rewriting dance as exhibition, De Keersmaeker also disturbs the given condition 
both for being a spectator in a theatre context and a visitor in an exhibition context. In 
Work/Travail/Arbeid, what emerges is the spectator-visitor who has to adopt a situation 
that is neither exhibition nor theatre. And this spectator-visitor is constantly disturbed 
by unexpected situations and contingent encounters with the dancers and with other 
spectators. For instance, despite the fact that I, as a spectator-visitor to De Keersmaeker’s 
exhibition, tried to limit the exposure of my own body, I found my body being constantly 
located in the space of appearance. This is because De Keersmaeker’s dancers are located 
in an exhibition context in which no particular spatial focal point is guaranteed, unlike the 
black-box situation, so that every spot is a potential spot for action. Moreover, when my 
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body as a spectator-visitor appeared in the space of appearance, the attention supposedly 
paid to the dancers was inevitably distracted and dispersed. This dispersion of attention 
no longer secured the specifically idealised representation of space-time sustained in 
either the black box or the white cube. In this context, what is highlighted in De 
Keersmaeker’s choreographic experiment is the emergence of a choreographic body 
instead of a spectator-body or a dancer-body. In De Keersmaeker’s rewriting of dance as 
exhibition, the normative imperative that falls upon the spectator-body, of ‘being there 
without being there’ as devised and legitimised in either the black box or the white cube, 
is no longer sustainable. In other words, when the ontological condition of being a 
spectator-visitor is contaminated, what we witness is the emergence of a choreographic 
body, where being a body becomes an event of being with other bodies. This is why the 
coming into being of choreographic bodies cannot be planned ahead of time. 
In this context, I attempted to take a detour via Nancy’s articulation of the body 
as a limit in order to lay a theoretical ground on which choreographic bodies can be 
articulated. Perceiving the body as a limit challenges the classical ontology of the body 
within the logic of representation. The body is not a mere object, as it is constructed 
within discourse or within a social symbolic order, nor is it simply a material reality that 
is indifferent to the process of signification. Going beyond both materialisation and 
signification, for Nancy the body comes into being at the limit point, at which ‘sense and 
matter touch or come into contact’.273 And this body’s coming into being at the limit 
manifests itself as an event whose coming and slipping away cannot be announced prior 
to its arrival. This is why one’s experience of the body is something that can never be 
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completed. Only by the fragmentary experience via touching can we have an experience 
of the body. 
Nancy’s rethinking of the body as something coming into being as an event, instead 
of being already there, allows him to put forward an argument that the body is a space 
itself. Here, the space does not refer to a ‘three-dimensional extension as measured by 
geometry’. Instead, space is a spacing of space, or an espacement, that already implies a 
‘spatial-temporal unfolding’.274 Therefore, the choreographic body is a choreographic 
space where both body and space cannot be delimited as an essence or finality. This shift 
from the discursive body to the choreographic body also emphasises that the body’s 
coming into being always implies the state of ‘being-with’. The choreographic body comes 
into being when it is with other bodies. What I wish to highlight here is the fact that the 
emergence of the choreographic body/space is not necessarily limited to the disciplinary 
boundaries of dance. In other words, thinking about the body in terms of a choreographic 
body/space has political implications that go beyond the institution of dance. In fact, 
highlighting this was one of my aims when embarking on a whole series of theoretical 
journeys through the notion of choreography. 
Choreography was invented as a pedagogical technique in the institutionalisation 
of dance. However, in an attempt to rethink the hierarchies and the position of mastery 
within the institution of dance, contemporary choreographic experiments demonstrate a 
different possibility of choreography, whereby the technique of signifying the body in 
relation to other bodies is deployed to bring about the choreographic body that always 
already implies the state of ‘being-with’ other bodies.  
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In highlighting the deconstructive mode of operation evident in contemporary 
choreographic experiments, I have attempted to describe this different possibility of 
choreography via the term choreo-graphy. Choreo-graphy is neither the name of a genre 
nor a form of artistic practices. As the event of writing, choreo-graphy signifies a body in 
relation to other bodies that is not captured within the pedagogical logic. Instead, this 
process of signification is open to contingent encounters, as being a choreographic body 
always already implies the state of ‘being-with’. Challenging the system of representation 
that sustains the particular pedagogical logic, the choreographic body can be understood 
as a radical opening from the dogmatic paradigm of the social and political body based on 
the idea of totality. The choreographic body can never be accumulated and summed up, 
as it always speaks/writes too much or too little. 
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